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THE IMPACT OF NATURALIZATION ON CIVIC INTEGRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON TCNs IN ITALY

Ph.D Dissertation

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“Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood. Now is the time to understand more, so that we may fear less.”

- Marie Curie

Abstract:

The main objective of this dissertation is that of exploring the relationship between *naturalization* and *civic integration* from an empirical standpoint. Most existing studies have focused on the impact of naturalization on the specifically *economic* dimension of integration, whereas the *non-economic* aspects have been much more neglected. Here the question of the impact of naturalization is developed with regards to *first-generation, third-country nationals* (TCNs) residing *in Italy*, and focusing the attention on *civic* integration. The latter is provided a working definition characterized by three dimensions ("vertical", "horizontal" and "subjective"). The research is based on interviews with fifty individuals carried out between 2012 and 2014. Interviews featured both a structured questionnaire and an open-ended talk. The methodology of analysis of the data was both quantitative and qualitative. The objective of mixing the two methods was to enable me, on the one hand, to define the relationship between the "citizenship variable" and the other main ones, and on the other, to gather a deeper understanding the mechanisms at work behind the process of integration in relation to citizenship acquisition. Overall, this research finds that notwithstanding the pervasive effects on the economic, social and political life that globalization, deterritorialization and increased cross-country mobility have had on nation-states and on individuals living within their borders, national citizenship is still a powerful drive in shaping first-generation immigrants' chances for civic integration into the host country.

Key Words: Naturalization; Civic integration; Citizenship; Immigration; Third-Country Nationals (TCNs).

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Synthesis

The main objective of this dissertation has been that of exploring the relationship between *naturalization* and *civic integration* from an empirical standpoint. There already exists a number of empirical studies concerning such relationship, most of which focus on the impact of naturalization on the specifically *economic* dimension of integration. These studies feature pretty homogenous results, showing that naturalization generally *does* have a positive effect on economic integration. The studies that investigate the *non*-economic dimensions of integration (social, cultural, civic) instead are fewer and have generally produced much more heterogeneous results. This is especially true for what concerns studies on the case of Italy, where the lack of any systematic contribution on this area denotes the scarce attention that is generally paid to the role of naturalization policies in the process of integration of immigrants.

In this research the question of the impact of naturalization on civic integration is developed in particular with regards to *first-generation, third-country nationals* (TCNs) residing *in Italy*. Civic integration is given a working definition characterized by three dimensions ("vertical", "horizontal" and "subjective"), each of which corresponds to a set of variables which ultimately make up an index of civic integration. The research is based on interviews with fifty individuals carried out between 2012 and 2014. Interviews featured both a structured questionnaire and an open-ended talk in which individuals were free to elaborate on the topics suggested by the interviewer. The respondents, all of whom belong to one of the five main non-EU foreign communities in Italy, have been divided into two main groups, whose main difference consisted the fact of holding (or not) Italian citizenship. The two groups were characterized by internal heterogeneity (in terms of levels of education, religion, background, origin, place of residence), but they were specular to the other group. The methodology of analysis of the data was both quantitative and qualitative. The objective of mixing such two methods was to enable me, on the one hand, to define the relationship between the "citizenship variable" and the other main ones, and on the other, to gather a deeper understanding the mechanism at work behind the process of integration in relation to citizenship acquisition. Due to the small interview sample size, and to the use of a single observation site (the Lazio region), the present study does not intend to make universal claims. Rather, the research should be read as a single puzzle piece that can be used to enhance knowledge building on a much neglected topic.

Overall, this research finds that notwithstanding the pervasive effects on the economic, social and political life that globalization, deterritorialization and increased cross-country mobility have had on nation-states and on individuals living within their borders, citizenship is still a powerful drive in

shaping first-generation immigrants' chances for civic integration into the host country. Individuals who have acquired citizenship have been here observed as having better records in terms of *two out of three* of the main indicators that have been used to operationalize the concept of civic integration. In this light, I argue that the formal recognition of membership that comes with citizenship acquisition eases those material and immaterial barriers that make it difficult for the individual to experience a sense of belonging to the society. The empirical findings give rise to a number of considerations which oppose me to post-nationalists (of various kind) who argue that citizenship has lost its centrality in shaping individuals' attachments, identifications and life paths.

My argument about the persistent centrality of citizenship is *not* meant as a normative stance. I do not mean this dissertation as a conservative defense of the old national categorizations on who is a member and who is not. Neither was this research aimed at defending the current status quo in terms of citizenship policies and legislation in Italy or elsewhere in Europe. Rather, its main objective was that of understanding what is the impact of the current status quo in terms of citizenship policies on immigrants' ability to integrate in their host society. The focus was therefore not so much that of indicating the moral, ethical and practical concerns which should be taken into consideration while designing new public policies for citizenship acquisition, but rather, that of detecting how the relationship between citizenship and integration works within the current state of affairs.

The dissertation has been structured into six main chapters, plus an introduction and a conclusion. The six chapters correspond to three different levels of analysis: a theoretical level, an empirical level and an analytical one. The aim of the two chapters in the *theoretical* part was to provide a definition and a contextualization of the two main concepts that make up the research question and around which the dissertation is build, that is, namely, "civic integration" (Chapter 1) and "citizenship" (Chapter 2). The *empirical* level also consisted in two chapters accounting for the methodology (Chapter 3) and the empirical study itself (Chapter 4). The third and last part deals with what I called the *analytical* level, a part of the dissertation in which the results of the empirical study and a number of issues connected to them are discussed with a broader level of abstraction. In particular, Chapter 5 discusses the results of the empirical study in light of post-national membership theories, whereas Chapter 6 discusses the impact of the EU on member-states' integration regimes, arguing that significant homogenization has not taken place yet. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 represent the core of the study.

Introduction

I. Questions, aims and context

The main objective of this dissertation has been that of exploring the relationship between naturalization and integration from an empirical standpoint. As Ersanilli and Koopmans (2010, 776-7) correctly indicate, the question of the relationship between naturalization and immigrant integration generally conceals two, analytically distinguishable questions: (a) Does naturalization correspond to effective integration?; (b) Should naturalization be employed as a tool or a reward for integration?. The two questions might be interrelated but involve different objects and strategies of investigation. The first involves an evaluation of the actual levels of integration of naturalized individuals, which might be carried out through a comparison between individuals who have naturalized and individuals who have not. The second has to do with a comparison of public policies between countries which feature different extents of liberalization of their citizenship policies. The present work has been primarily focused on the first question.

There already exists a number of empirical studies on the issue of the relationship between naturalization and integration. For reasons linked to data availability and clarity of the concepts, however, most of them focus on the impact of naturalization on the specifically *economic* dimension of integration (Fougère and Safi, 2008; Mazzolari, 2006; Bratsberg *et al.*, 2002; Steinhardt, 2008; Bevelander and Veenman, 2006a; Le Grand and Szulkin, 2002; Chiswick, 1978; Eurostat, 2011; Bauböck *et al.*, 2013; MPG and ISMU, 2013). These studies feature pretty homogenous results, showing that naturalization *does* have a positive effect on economic integration, as indeed it often coincides with enhanced participation in the labor market, higher wage levels and lower over-qualification rates. The studies that investigate the other dimensions of integration (social, cultural, civic) are instead fewer and have generally produced much more heterogeneous results (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010; Bevelander and Veenman, 2006b; Messina, 2006; OECD, 2011). The great heterogeneity is very much dependent on the fact that, fist, each study has its own particular focus (social/cultural/linguistic/civic integration), second, the concepts employed are most often operationalized and measured in different ways, and third, the objects of the investigation vary (all immigrants; immigrants with a specific origin; first or second generation; immigrants from a specific region within a certain country of origin, etc.). The issue of the relationship between naturalization and the non-economic aspects of integration therefore remains overall very much unexplored. This is especially for what concerns the case of Italy, where the lack

of any systematic contribution on this specific area denotes the scarce attention that is generally paid to the role of naturalization policies in the process of integration of immigrants.

In this research the theme of the impact of naturalization on the integration is developed in particular with regards to *non-European*, *first-generation* immigrants living *in Italy*, and delimiting the attention to specifically *civic* kind of integration. Civic integration is given a working definition characterized by three dimensions (vertical, horizontal and subjective), each of which corresponds to a set of measurable variables which ultimately make up a sort of "index of civic integration". The research is based on a both quantitative and qualitative methods of empirical analysis. Structured, semi-structured and open interviews with foreign-born representative individuals have been carried out in the years between 2012 and 2014 to, on the one hand, define the relationship between the "citizenship variable" and the others, and on the other, gather a deeper understanding the mechanism at work behind the process of integration in relations to the fact of having acquired (or not) host country citizenship. For this purpose, selected interviewees have been divided into two main groups, whose main difference was the fact of holding or not Italian citizenship. The two groups were characterized by internal heterogeneity (in terms of levels of education, religion, background, origin, place of residence), which is specular to that of the other group.

The results show that naturalization has a positive impact – although to a different degree – on two out of three dimensions of civic integration, that is, namely, on the horizontal (social and interethnic contacts) and the subjective (identification and feeling of belonging) aspects. Integration in those two areas is also strongly positively correlated to another variable, namely, the fact of being married to a "local". The vertical aspect of integration (knowledge and information about the country political and social life), on the contrary, does not appear to have any significant relationship with naturalisation; rather, it seems to be much more closely related to a high level of instruction. It also emerged from the study that, while citizenship is in the great majority of cases picked up for reasons that are instrumental in nature, citizenship is then likely to transform, for its beholder, into something which also has a non-instrumental value after having acquired it. Based on these overall results, the central claim made in this thesis is that naturalization appears to work as an accelerator of the process of integration: something that helps and incentivizes immigrants to stand for their rights and feel part of the society in which they live.

II. The empirical study

The study on the effects of naturalization on integration has been carried out through an empirical research on *non-European*, *first-generation* immigrants living *in Italy*, and delimiting the attention to specifically *civic* kind of integration. In what follows, I give an account of the reasons why I have decided to set those boundaries to the research. I will answer five key questions, in the following order: why Italy, why non-EU immigrants, why third-country nationals, why civic integration.

i. Why Italy?

The above headline conceals two analytically separate questions. The first one is about the reasons why I chose Italy as the focus on my research; the second one is about the reasons why I chose *only* Italy as the focus of my research. In the first case my answer will have to deal with the reasons why I think that the case of Italy is more important or representative than that of another country; in the second, instead, I will have to justify why I think that the best way to go about making the point I want to make is by focusing on one, single country, rather than for example undertaking a comparative analysis between two or more.

First question. The main reason why I think that Italy is a particularly important case for a research about the relationship between naturalisation and integration is that it represents a very emblematic case of a country which not only *does not encourage* immigrant naturalization, but actually has a tendency to even *obstacle* it. The reasons for it are rooted both in the nature of the naturalization law itself, as well as in the complications (mainly of bureaucratic nature, but not only) that immigrants encounter during the naturalization procedures. The naturalisation law of the country (law 91/1992) dates back to the time when Italy was still primarily a country of emigrants, and since then, the political élites have not been able to significantly reform it.[1] The requirements that it sets for non-European, first-generation immigrants to become Italian citizenship are very strict, requiring that they can only apply for after 10 years of regular residence and when they can proved of having had a sufficient salary level for the three years before the application. The naturalization procedure is then further complicated by other obstacles of primary bureaucratic nature, such as those requiring the individuals to get some identity documents from the country of origin, and to go through an informal language test the passing of which is subjected to discretionary judgment of the policeman in charge at the police station.

[1] Recent reform proposals explicitly targeting *second-generation* immigrants appear to be increasingly gaining momentum. However, at the time of writing, no significant consensus exists on the eventuality of a reduction of the years of residence for *first-generation* immigrants.

The result of all of this is that Italy has one of the lowest naturalization rates in Europe: 17% against a EU15 average of 34% (MPG and ISMU, 2013). Among those who succeed in naturalizing, the majority of them has been reserved the preferential treatment that Italy accords to those who prove to have Italian ancestors, or else to spouses and family members of Italian citizens. In Italy the naturalization rate is so low that, differently from the majority of other EU countries, the naturalization rates of non-EU citizens is lower than that of EU citizens.



Figure 1. Foreign-born persons by country. Source: http://eudocitizenship.eu/indicators

Another reason for choosing to pick up Italy is that there seem to exist very few empirical data on immigrant integration in that country, and this is especially true for what concerns the matter of the effects of naturalization on immigrant inclusion. Finally, Italy was also chosen as the main research site due to my personal ties with the city and the presence of local gatekeepers that attempted, albeit most of the times unsuccessfully, to provide me with easy access to the field and to a good number of interviewees.

Second question: why did I not choose an inter-European comparative approach for studying the effects of naturalization on integration. Here the answer is double-sided. One the one hand, there are the methodological difficulties related to cross-country comparisons. As it is explained in greater detail in the chapter on methodology (Chapter 3), in order to test my hypothesis I needed to select individuals with a specific set of characteristics in terms of age, gender, country of origin, instruction and background, whom I would have then divided into two specular group, where the only difference distinguishing individuals from one group from those of the other would have been

the fact of possessing (or not) host-country citizenship. Now, the sought specularity, which is *per se* already problematic to produce due to the intrinsic peculiarity of each individual *vìs à vìs* the others, would be even more difficult to reproduce on a cross-country basis, as the latter situation would have introduced a number of new variables which would have been particularly hard to control. The point, as I anticipated, will be made cleared after reading the chapter devoted to methodology. The main idea, though, is that choosing the comparative approach would have complicated the analysis in an unnecessary way. The second reason for focusing on Italy alone is linked to the first one but has a higher degree of abstraction. It is the issue of the profound differences that still characterize the immigrant integration regimes of the main European receiving countries.[2] As opportunities for immigrant integration might vary, even consistently, according to variations in the institutional setting of the receiving country, the persistent divergence of the integration regimes in the various EU countries would have made it even more difficult to "neutralize" the possible intervening factors and isolate the "citizenship variable".

The fact of keeping my main focus on Italy, however, does not imply that the study is just blind with respects to the larger European panorama. I do not pretend the analysis to stand in a vacuum. Reference to other EU-states' immigration and integration policies is indeed constant throughout the dissertation, both with regards to the different immigration regimes embraced by the other countries, and with regards to the more general discourse on immigrants' integration.

ii. Why non-European immigrants?

The idea of focusing only on non-European immigrants is explained by at least two, different, but strictly interconnected reasons. The first one is that the Italian naturalisation law, just like all European ones, foresees different paths for the naturalization of EU and non-EU citizens. The most evident aspect of the difference is that citizens of another EU country can become Italian after 4 years of legal permanent residence, whereas for non-EUs the required period of residency is more than doubled (10 years). Such difference in timing has an immensely different impact on both the psychological aspects of the life of the immigrant, as well as on the more pragmatic ones.

Another worth mentioning aspect of the difference between EU and non-EU immigrants is that the first groups has a quasi-immediate access to vote (local and European elections), whereas for non-EUs the acquisition of such right is not as straightforward, and made to depend on local-based decisions. This represents another important formal difference that certainly has an

[2] In Chapter 6 the persisting differences among EU countries in terms of immigrant incorporation regimes are illustrated and discussed into detail.

immediate impact on the life of the migrants. But there is also another aspect accounting for the profound differences between a EU immigrant and a non-EU, which makes up for the second reason why I decided that my research will be focusing on the second group of immigrants only. This has to deal with the fact that EU citizens, however immigrants, can more and more enjoy the feeling of belonging, although in a non-traditional way, even in another EU country thanks to the growing EU unification rhetoric and practices. This more informal, but still substantive difference between the status of EU and non-EU immigrants makes up for very heterogeneous highways of integration which have little in common and therefore deserve to be treated separately.

The point of distinguishing between EU and non-EU (or extra-EU) immigrants is therefore that the first can easily be considered a "smoother" kind of immigration. Although still implying some extent of integration efforts on both the individual immigrant and the receiving society, inter-EU integration definitely puts far less stress on the interested parties mainly because of all the privileges and protections that EU citizens do enjoy.

iii. Why first-generation immigrants?

Just as I believed it fundamental to separate third-country nationals from their European counterparts by virtue of the very different challenges that they face in the process of integration, the same reasoning applies to first and second-generation immigrants. The two categories are fundamentally different for a significant number of reasons, among which, very importantly, the fact that while first-generations have chosen to emigrate, the situation of second-generation immigrants is often a product of their parents' choice to which they had no role in participating[3]. The consequence of this is that while for first generations the country of immigration does not coincide with the place in which their socialization has taken place, for second-generations it does, because that is where they have been (at least partially) schooled and raised. It follows from this that first-generations face extremely different challenges than second-generations, which makes it fundamental for the two groups to be treated separately.

In this sense, I maintain that first generation immigrants are the only "real" newcomers to the society, in that second-generations cannot be considered as absolute strangers to the country in which they have grown up, and which has at least partially contributed to their social and cultural formation. For this reason, it think that the argument according to which that the real effectiveness of state integration policies has to be measured in terms its impact on second generations is

misleading. First, because it leads us to consider the integration of first-generations as not crucial for the host society, which does not correspond to the reality, in that from the state's ability to include them into society depends, to some significant extent, its stability and prosperity[4]. Secondly, because the integration of second-generations might in some cases be connected with the experience of their parents, in that if their parents have lived in a condition of pure marginality in the host country, their own experience would be marked by it.

iii. Why civic integration?

The research is focused on the specifically civic aspect of integration, leaving the other possible ones aside. This decision depends on two considerations. The first is purely methological. Selecting and isolating one specific aspect of integration makes it possible to build a more transparent and coherent "integration index" to test against empirical data, which could not be as efficiently defined if we were to include every single aspect of integration. This is especially true if we consider that "integration" represents one of those essentially contested concepts whose boundaries and definition are always blurred.

The second, and probably most relevant reason for focusing on the civic dimension of integration specifically is that the field seems to have not been explored much so far. In contrast to the specifically economic dimension of integration, which has received much scholarly attention (Fougère and Safi, 2008; Mazzolari, 2006; Bratsberg *et al.*, 2002; Steinhardt, 2008; Bevelander and Veenman, 2006a; Le Grand and Szulkin, 2002; Chiswick, 1978; Eurostat, 2011; Bauböck *et al.*, 2013; MPG and ISMU, 2013), civic integration has remained on the side. This has been largely the case due to fact that the non-economic aspects in general, and civic one in particular, pose much more complex problems tied to data availability and collection, as well as concepts' operationalization. This is what in large part explains why, as underlined above, the studies that *do* investigate the different non-economic dimensions of integration have generally produced very heterogeneous results (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010; Bevelander and Veenman, 2006b; Messina, 2006; OECD, 2011), ultimately not being able to give significant impulse to the process of academic knowledge buildup in this area. The marginality of the studies in this area is however in profound contrast with the empirical reality of every European society, where the greatest challenge

[3] Even when forced to emigrate by war, poverty or marginalization, for first-generation immigrants emigration still represents a choice in the broad sense of the word, in that they were active protagonists of a migratory plan of which instead second-generations have only dealt with the consequences of.

[4] A more detailed account on the reasons why the integration of first-generations is important for the host country can be found in Chapter 1, section 1.4 ("Why is [integration] a desirable goal").

to be faced by governments and society at large is that of inclusion of foreign-born residents first and foremost at the specifically civic level.

III. Structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is structured into six main chapters, plus an introduction and a conclusion. The six chapters are divided up into three parts, each of which is composed of two chapters. The first part features the *theoretical* level. The aim of this part is to provide a definition and a contextualization of the two main concepts that make up the research question, that is, namely, "civic integration" (Chapter 1) and "citizenship" (Chapter 2). The second part features the *empirical* level, that is, a chapter on methodology (Chapter 3) and one on the empirical study itself (Chapter 4). The third and last part deals with what I called the *analytical* level, in which the implications of the results of the empirical study are discussed with a broader level of abstraction to touch on a number of related topics. In particular, this part features a discussion of the results of the empirical study in light of post-national membership theories (Chapter 5), and a discussion of the impact of the EU on member-states' integration policies (Chapter 6). Chapters 3, 4 and 5 represent the core of the research. The last chapter (Chapter 7) draws some important overall conclusions.

1. Defining (Civic) Integration[5]

Defining terms is of crucial importance for any analytical study, as it allows to specify the concept under analysis by drawing its boundaries and indicating the domains of its application. Definitions are particularly crucial when dealing with highly abused concepts which, as in the case of the notion of integration, find a quite wide variety of definitions in the existing literature. This operation is particularly crucial in the case of *empirical* studies, since depending on how the concept is defined, the results vary, sometimes even to a large extent.

The present chapter is structured as follows. First of all, a broad conceptualization of the concept of integration in general is provided (sections 1.1 and 1.2). This conceptualization also takes into account how the concept has developed in the history of modern political thought. From the concept of integration generally understood, the focus is then moved to the specifically *civic* dimension of integration (sect. 1.3), which is the core of the present research. The definition of the latter is crucial for the development of the empirical analysis in the following chapters, as it represents the basis for its operationalization. The fourth and final section (1.4) is aimed at providing reasons for considering integration in general, and civic integration in particular, as important from the point of view of the host society.

1.1 What integration is not

The concept of integration belongs to the group of essentially contested concepts (Gallie, 1956). The latter includes all of those mostly qualitative, evaluative notions which, lacking a tight link to empirical reality, are often source of strong discussions in the context of the definition of their meaning. Notions such as "justice", "liberty" and even "art" are most common examples of members of this group. While there is no doubt that the term "chair" might be used in reference to a piece of furniture made for human sitting, the use of more abstract terms such as that of "integration" appears to leave a larger margin for interpretation and discussion. In the latter case confusion originates over the phenomenon to which the term refers and the context in which its use might apply appropriately. The confusion is then magnified in the realm of common language, where misuse of these types of concepts is highly diffused.

[5] An earlier version of this chapter has been published as Silvia Cavasola (2013) "Meaning and Importance of Civic Integration", *Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies*, n.190, pp. 316-332. ISSN 0039-2936

If one makes a brief survey of how the term "integration" is employed in the political and media realm, in Italy as well as in most of the other EU countries, s/he will find out that the term is very often confused with a range of other terms which are taken to be its synonyms. The most common among these terms are "coexistence", "tolerance" and "assimilation", with which the notion of integration is commonly used interchangeably. Another common mistake is that of referring to the concept of integration as if the latter was a state of things, a status quo. Finally, the term integration is often wrongly assumed to be the direct result of one or more political decrees.

Let us start with order in explaining why all of the above common language uses of the term integration are superficial and mistaken. A first important distinction is that between the terms coexistence and integration. In this case the etymology of the two words is of great help in spelling out the difference. Co-existing (from the Latin verb *coëxistĕre*) literally means "to exist with", and it points to the situation in which two or more individuals or communities live together at the same time. The situation described by the term is one in which interaction does not necessarily occur, as the two or more entities, which happen to be present within a single space and historical moment, could simply virtually ignore the presence of the other. In the case of the term "coexistence", the difference from that of "integration" is therefore quite straightforward. In the latter the prefix "inter" indeed clearly points to a reciprocal penetration of two or more realities, a phenomenon that transcends the mere juxtaposition of different entities. Coexistence in this context can at best be understood as a precondition for the process of integration to start, but is far from coinciding with the process itself.

Distinguishing the notion of integration from that of "tolerance" is instead somewhat less straightforward. The main challenge here resides in the fact that the meaning of tolerance is itself a disputed question (Cofrancesco, 1996). The notion of tolerance owes what is perceived as quite a high degree of ambiguity to the fact of carrying different implications depending on how it is conceived. Tolerance can indeed be understood, on the one hand, in its most feeble version, as the mere acceptance of differences; on the other hand, in its stronger version, as the willingness not only to accept and understand the different positions of others, but also to go as far as to guarantee them protection (La Torre, 2000; Bobbio, 2007; Veca, 2007).The weak interpretation of the notion of tolerance is clearly far from coinciding with the notion of integration. In this version tolerance simply means that the majoritarian group is willing to accept, within arbitrarily and unilaterally-defined limits, the implications deriving from the presence of minority groups in the larger community. It is therefore clear that the mere acknowledgment of the presence of different values and conceptions of the good does not by itself involve or produce any mutual penetration of such different realities. The stronger version of tolerance might instead appear to have greater

resemblance to the concept of integration. Yet, toleration conceived as recognition and protection of the (cultural, ethnic, religious) difference appears to be more in line with an integration *strategy*, or model, than with the notion of integration itself. Toleration as protection is, in other words, be better conceptualized as a specific integration policy, and in this sense does not coincide with the process of integration itself. Once again, as in the case of the term "coexistence", we might say that toleration could at best be conceived as a prerequisite for the process of integration to start, but does not coincide with integration itself.

A further important distinction to be made is that between the concept of integration and that of assimilation (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994). The term assimilation literally indicates the attempt to make somebody resemble somebody else; it involves the complete disavowal of an external identity in favor of another, most commonly the mainstream one (Zincone, 1992, 243-4). It signals a phenomenon of total and unconditional embracement of the majoritarian culture at the expense of one's own, which in turn gets, if not completely abandoned, at least postponed to the language, traditions and lifestyles of the host country one (IOM, 2014). The relation in which the concept of assimilation stands with the process of integration can be conceived as one of dependency. Assimilation is a phenomenon that occurs, or rather *might* occur, at some point of the process of integration; it is a possible ultimate development of such process. Assimilation therefore does not coincide with integration: it goes beyond it.



The above scheme also speaks about the different nature of the two concepts. While integration is a process, assimilation, although it might be progressive in some cases, is ultimately an outcome, a status quo, a precise and identifiable condition. The idea of integration as a process will be better elaborated in the following section (1.2). For now it is important to point out that it is another common language mistake to refer to integration as if it was itself an outcome, a status quo. Dynamism is an intrinsic characteristic of the process of integration, which makes it virtually impossible to contrast a group of supposedly "integrated" individuals versus a group of "non-integrated" individuals. It is in fact more appropriate to speak of *degrees* of integration, so as to highlight the inherent progressiveness of the phenomenon (Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2007, 21).

The intrinsic dynamism of the progress of integration is also part of the reason why it is fundamentally incorrect to conceive integration as the direct outcome of a legislative decree or a political move. While phenomena such as, for example, equal job opportunities for male and female can happen to be the direct consequence of a governmental decree, ranging from sanctions to quotas, the same cannot happen for integration, which requires instead that whatever measures are taken meet a positive response from the environment. Integration cannot be deliberated. The phenomenon is rather to be conceived as the indirect consequence of an x political strategy undertaken.



The above scheme is inspired by the classical Estonian model (Easton [1952], 1973). What it shows is that between the decree and the phenomenon of integration/non integration there is an intermediate step, represented by the environment. The propitiousness of the environment is a key element determining the success or failure of the political maneuver aimed at fostering integration. The main proof of this is that the same formula in different places might produce different results. To sum up, we might say that the fact that integration is a term characterized by quite a high level of abstraction exposes it to misinterpretation and abuse, especially in common everyday language. Before moving towards the construction of a definition, it is important that the ground gets cleared up from such most common mistakes.

1.2 Defining integration

The concept of integration refers to a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has hardly found a single and coherent definition in the literature. It is however possible to individuate a number of elements which are shared by most definitions, and therefore might be useful to build the basic framework for a definition of the concept. This section will first (1.2.1) focus on the historical

roots of the notion of integration by looking at how it was understood in the history of political thought, and then (1.2.2) move on to the contemporary international literature.

1.2.1 Elements from modern political thought

Contemporary debate on the nature of the concept of integration dig their roots in the modern political thought. That literature represents an essential point of start to identify the main elements that characterize the most widespread understanding of the concept. In this regards, a first relevant contribution to the debate was that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Rousseau ([1762], 1966) conceived integration as a form of solidarity. Any given system, to work as a system, implied a degree of solidarity between its members. Solidarity worked as a glue between otherwise mutually indifferent individuals (Romano, 1994, 767). Integration therefore meant introducing newcomers to this network of solidarity already existing between old members of the society. A similar idea was expressed about a century later by August Compte. Compte ([1822]1970) maintained that the notion of integration is fundamental to understand that of society. While presupposing heterogeneity, integration represents what differentiates a society from a mere agglomeration of different individuals. In this conceptualization, society is by definition an *ensemble*, a system that presupposes some degree of sharing on the part of its members. Integration is therefore conceived as a *conditio sine qua non* for society to exist.

The idea of integration as necessary glue for society to function as such was then famously embraced and developed by Talcott Parsons in the twentieth century. Parsons ([1951], 1991) conceived any system as composed by different and heterogeneous units. Each unit was internally coherent but different from the other ones. Parsons conceived integration as a "functional necessity" for any such system. The term "necessity" indicates a stringent need, something from which the system under consideration, that is society, cannot disregard. The term "functional" refers to the fact that the necessity is such with regards to a specific end. In the case of Parsons, in particular, the function played by integration in society is that of both maintaining and increasing its stability. Parsons was among the first ones to formalize the idea that the acceptance and "interiorization" of a minimal set of common norms is the basis for the integration into society of heterogeneous individuals (Romano, 1994, 765). At the basis of this idea stands the intuition according to which an internally heterogeneous system can only survive if individuals contribute to the functioning of society as a whole. Such contribution can only happen if the different members of society are able share at least the basic values of society.

The idea of minimum value sharing as the ground for an integrated society was to have great fortune in later political thought and ultimately to become the dominant view in modern political philosophy. Starting with John Rawls (1971; 2005), the idea was developed and elaborated so as to become an autonomous theory on social justice in in internally heterogeneous liberal political systems. In parallel to this view, the contemporary debate also witnessed the rising of a critical perspective which saw the sharing of a minimal set of values as not sufficient for the existence and functioning of a society. Among the holders of such perspectives stand, most famously, the so-called communitarians (Taylor, 1985; 1994; Sandel, 1994).

Taking a step back from the contemporary debate on the amount of sharing needed to have an well-integrated and functioning society, we should mention Vilfredo Pareto as another interesting contributor to the debate on the notion of integration. Writing between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, Pareto was among the first ones to point at the crucial role played by time (Demarchi *et al.*, 1987, 1057-9). Integration had to be conceived as an intrinsically dynamic phenomenon: an interaction between different parts constituting a system which evolved and changed over time. Such interaction could only be understood as a fluid, perpetually progressive phenomenon. Yet, Pareto also warned that the idea of progressiveness and dynamism of the process of integration did not imply determinism. The phenomenon did not follow an evolutionistic path; it was not to be conceived as headed towards an univocal or necessary end. On the contrary, the process of integration could take different characteristics and lead to different situation depending on cases and on the characteristics of the members involved. Pareto therefore clearly recognized the essentially the role of time in the process of integration. On the one hand, time was a fundamental condition for integration to proceed and evolve, as the possibility of something like a "sudden integration" appeared counter-intuitive and implausible. On the other hand, time was no guarantee that integration would happen: it was a necessary but not sufficient condition for integration. This last point is indeed very relevant, especially when considering that second generations have in some cases been observed as having a lower level of satisfaction towards the host society and government than first generations (Maxwell, 2010). For Pareto time was to be understood as a necessary but not sufficient condition for integration. What he did not register, however, is that time can in some cases also represent an element that worsens individuals' potential for integration. The passing of time can indeed deteriorate some of the resources of which newcomers necessitate for the process of integration to be successful (ex. health and psychological wellbeing). In this respect, one could conclude that nature of time's role in the process of integration is essentially binary: it normally facilitates, but it can also become disruptive.

The above mentioned eighteenth to twentieth century political theorists have played a fundamental role in shaping the contemporary debates on the notion of integration. The concepts and elements underlined by them constitute an important part of today's most common definitions and a point of departure for the critical ones.

1.2.2 Integration in contemporary debates

Contemporary literature on integration has grown richer and more specific starting from the early 1990s as a consequence of the diffusion of the phenomenon of immigration as a permanent characteristic of Western societies. Consensus on a single and coherent definition of the concept is however still far from having been reached today. Different observers tend to privilege different aspects of the phenomenon, ultimately producing definitions whose final outlook vary to a quite large extent. Differences are in some cases also the product of the specificities of the particular context observed. There exist two main strategies to deal with such a vast and differentiated literature. One is to focus on what makes the various definitions different from one another; the other focuses instead on what they have in common. The advantage of the first approach is that, by critically examining each definition, it avoids approximation and does greater justice to each conception. The advantage of the second, on the other hand, is that it engages in a consensus-building operation which might turn out to be vital for the progress of the overall comparative study of the phenomenon of integration in different contexts.

The difference-based approach is for example embraced by Zincone (2000, 13-30), who distinguishes between three different most common understandings of the notion of integration in the literature (as equality, as utility, and as resemblance) and, having underlined the weaknesses of each, then produces her own definition. This is not the strategy used here. The present study analyses the different conceptualizations of the notion of integration with the purpose of finding a common ground on which to base its working definition. The focus will therefore be on the analogies that exist among some of the authoritative formulations on the matter.

The following seven definitions of the concept of integration belong to two supra-national intergovernmental bodies (EU Commission and UN) , an international organization (IOM-International Organization for Migration), a European research institute (EMN- European Migration Network), a Catholic Institution devoted to the study of the phenomenon of immigration (the Italian Caritas Diocesiana) and two specialized encyclopedias. The rationale behind the selection is that choosing sources that are different in nature is probably the best way to enlarge the spectrum of

perspectives on the notion of integration, and therefore to gain a more complete overview of the most common understandings of it.

In a communication of 2003, the EU Commission defined the term integration as a bilateral phenomenon, progressive in nature, whose successfulness depended on the attitudes and efforts of both the host society and the individual immigrants.

> Integration should be understood as a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant. (European Commission, 2003)

In this definition, great importance is placed on immigrants' active participation in the life of the host society. The Commission attributes the possibility of immigrants' participation to, on the one hand, immigrants own willingness to be part of the society of immigration, and on the other, to the host country's capacity to open up spaces for their active involvement. The EU Commission also specified that for such active participation to be actually conceived as signal of successful integration, the immigrants should be able to exercise it "without having to relinquish their own identity". A similar emphasis on participation is to be found in one of the UN's most recent formal definitions of the concept of integration (Ferguson, 2008). The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs indeed conceives integration as a progressive opening up of spaces of participation for the newcomers.

> Social integration can be defined as the process of promoting the values, relations and institutions that enable all people to participate in social, economic and political life on the basis of equality of rights and opportunity, equity and dignity. (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2008)

The effective participation of all individuals is the meter for measuring the success of integration. Here again it is possible to notice a certain idea of the multilateral nature of the phenomenon. Integration does not depend merely on the efforts of the hosting society and institutions, but rather, it depends on the diffusion, among all individuals, of a certain set of values and modes of relations which enable integration itself. The same idea is clearly expressed in the definition developed by the International Organization for Migration, according to which "the responsibility for integration rests not with one particular group, but rather with many actors: immigrants themselves, the host government, institutions, and communities"(IOM, 2004, 34). IOM also places emphasis on the idea that or the process of integration to occur immigrants must find their place into society not only as individuals, but also as members of specific communities.

> Integration is the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. (IOM Glossary, 2004)

The European Migration Network, funded in 2008 by a decision of the European Council, draws its definition from the documents regarding the "common basic principles for integration" (2008/381/EC). The definition includes most of the elements which characterize those previously analyzed, namely, the idea of integration as a progressive and bilateral phenomenon, requiring the efforts of both the immigration country and the immigrants themselves.

> Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. (EMN Glossary, 2011)

A more relational perspective on the phenomenon characterizes the understanding of the Italian Catholic organization Caritas (2008). Here the idea is that integration rests on the nature of the relationships of the individual components of a society, whether immigrants or old members. According to this conceptualization, integration is indeed "a question of relationships among people of different belonging and identity who share the same physical, social, administrative and political space"(Caritas, 2008, 17). Similarly to the other above definitions, here again it is possible to find the idea of integration as

> (..) a process which permeates the whole society. (Caritas, 2008)

Finally, many of the elements that make up the above understandings are also present and strong in the two encyclopedic definitions. On the Dictionary of Sociology (Gallino, 1993, 372-5) the mutual nature of integration is conceived as "coordination". Integration exists when the members of a community are willing and capable of coordinating their actions on a long-term basis.

> Integration is a variable state (stato variabile) of a society (..) characterized by the constant tendency of the individuals who inhabit it to regularly coordinate their social actions with those of the others. (Gallino, 1993)

The changeable and progressive nature of the phenomenon is underlined by the phrasing "variable state"; the idea of multilateralism is inherent to the very concept of "coordination". In a similar way, the Dictionary of Politics (Bobbio *et al.*, 2004) underlines those aspects by conceiving the notion of integration as

> The progressive overcoming of division and fractures among the members of any organization. (Dizionario di politica, 2004)

On the basis of the above contributions, it is possible to draw a working definition of the concept of integration. Integration will be conceived as a (1) process, (2) multidimensional in nature, (3) in which immigrants individuals and society at large are involved (4) for the sake of the possibility of participation of all to the life of the society itself. These four, main elements represent the grounds on which the specifically civic aspect of integration will be later analyzed. The first element is that of progressiveness. Integration never describes as a status, a specific moment. Rather, it is most often referred as to a "process" or "variable state", whose dynamism is intrinsic to the nature of the phenomenon itself. Integration will therefore never be referred to as something that either exists or does not, but rather, as something that characterized by different degrees of intensity.

A second important element of the concept of integration which is not everywhere explicitly underlined is that of its multidimensionality. Integration is a process which applies to several domains or spheres. The spheres are, most notably, the economic, the social, the political and the cultural spheres, each of which enjoys quite a degree of autonomy from the others. In particular, we might say that the relationship between spheres is never deterministic. The fact of being integrated, say, at the economic level, is no guarantee that integration will also occur at the social, political or cultural level. The different spheres do not necessarily need to appear in a basic definition of the notion of integration. It is the idea of multidimensionality itself that is constitutive to it.

The third important element identified by all of the above definitions is that of multilateral character of integration. The process of integration is described as "bilateral", "mutual", "two-way", so as to underline that it requires efforts from all of the members of a society, the old ones or as well as the newcomers. The element of multilateralism therefore hints to an inherent reciprocity of the concept, which involves never just only one part of the society, but rather requires everybody's interest and efforts. The idea of reciprocity is indeed important because it is what differentiates the term integration from that of assimilation, as in fact the characteristic of the latter is that of being fundamentally univocal. In the process of assimilation it is primarily the immigrants who are involved: contact with the host society depend on individual immigrants' willingness and capacity to conform to the habits and lifestyles of the majority. Integration, on the other hand, points to a phenomenon in which successful inclusion of the newcomers is also a responsibility of the host society, which is required to open up spaces for diversity. The idea of reciprocity is also important in as far as it highlights the key role played by the very the physical place in which immigration takes

place. Be it a region, a nation, a city or a neighborhood, empirical studies have in more than one occasion proved that some areas have a greater integrating capacities than others (CNEL, 2010). Generally speaking, the more civically integrated the autochthonous community, the more chances there are for the effective integration of newcomers (Sciolla, 2004, 35).

The fourth and final element to be included in our working definition is that integration has to do with the possibility for everybody in society to participate. This is the very aim of the process of integration: to have all units of the system to have the possibility to contribute, if they seek, to the life of society at large.

To sum up, the working definition of integration, deriving from a general overview of contemporary literature, that is adopted here conceives the term as follows. Integration is a multidimensional and multilateral process, aimed at providing everyone in society the possibility to participate and contribute to the life of the society itself. Integration is therefore to be understood not as the mere cessation of discriminatory practices against the immigrant communities, but rather, as the transformation of the values and practices which regulate the relationships between host society and the newcomers in order to build "a society for all"(Ferguson, 2008, 3).

1.3 Defining *civic* integration

Having identified the multi-dimensional nature of the notion of integration, we now turn to the dimension that represents the focus of this study, the specifically *civic* dimension of integration. The definition of what this dimension entails is the object of the present section. The civic dimension of integration will be first compared and contrasted to the other main dimensions, and then provided its own definition.

The integration of immigrants at the specifically civic level is not a very much explored topic, as the economic aspect has been largely privileged in most of the literature on the subject. This fact is in sharp contrast with the growing centrality of the idea of civic integration in the public discourse in most immigration countries, and primarily the European ones (Joppke, 2007b). Having experienced the dangers implied in pretending from immigrants either too much (assimilation) or too little (multiculturalism) (Brubaker, 1992), governments in these countries are now increasingly shifting their policy efforts towards a civic kind of integration as a sort of middle way between the extremes (Hansen and Weil, 2001).

Civic integration is to be distinguished from, respectively, the economic, the political, and the social aspects of integration. The distinction from the economic sphere of integration is the most

straightforward. Economic integration concerns primarily the immigrant's positioning on the retributive scale. Successful integration here is normally associated with a stable and remunerated job, with the level of qualification, of income, and with the patterns of consumption that derive from it (Zanfrini, 2007b). The indicators entail little or no reference to the attitude towards the community of citizens where the immigrant carries such economic activities, and therefore set even at a first sight a clearly ample margin of difference from the civic dimension of integration.

What might appear less evident is its distinction from the social and political spheres of integration. Civic integration indeed does share a few aspects with these other spheres of integration. With social sphere, on the one hand, it shares the horizontal dimension (De Gregorio, 2011, 36-8), that is, the strong focus on the relationships between individuals. With the political sphere, on the other hand, it shares the attention to vertical dimension, which has to do with the link between the individual level and the state level. However, it is in light of the very fact of sharing some elements of the social as well as the political sphere of integration, that civic integration should be distinguished from both. By including defining characteristics of each of them, the specifically civic domain of integration operates a synthesis between the two, which ultimately sets it apart from any of them. The distinction of the civic domain of integration from both the social and the political ones is then further justified in reason of the fact that civic integration also includes in its definition what could be called a "subjective dimension". The latter is characterized by self-identification: recognition of oneself as member of a group (Basili, 2001). The self-identification also implies a certain degree of consciousness about the group's characteristics, constitutive principles and values.

Such identification is to be understood in minimal terms (Habermas, 2007, 116-7). It should not to be confused with some kind of "cultural assimilation", whereby the individual shares and embraces the whole system of traditions and cultural assets of the host society. The identification element of civic integration only regards a minimal package of principles and values that allow for the interchanges among members of the same society (Modood, 2007); it connects to the acceptance of a "public ethic" which does not deal with the specific notions of the good (unless these are in open contrast with one or more of the constitutional principles), but rather only sets the guidelines for the life of the community.

On the basis of the above analysis, we may consider the civic dimension of integration as being composed by three, crucial sub-dimensions. The first one regards the relationship between the individual and the state (or the institutions in general): that is the vertical dimension of civic integration. The second one regards the relationship between the individual and the other individuals in the society: the horizontal dimension. The third one regards the individual

him/herself, him/her self-identification as a willing member belonging to the whole, who recognizes as legitimate and shares the basic values of that society. This last dimension can be called subjective dimension. Each of the three dimension actually refers to and can be operationalized according to an empirical, observable phenomenon. The relationship between the state and the individual, that is the vertical dimension, refers to the knowledge that the immigrants has about the political system in which s/he lives, to how much s/he is informed and to how much s/he participated through the means at his/her disposal. The horizontal dimension, that is the nature of the relationship between the immigrant and the other individuals of the society, can be assessed by measuring the quality and quantity of the contacts between them, and the existence of forms of trust among them. The subjective dimension, which instead refers to the the extent to which s/he "feels parts" the society, can be measured by considering the extent to which the immigrant accepts, respects and shows care for the constitutional principles of such society.

CIVIC INTEGRATION			
Dimensions	Vertical	Horizontal	Subjective
Relationship involved	Individual/State	Individual/Individuals	Self
Empirical indexes	Knowledge, information and participation	Quantity and quality of contacts and trust in others	"Feeling part of"

Table 1. Operational definition of civic integration

The table above summarizes the three main constitutive dimensions of civic integration. Although analytically separated, each dimension is strongly interrelated with the others, as the three are mutually reinforcing. It is indeed a relation that works in all directions, depending on cases. In some cases, for example, it is the fact of participating that creates a sense of belonging, which then encourages the development of trust in others. In some other cases, it is the fact of having frequent contacts with other members of the community that fosters respect for the community and encourages participation.

Successful civic integration is therefore a multifaceted phenomenon in which the three fundamental aspects – information, relationships and identification – merge together to create a situation in which the migrant engages in the public life of the community and in other social and political activities (COM/2003/0336). The civically integrated individual is not only accustomed to the habits of the host society, but rather is an active contribution to it. In this view, the macro-phenomenon of civic integration is produced by a series of micro-phenomena ranging from the acquisition of basic linguistic competence to the acceptance of liberal principles, from basic knowledge about local institutions to exchanging small favors with the neighbors, from being informed about the major public issues to not leaving waste in a public garden. Civic integration is as a certain sense of the community, which drives individuals to act as if the public arena was, at least in a tiny portion, theirs own.

The above conceptualization of civic integration had the advantage of being independent from any specific definition national identity. Given the inherent difficulties involved in trying to define the boundaries of whatever national identity, and despite the courageous attempts to do so[6], such definitions stand on such precarious and uncertain grounds that a conceptualization of civic integration that depends on them is inevitably open to easy contestation.

A final note. The term civic integration or "civism" is sometimes used interchangeably with that of "social capital". (Cartocci, 2007). As will be discussed later in greater detail, here the two terms as understood as separated. Rather than to civism itself, social capital is more specifically linked with the relational aspect of civism, of which it is the ultimate product. It is the fact of having relations with others individuals in society which, progressively creating a network among them, finally leads to the emergence of social capital.

1.4 Why it is a desirable goal

Why should we want more integrated immigrants? Why should a State care about devoting a part of its precious resources to designing public policies aimed at enhancing newcomers' inclusion into the host society? In times of severe economic crisis, the question might not appear so trivial to those who do not see why a given country should employ its scarce resources to integrate newcomers, instead of, say, focusing on tackling locals' unemployment. This section offers an account of the main arguments about the importance of immigrant integration from the perspective of the host country. The arguments fall into two distinctive categories: normative (or prescriptive)

[6] See for example Della Loggia (2010)

arguments on the one side, and non-normative (or empirical) arguments on the other. The two are often mixed in public debate, which is the main reason for their overall ineffectiveness. By dividing them up according to their nature, I attempt here to overcome such shortcoming.

Arguments of normative nature are generally related to considerations about the *quality of democracy* in immigrant receiving countries. Their normativity depends on conceptions of how healthy democracies should be and, more specifically, on how they should engage with non-citizens who are however stable members of their societies. Here the arguments have a varying degree of radicality according to the specific normative notion of democracy that they endorse. Still, the most important common points that are generally made are two. On the one hand, the idea that in every democracy the power of the governors is only legitimate to the extent to which those who are subjected to it have had the power to elect. The argument is obviously mainly made with reference to long-term immigrants. In as far as those permanent residents lack the power to vote – the argument goes – the legitimacy of the exercise of coercive powers on them cannot be considered to be fully legitimate. In order for it to be so, the paths for immigrant integration (all the way to full membership) must be open and transparent for every single settled immigrant. According to this first argument, democracies that do not devote efforts and resources to the objective immigrant integration therefore face a serious democratic deficit.

The second main normative argument is linked to this first, although ultimately distinct. It is the principle of no taxation without representation, according to which democracies should ensure that all of those who contribute to the fiscal system through their work and productive activities should be given the power to participate into decision making processes which ultimately have a strong impact on their lives. An ample body of literature shows how civic integration of the citizenry is a crucial contributor to the stability of the political system and of society (Almond and Verba, 1963; Zincone, 1992; Putnam, 2004). Having informed, active and participating citizens constitutes an anchoring factor for any democracy[7], whose legitimacy ultimately rests on the consent of the body of citizens. The argument has traditionally been used with regards to the body of citizens, that is, of those permanent residents who possess the citizenship of the country of residence. It appears clear, however, that with the transformations that European societies have witnessed over the last fifty years, which has created a situation in which there is always a larger share of permanent residents who *are not* citizens (the average of EU countries is around 10%), the argument might also gain certain relevance with regards to this category of permanent residents. A

[7] Note that Almond and Verba specify that it is not necessary that every single citizen, or even the majority of them, be active participants for the stability of the political system; rather, it is important that they are numerous enough to create an equilibrium with those who know nothing (parochial) or very little (subjects) of the political system. (Pasquino, 2005).

detachment of the governors from the governed, of the political sphere form the social sphere, of the institutional authorities from the real world society might, according to this argument, create a crisis of legitimacy of the political system which, not being able to absorb and reflect the claims of real society, ends up encouraging deviant behaviour and anti-system sentiments. Such crises of legitimacy have already occurred in more than one European country.

However sound and to some extend sharable, the inherent and predominant prescriptiveness of the arguments above is ultimately a reason for their weakness, in that they risk to be considered as bias by individuals endorsing different conceptions of democracy. In this sense, non-normative arguments have a comparative advantage, in that their reduced normative content[8] keeps them from being tackled as moral or bias arguments.

Non-normative arguments on why immigrant integration is crucial for host countries might be divided up into three main sets: economic, demographic and social considerations. Before going into each of these, however, there is a first key, general premise to be made when debating the desirability of immigrants' integration, that is, namely, that *immigrants are already there.* Although this might look like a trivial statement, it is a still a fundamental point of start. Each European country has at least one political party which looks at immigrants as if we could send them back to their countries of origin and return to homogenous societies of the 20th century. Such positions are obviously populist and obsolete, as they disregard the fact that immigration has already decades ago turned into a stable, *permanent characteristic* of all Western European countries. A concrete indicator of the measure of immigrants' presence is provided by demography. If we look at countries like Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy, which, when taken together, account for 75% of all the foreign-born residents on European soil, we notice that these countries' populations today include a huge percentage of immigrants among their long-term residents. The impact on the total population ranges from 5% (in Italy) to almost 9% (in Spain).

	Total Population	Born in non-EU country	% populat.
Germany	82,002,356	6,127,771	7.5
France	64,366,894	4,992,168	7.8

[8] I accept the idea that no argument is ever *fully* empirical as observation necessarily imply some degree of interpretation and therefore of prescriptiveness. Still, some arguments have a *greater* prescriptive content than others, as some arguments can be considered to be *mainly* normative and others are *mainly* empirical. The arguments presented here as "non-normative" or "empirical" fall into the second category.

UK	61,595,091	4,603,792	7.5
Italy	60,045,068	2,984,091	5.0
Spain	45,828,172	4,057,197	8.9

Table 2. Data source: Eurostat, Demography report 2010

The numbers clearly show that these countries have already been profoundly transformed by immigration. Immigrants are no longer a temporary reality with limited impact; rather, they have become a constitutive trait of these countries' social fabric. The impact of this demographic changes is likely to continue growing in the future as a consequence, among many other possible *pull* factors, of new waves of political and economic instability at the EU periphery, of an enhanced integration capacity of EU member-states, of bilateral agreements, etcetera.

From an economic perspectives, there exist a number of reasons to hold for the desirability immigrant integration in host countries. On the one hand, the idea that diversity represents a fundamental characteristic for any economic system to gain competitiveness at a global level in the contemporary contest of globalized economies. Indeed, although predominantly homogenous societies might have some short-term advantages – such greater social trust and cohesion – their lack of internal diversity is ultimately a drawback in terms of human capital and ability to play a key role on the contemporary global markets. In this view, multicultural societies like, for example, the US, have a significant competitive advantage over homogenous ones like Japan (Putnam, 2014) in terms of medium and long-term economic growth perspectives. In the context of the EU, such notion of workers' mobility as key for competitiveness has been explicitly embraced and put at the very heart of the Lisbon strategy "for growth and jobs", which later developed in the Plan for Legal Migration (COM/2005/0669).

Developed Western countries also need immigrant workers to cover their workforce shortages. Even after the recent economic downturn, most EU member states still suffer from inability of finding the right profiles to fill in their vacancies (Manpower, 2014). Italy represents an emblematic case of this phenomenon. For the Global Migration Barometer (2008, 11), the country features at the second place after Japan in the world ranking of countries for which these workers represent a real structural necessity. Interestingly enough, the first twenty positions of the global ranking are actually all occupied, with the only exception of Japan, by Western and Eastern European countries. The main reason for it being that those countries have recently been going through radical changes in the demographic structure of their societies, resulting in a shrinking of

the working-age population, and a consequent dropping down of economic productivity and performance.

The demographic problem is indeed another of the main reasons for the desirability of immigrants' integration into receiving countries. The great majority of EU countries has been witnessing a dramatic drop in women fertility rates in the last 50 years. Low population increase due to low fertility rate is especially problematic when considering that life expectancy continues to rise (United Nation Population Division, 2009), with the number of individuals over 65 rising by 60.3% around 2020, and those over 80 by 156% (Urso, 2013, 115). In the meantime, the working age population (15-64 years old) is expected to decrease by about 32%, with the important consequence of a fundamental alteration of the balance between contributors to the welfare system on the one hand and benefiters on the other.

Immigrant workers are needed not only to fill up those service, care and domestic sector jobs (Pugliese, 1991) sometimes also described as the "5Ps jobs" – as in precarious, ponderous, perilous, little-paid, socially penalizing (Ambrosini, 2008, 8) – but also, very importantly, for the highly qualified jobs that required specialized technicians and professionals (Manpower, 2014). Immigrant integration is particularly crucial with regards to those highly qualified jobs because it is only by granting facilitated settlement conditions, equal opportunities of participation and non-discrimination that an effective valorization of workers' talents and skills independently from nationality can take place. Here again Italy offers an emblematic negative example since, with an immigrant population averagely well educated (half immigrant workers possess a diploma or a university degree), as many as 43% of them is overqualified for their job. Better and more efficient integration of these individuals would help filling the personnel shortages and carry important economic benefits for enterprises as well as for the host country as a whole.

Finally, immigrants are overall significant contributors to the economic wellbeing of their hosting countries because they create jobs. In OECD countries, about 13% of foreign-born workers are self-employed (OECD, 2013). The percentage of immigrant entrepreneurs over the overall entrepreneurs number in OECD countries is around 10%, and constantly growth. In Italy, for example, at the end of the year 2013, the number of foreign-born entrepreneurs had risen by 4.88%, whereas that of Italian born one had increased of just 0.21% (Istat, 2013). In this terms, immigrants contribute actively to the creation of job opportunities for other people in their host countries – be them family-members, other foreign-born individuals, or Italians (Cnel, 2011).



Figure 3. Self-employment rate by place of birth (years 2009-11). Source: OECD

As for the social reasons which make immigrant integration a desirable objective for host society, an important one is that integration increases social capital[9]. The concept of social capital can be broadly defined as the network of relationships and solidarity among individuals living in the same community (Putnam, 2004; Pizzorno, 1999; Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman, 1988), and it is generally associated with indicators such as the frequency and intensity of relationship with the neighbours, membership in associations, trust and care for others, and similar relational behaviour. Having attracted growing attention beginning in the 1990s[10], social capital has been attributed the potential to enhance social cohesion, security, and ultimately even economic growth (Andreotti, 2009, 45-83). The connection between civic integration and social capital also turns out to be crucial when focusing on the point of view of the individual immigrant. A more civically integrated individual has more chances of developing networks of relationship and solidarity with other individuals in the host country, both immigrants and autochthonous. This social capital is in turn very likely to become beneficial in terms of employment records as well as career development. Social capital has indeed been described as

[9] The relationship between civic integration and social capital might of course also work the other way around, that is, social capital increasing civic integration. Here however we focus on when the relationship works in the opposite direction.

working for the individual as an actual resource, just like education or other individual abilities (Bourdieu, 1980; Lin, 1999), which is therefore taken as one of the explaining variables in the studies on individual economic success (Andreotti, 2009, 31-2). By opening up new pathways for immigrant inclusion, social capital has therefore the power to prevent the risk of serious marginalization, therefore ultimately contributing to the stability of the society as a whole.

To sum up, there are two kinds of reasons for the desirability of host countries putting more efforts into immigrant integration strategies. The first set is represented by normative arguments linked to the quality of democracy, which is to be considered at risk in a situation in which a large part of legal, long-settled residents (around 10% in EU countries) is permanently excluded from the decision-making processes whose effects have a strong impact on their everyday lives. The second set of reasons is represented by those data forecasting how effective immigrant integration would be beneficial for the host society from the economic, demographic and social level.

[10] Although the concept existed from long before that.

2. Citizenship, and its borders

This main aim of this chapter is that of discussing the notion of citizenship. Differently than for the notion of integration (Ch.1), the focus here is not so much on defining the term, but rather on describing its main dimensions and development over time, with a particular attention to the juridical, political and socio-economic changes that have had an impact on its most recent evolutions. The analysis of the notion of citizenship will lead us to taking into consideration other, contemporary forms of membership, which have progressively risen as alternative forms of belonging to a territorial unit and which, according to an growing number of scholars, are ultimately leading to a decrease of the importance of the role of citizenship for individuals.

The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section (2.1) the focus will be on the different constitutive dimension of citizenship and on the main debates surrounding each of them. The second section (2.2) will look at the evolution of the relationship between citizenship and the State, with particular reference to the process of de-nationalization of rights which has happened progressively after the emergence of the fundamental human rights discourse and norms. The third part (2.3) will go more specifically into the idea of a set of de-nationalized rights by looking at the differences between rights of citizens and the rights of aliens.

2.1 Citizenship as rights, belonging and participation

Ever since the Ancient Greece and Roman Empire times, debates on citizenship have always been animated by a discussion on the rules to determine "who is in and who is out" (Isin and Wood, 1999, 5-6). The debate is emblematic of a constitutive characteristic of the notion of citizenship itself, which indeed features two, distinctive but mutually depended faces: a gentle face, aimed at inclusion, and an harsher face, aimed at drawing and enforcing difference of treatment between those who belong to the community and those who do not (Brubaker, 1992). The boundaries have historically never been merely external; exclusion has also been fostered at the internal level. Indeed, despite its sometimes universalistic rhetoric (Joppke, 2008), citizenship status has never been granted to all individuals physically present on the territory of a polity.

In this section we will only deal with the "modern" notion of citizenship, the one which emerged with the French Revolution, and that is inextricably linked with other concepts such as that of State, nations, freedom, equality and individual (Costa, 2005). Modern citizenship has been understood as a condition of individual membership to a self-conscious political community, a State. Its constitutive dimensions are mainly three: rights, belonging and participation (Moro, 2013, 46; Colombo, 2011). As it will be seen, each of those dimensions has gained or lost portions of

relevance during different historical times; however, the three still hold significance as constitutive features of the citizenship status.

2.1.1 Rights

The first component, that of rights, is particularly essential to the notion of citizenship. Ever since the French revolution, during which the term "*citoyen"* was used as a synonym for *equal*, the concept of citizenship has described a condition in which all individuals enjoying that status are by law deserving of an equal treatment by the State they belong to (Schnapper, 2000, 26). The notion of equality of rights is also central to Marshall's (1950) definition of citizenship, according to which the status represent a fundamental instrument of mitigation of the inequalities implied in the social class stratification originated by the capitalist system.

For a citizen to be able to legitimately claim a right, the State and the other citizens in the community must have a duty to respect it. The State, on the one hand, must be committed to a systematic and universal protection and enforcement of those rights for all of its citizens through its public policies, its juridical and administrative apparatus. The community of citizens, on the other hand, must effectively recognize and respect others' equal right to their fruition and exercise (Moro, 2013, 51). In the polity, rights and duties are therefore strictly dependent on each other at least at the most fundamental level, that is, on the idea that having a right implies respecting others' right to benefit from it too.

Of course, the relationship between rights and duties has been understood differently in different constitutional traditions. The liberal scheme is more of a rights-centered scheme: the system is based on individual fruition of rights, and the duties individuals have towards their fellow citizens are mainly those of non-interference and respect of their rights. In the republican or, as some have called it, "integrationist" (Joppke 2008, 536) tradition, instead, the focus on duties is much more accentuated. Here much of the emphasis is on collectivity and sharing, as if citizenship represented "a force of social unity and integration" (Joppke 2008, 536). This latter tradition has survived even after the mandatory military service has disappeared in most Western countries, transforming itself into a broader duty of civic engagement for the overall good of the community as a whole.

In his famous *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950), Marshall divides up citizenship rights into three main categories: civic rights (such as freedom of speech, right to justice and right to own property), political rights (such as right to exercise of political power, right to freely choose representatives in the elections), and social rights (such as right to welfare and security). Those

rights have evolved in a teleological way (Turner, 2009), starting from "civil rights in the eighteenth [century], political in the nineteenth, and social in the twentieth" (Marshall, 1950). Marshall's categorization of rights has been criticized both from a formal and from a substantial level. However, the broad scheme remains valid for the purposes of this thesis.

2.1.2 Belonging

The second constitutive element of citizenship is that of belonging. This aspect is also multilayered and its meaning has changed over time. Belonging is a somewhat ambiguous term in that it can be described as both *being* part and *feeling* part of a political community. The first aspect, that of being part, is at its turn constituted by both a juridical and a more sociological aspect. The juridical aspect is connected to the actual status of citizenship, by which an individual belongs to a community if s/he is officially recognized as such by the law. Individuals are either born as citizens (*ius sanguinis*) or can become so (via *ius soli*, *ius domicilii*, *ius connubii*) in the context of a naturalization procedure. In the different countries, becoming a citizen is more or less easy depending on the national citizenship laws.

From a more sociological perspective, being part of a political community means being somewhat part of the networks of solidarity, trust and interdependence that are commonly defined as social capital (Putnam, 1994; 2001; Pizzorno, 1999; Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman, 1988). If it was to be translated into empirical indicators, the latter would be associated with data such as the frequency and intensity of relationship with the neighbours, trust and care for others, and similar ordinary relational behaviour (Billig, 1995). The sociological aspect of being part is analytically distinct, but still often very much connected with the cognitive aspect of belonging mentioned above, that is, the *feeling part* aspect. This is where the notion of belonging critically interact with that of identity.

The relationship between citizenship and identity is part of intense philosophical discussions the resolution of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. For our purposes, it suffices here to give a broad overview of the main perspectives in which that the relationship can be understood. Since the advent of modern nation-states, identity was understood in two main ways: on the one hand, as something natural which exists even before the nation and which individuals are simply born into; on the other hand, it was rather interpreted as a choice of individuals who have the possibility to adhere to one or another tradition on a voluntary basis.[11]

[11] The two positions emerge in a particularly clear way in the German vs. France dispute over the region Alsace-Lorraine. See Renan (1996, 52-54).

These two classical traditions have developed into the more contemporary contraposition between the liberals and the communitarians. According to the liberal perspective, the type of identity that is involved in membership to a state is one that does not involve a consensus of particular notions of "the good", but rather, only on an understanding of what is "just" (Rawls, 1982; 1994). According to the communitarians, instead, a differentiation between what is "good" and what is "just" is both impossible and undesirable, and therefore the type of identity that citizenship involves is a somewhat comprehensive one (Muhall and Swift, 1992; Taylor, 1994; Sandel, 1994). The two perspectives put in place two very different notions of belonging, one of which is procedural and only involves what has been called a "constitutional patriotism" (Habermas, 1999, 263), and the other being thicker and substantial.

Moving away from the philosophical debated to the more socio-political analysis, in most Western European countries today the concept of identity is permeated with universalistic rhetoric, and therefore only extremely rarely officially defined with reference to particularistic culture of lifestyle. France represents virtually the only case in which that happens, but that is the case uniquely because "its particularistic identity *is* universalism" (Joppke, 2008, 537). This does not mean that everywhere in the Western all public references to a shared culture and traditions have been eliminated; on the contrary, nations' common past is still very much celebrated in public occasions and ceremonies. What has changed, rather, is the view of the present and the future of the identity of such nations, whose main identity is mainly defined with reference to the liberal democratic principles. To put it in other words, the relationship between citizenship and identity today has moved from the question "which identity?" to that of "how much sharing?".

2.1.3 Participation

The third and last constitutive component of citizenship is participation. Like the other two elements, the idea of participation as a constitutive element of citizenship also gives rise to several questions. The main debate is probably the one linked to the discussion on what accounts for participation. Indeed, participation cannot be merely understood in terms of electoral participation (voting, being elected), but must also take into consideration other forms of participation which are non-electoral (Verba et al., 1993).

Understood in electoral as well as non-electoral terms, any attempt of determining the extent of citizens participation into public affairs should at least take into consideration the specific forms that it takes, its extension, and its effectiveness in terms of ability of having an impact on the policy making process (Moro, 2013, 52). For what concerns its forms, participation might take a quite

wide variety of shapes beyond the electoral ones, including support and participation in public campaigns, membership into associations, protests and boycotts, dialogue with institutions and public officials, etc. To these traditional forms of participation, other forms more linked to the rise of new technologies and social media might count as well. They are all forms of civic and political participation citizens might engage in at one or more times in their life.

Still, taking into account non-electoral forms of participation does not change the fact that in contemporary democracy electoral participation represents a key form of vehicular participation. Through their vote, which in its national-level form is *par excellence* the exclusive right of citizens, citizens express their right to choose their representatives, participating into the decision-making process which will then have an impact on their lives and future (Hirschman, 1970). Even though the relationship between the voters and the voted has never been unproblematic, the fact that direct participation into politics is impossible in contemporary societies (Dahl, 1990, 328), gives choosing one's own representative still a central and fundamental role in the exercise of the rights of citizenship.

2.2 The de-nationalization of rights

As a condition of belonging of an individual to a specific national territory, citizenship has traditionally been represented as an exclusive link between the individual and the State. The exclusiveness of such link was determined by the fact that the State had absolute and full sovereignty over matters concerning which rights were to be assigned to which individuals in its territory. The State, in other words, was completely free to determine who qualified as a citizen, which rights in particular were to be ascribed to such condition, and on which ground the concept of "otherness" should be defined.

The nature of such exclusive link has however changed to a significant degree starting after the end of WW2. The emergence of international human rights law on the one hand, and the parallel increase of communications, contacts and coexistence between previously more separated individuals and communities on the other, has led to the emergence of a number of limits to the exclusiveness of the link between the citizens and the State, which has resulted in a transformation of the relation between "the other, or the alien, and the polity"(Sosyal, 1994, 2). Produced by different dynamics, such limits to de facto State sovereignty belong to two analytically distinct dimensions: a juridical dimension and a more sociological dimension.

2.2.1 The juridical dimension

The juridical limits to the State-citizen relationship are mainly connected to the emergence of the human rights discourse and norms (Lister, 2012). The idea that a certain number of fundamental rights should be accorded to individuals as such, independently from other contingent characteristics such as nationality, ethnicity and beliefs begun to take place towards the end of WW1. Then the echoes of the massacres happened during WW2 created an even more favorable international climate for the idea of the necessity of drafting an international convention aimed at the universal recognition of human beings as intrinsically valuable.

The old idea of nationality as the only legitimate basis for granting and protecting fundamental rights to individuals was therefore challenged by the laying down of the principles of *non-discrimination* and *equal treatment*. These principles dig their roots in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), according to which every individual has, as such, a right to all of the fundamental rights and liberties.

> Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. (UDHR, Art. 2)

The idea that nationality should not anymore considered a legitimate basis for excluding individuals from enjoying fundamental rights was then reasserted and reinforced in a high number of international conventions including, most importantly, the 1949 International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Art.6), the 1954 Geneva Refugee Convention, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art.2), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 2), the 1975 ILO Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (Art. 10), and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 2).

In some cases, the principles of non-discrimination and equality of treatments were asserted in very broad terms, whereas in other cases a greater focus was put on specific domains of potential discrimination. The Geneva Convention on Refugees for example specifies a quite ample and specific set of rights to be granted to non-citizens, including not only the right to be equally treated in terms of occupation, remuneration, right of association and right to appeal to courts, but also in terms of access to social security benefits.

> The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect of the following matters:
>
> (a) In so far as such matters are governed by laws or regulations or are subject to the control of administrative authorities: remuneration, including family allowances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on home-work, minimum age of employment, apprenticeship and training, women's work and the work of young persons, and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining;
>
> (b) Social security (legal provisions in respect of employment injury, occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unemployment, family responsibilities and any other contingency which, according to national laws or regulations, is covered by a social security scheme). (Art. 24)

In a similar fashion, the ILO conventions on migrant workers foresaw equal opportunity and treatment for legally residing aliens in areas including occupation, social security, trade union and cultural rights as well as individual and collective freedoms.

> Each Member for which the Convention is in force undertakes to declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote and to guarantee, by methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, of social security, of trade union and cultural rights and of individual and collective freedoms for persons who as migrant workers or as members of their families are lawfully within its territory.(Art.10)

The principles of non-discrimination and equality of treatment, understood as above, all aimed at overcoming the notion of nationality as the only basis for granting fundamental rights and, in this sense, limited what was previously an exclusive sovereignty of the State over the individuals finding themselves within its territorial boundaries (Gargiulo, 2013). The importance of those same territorial boundaries was however asserted in parallel through the emergence of a principle of a right to nationality (Art.15).

Indeed, the two world wars had left many individuals in a condition of statelessness, where the latter was defined as a condition of vulnerability in which someone "is not considered as a national by any State under operation of its law"[12]. Cases of territorial redistributions among States, and instances of individual loss of citizenship due to conflict, discrimination and forcible displacement, had left many without citizenship. A consensus started to emerge on the idea that this condition had an adverse impact on what Hannah Arendt has called the fundamental individual *right to have rights* (Arendt [1951], 1979,77).

Article 15 of the UDHR recognizes to every individual a fundamental right to citizenship. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons binds its signatory states to grant stateless individuals to have the same rights as citizens with respect to rights such as freedom of religion, education of their children, the right of association, to employment and to housing and freedom of movement, preventing them from expulsing them from their territory. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness represents the main international law instrument which aims at preventing and reducing the number of stateless persons by setting the rules for the conferral and non-withdrawal of citizenship.

The same post-WW2 years therefore saw the emergence of, on the one hand, a challenge to citizenship as a the only legitimate basis for granting rights, and on the other, a recognition of the importance of citizenship to a national state as the most effective instrument to prevent situations of vulnerability of the individual. Although apparently in contrast with one another, the two norms went in the same direction: that of establishing the idea that that state sovereignty must be limited in a way to ensure that all individuals are granted fundamental rights and protections.

International jurisprudence on human rights therefore constitutes today an important element of mediation in what previously was an exclusive link between the state and the individuals in its territory. While recognizing that individual rights are still most effectively granted and protected at the national level[13], international norms have posed important limits to the State's exercise of power within their boundaries. This of course doesn't mean that international norms have forced nation-states out of exclusionary logics: states do continue to exclude, but the specific ways in which they are allowed to do so, have been transformed by the rise of human rights norms.[14]

For what concerns EU States in particular, another significant breach of the exclusive State-individuals' link from a mainly juridical standpoint was represented by the EU process of unification. The embracement of the single currency and, even more emblematically, the coming into being of the "European citizenship", have transferred beyond the EU member-states boarders some of the key functions traditionally reserved to it. Particularly emblematic in this sense has been the pronouncement on the topic of the Court of Justice, which maintained that EU citizenship was going to replace EU member-states' national citizenship under some crucial regards.

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[12] Official definition adopted by the UN General Assembly in the 1954 *Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons* (see Article 1 thereof). See http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729.html

[13] Introductory note by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the United Nations *Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons* (1954, 3-4).

[14] As Joppke pointed out, States today are only allowed to "exclude" on an individual level, and not anymore on a group level, that is, with explicit reference to ethnic or group characteristics, in that the latter behavior would consist of a breach of international norms. (Joppke, 2008, 57).

> Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.[15]

Another emblematic example of this trend is represented by the EU positioning on matters that concern resident aliens' access to national member-states. The position held by the Union is that citizenship should be considered as an instrument to favor third-country nationals' integration, and that therefore member-states should develop plans to favor naturalization. Although citizenship laws are still under exclusive State sovereignty, the development of numerous recommendations in this sense, even if non-binding in nature, clearly indicates a trend of de-nationalization of topics previously formally accepted to be under exclusive national competence.

2.2.2 The sociological dimension

It is however not only in strictly juridical terms that the previously exclusive State-individual link got weakened with the advent of modern societies (Zanfrini, 2007a). The latter was also a product of a number of transformations of socio-economic and political nature which are linked to the coming into being of the so-called "second modernity". The expression has been used by Beck to denote the set of social phenomena which make it almost impossible today in most Western countries to have internally homogenous national communities in terms of language, place of birth, citizenship, nationality and physical connotations.

> Today there only exists pluralistic and multiethnic systems in which elements which before would have been kept separated by national and cultural barriers, are combined together. Such a mix of national identities is not anymore a nationalistic nightmare or an utopia. It is a daily reality and a tendency which will consolidate. (Beck, 2003, 138-9)[16]

The phenomenon of the mix of different national identities on the same territorial unit, which has also been referred to with expressions such as global, liquid or late-modernity (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2000; Lash, Featherstone and Robertson, 1995), has been made possible by a conjuncture of socio-economic and political factors including globalization, technological developments, consumerism and individualism, international migrations, mass global political

[15] Point 1, "Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve", *Judgment of the Court of 20 September 2001*, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61999J0184:EN:HTML
[16] My translation.

movements. These phenomena all contributed to create, on the one hand, an ever greater interconnectedness among peoples belonging to different national collectivities, and on the other, significant diversity within national State borders.

At the economic level, the past decades have witnessed a steady increase and consolidation of movements of economic production and trade across territorial boundaries. These movements of capital were facilitated and sustained by the latest technological developments, which set the grounds for their quantitative and qualitative increase. Their increase also incentivized a parallel growth of transnational contacts of socio-political nature, linked to the progressive emergence of significant networks of trust, solidarity, interdependence, as well as also of conflict and competition, across and beyond State borders.

Global communications and movements of capital have turned into an evanescent category the previously unitary notion of national economy. As the supra-national production processes and capital transactions have extended beyond national borders, states' control over their own economies has severely declined (Sassen, 1996). The increasing corporate need for a regulatory framework to allow market operations has coincided with the rise of a global corporate power that today is capable of competing with the traditional nation-state power in shaping policies and advancing claims. Its demands have acquired a globally significant weight.

As a result of the growing transnational character of economic activities and related policy-making, nation-states' sovereignty is today under pressure not only from above, but also from below (Isin and Wood, 1999, 7). New actors and sites for claim-making have emerged. Cities have become cosmopolitan micro-cosmos (Sassen , 1996). New cosmopolitan elites have emerged, as well as a new class of global disadvantaged individuals represented by those who have a marginal role in the global production and consumption chains. At the same time, both global challenges (ex. environment) and individual/group identity (ex. minority claims) have become a legitimate ground for rights claim-making at the national level.

The emergence of a transnational economy however did still not pose as much of a challenge to the traditional structure of sovereign nation-states as the almost simultaneous phenomenon of migrant workers' migrations did (Sosyal, 1994, 14-18). Happening after a significant process of consolidation of the logics of nationhood and citizenship throughout the twentieth century had been achieved, individual movements across borders indeed encountered significant opposition by the single states, which in most cases responded, to what they perceived as a threat to their sovereignty, through harsh policies of borders' reinforcement and protective legislation of exclusionary nature.

However, the rise of international law concerning the rights of personhood on the one hand, and the ineffectiveness of restrictive policies in an overall situation of increased presence of a body of individuals of foreign origin permanently residing in a country different than their own on the other, led to a progressive path of expansion of non-citizen rights in the context of nation-states. As it will be seen in the next section, new and expanded schemes of residence rights have progressively seen the light in most western host countries, resulting into new models of membership parallel to that of citizenship.

The point of this section was to show how the transformations that have happened both at the juridical and at the socio-economic-political level, have (and still are) fundamentally changing the traditional link between the State and the citizens in terms of all of the main traditional components that characterize such relation, that is rights, belonging and participation. The next session will go more into details on how the relationship between the State and the individuals residing on within its territorial boundaries has changed as a result of the expansion of the body of non-citizen rights in most Western countries of immigration and most notably in the EU.

2.3 Rights of citizens, rights of aliens

Citizenship is characterized by an inherently two-folded nature (Colombo, 2011, 41-55; Wallerstein, 2003, 32-33). If on the one hand it has historically functioned as a tool of social inclusion, on the other, it has played a crucial role in the formalization of a notion of otherness, by creating a sharp distinction between the citizens and those who are not (Layton-Henry, 1990). In her *The Citizen and the Alien*, Linda Bosniak (2006, 4) describes citizenship as being, just like an egg, "hard outside, soft inside". The expression hints to the idea that whereas towards the community of beholders citizenship offers opportunities for equality and empowerment, for those who happen to be outside of that community, citizenship represents more of a tool of purposeful discrimination which keeps aliens in a condition of legally-enforced deprivation (Chhean and Li, 2007, 244).

The hard outside, soft inside definition unveils its greatest potential when applied in particular, as Bosniak does, to the current societies characterized by the highest number of non-citizen permanently residing on host country territory in history. Following Michael Walzer, Bosniak holds the normative stance that once "the others" successfully cross state borders, then that state is morally obliged to give them the opportunity to become citizens in order to avoid the risk of subjecting them to tyranny and abuse (Walzer, 1983, as cited Chhean and Li, 2007, 245). Such normative argument started to have, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, some empirical resonance when, in order to face the presence of always more significant number of stable resident aliens, resident rights in Western countries of immigration begun to gain momentum.

Especially since the mid-1990s, residence rights have indeed undergone a progressive but significant process of expansion. In Western Europe, such process has generated and kept alive by, on the one hand, the overall increase of the number of stable resident aliens, and on the other, a conjunction of international, European and national regulations. Pushing together towards the idea of a need to grant fundamental rights to individuals as such, those three drives have gradually led to the abandonment of the notion of nationality as a *per se* legitimate basis for excluding human beings from entitlement to basic rights and protections.

The previous section has shown how the role of human rights discourse and norms in leading, in the context of an increased globalization of societies, to the abandonment as nationality as a ground for exclusion from basic rights and protections. Here the attention will be put on the other two levels of norms production, that is, the European and the national. The national-level dimension will be in particular explored with reference to the Italian case, which represents the main setting for the empirical case study developed in the next chapters.

There are three main categories of non-citizens residents, and these are the undocumented aliens, the residents and the long-term residents. Each of the three, whose main formal difference consists in the type of residence permit held, enjoys specific treatment. The similarities and differences between them is the object of the present section. Particular attention will be devoted the rights enjoyed by those holding the long-term residence status (LTRs) and to its differences from the status granted by citizenship.

2.3.1 International, European and Italian norms

When it started to become clear that immigration was becoming for Italy, just like for most other Western European countries, a structural characteristic, guaranteeing equal treatment to resident working aliens became a major challenge. The above mentioned international conventions (see 3.2.1) have represented the normative basis for the development of both European and Italian norms with regards to all individuals in general, and migrants in particular.

The European Union has echoed the international conventions on non-discrimination and equality of treatment of every individual in many of its directives. More specifically, two Council Directives in the year 2000 explicitly appealed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in asserting, the first, the principle of equal treatment between individuals irrespectively of their national, racial or ethnic origin (Directive 2000/43/EC), and second, a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (Directive 2000/78/EC).

In Italy, those same principles, which already existed in the Italian 1948 Constitution (Art. 3), were reasserted with regards to immigrants specifically by the 1998 Immigration Law (286/98). That law granted all categories of immigrants, including irregular ones, a right to basic healthcare services and schooling. All regular immigrants with at least a one-year residence-permit were also accorded the same rights of citizens in terms of access to social benefits.

> Aliens holding a residence card or residence permit of a duration of no less than one year (..) shall be treated equally to Italian citizens in terms of possibility to enjoy the social benefits and services including economic and social assistance (..).[17]

In 1997 the Strasburg *Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level* entered into force. Although ratification has been limited and slowing over time, the document was very significant in that it introduced the idea of the importance of granting foreign residents equal rights to media and political association, to having some sort of consultative body appointed by their own communities, and to local passive voting rights after maximum 5 years' residence. The Convention received good support by both the EU Commission and EU Parliament, which have offered political, technical and financial support to member-states willing to introduce wider chances of political participation to their resident aliens.

Another fundamental step in the direction of granting fundamental rights to resident aliens was represented by the 2005 European Council Directive, which laid down the basic rules for granting the right to family reunification[18]. Such right had already been recognized by the above mentioned Italian immigration law which, as early as 1998, entitled all aliens possessing at least a one-year residence-permit with the possibility to reunite with members of their families in the country of residence.

Besides the above mentioned assertions of the principles of non-discrimination and equality of treatment, a more original, and perhaps more progressive commitment on the part the EU was the one taken with regards to the category of long-term resident aliens of third-country origin. Even though the Treaty of Rome's differentiation between EU member-states' citizens and third-country nationals has always been kept in the background of all EU policies, the progressive transformation of the immigration phenomenon into a structural characteristic for most EU countries has led the EU to put particular attention into ensuring that long-term residents be recognized equality of treatment.

[17] My translation.
[18] Even though the adopted Directive 2003/86/EC is now being challenged by the European Parliament before the European Court of Justice.

A fundamental step in that direction was represented by a 2003 Council Directive (2003/109/EC). Grounded on the principles agreed upon at the European Council held in Tampere in 1999, the 2003 Council Directive instituted automatically renewable long-term residence permits for individuals having resided in the host country for at least 5 years[19]. The aim of long-term resident permits was that of granting that particular category of residents "rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens"[20].

Indeed, the status of long-term resident does formally provide its beneficiaries with the same rights as EU citizens. This is true with regards to the possibility of participating to the job market, education, study grants, recognition of university certificates and other professional activities. Holders of the long-term residence permit also enjoy the right of mobility within the EU and the possibility of settling with their family in another Member-State.

> Provision should be made that the right of residence in another Member State may be exercised in order to work in an employed or self-employed capacity, to study or even to settle without exercising any form of economic activity.(2003/109/EC, Art.19)

Finally, the long-term residence status also gives access in the country of residence to a number of welfare rights indicated as "core benefits" of social assistance (even though the specific and concrete modalities for granting that assistance is left under national jurisdiction).

> With regard to social assistance, the possibility of limiting the benefits for long-term residents to core benefits is to be understood in the sense that this notion covers at least minimum income support, assistance in case of illness, pregnancy, parental assistance and long-term care. The modalities for granting such benefits should be determined by national law. (2003/109/EC, Art.13)

Of course, the notion of "core benefits" has left a quite ample margin for restrictive attempts in the various countries. In Italy for example, although the above mentioned 1998 law theoretically entitled all regular immigrants (possessing at least a one-year residence permit) to the same rights of citizens in terms of access to social benefits, such provision was challenged in more than one case by other norms. For example, laws 448/1998 and 388/2000 ruled that only Italian and communitarian citizens had a right to "child bonuses" for families with three or more children (Law

[19] Other major requirements include: having adequate resources for oneself and family to avoid becoming a burden for the Member State, having sickness insurance, not constituting a threat to public security and (for Italy and a number of other countries) having successfully passed a language test.

[20] In line with the guidelines agreed in October 1999 at Tampere. European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999, par. A/III/18, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm

488/1998, Art. 65). In a similar fashion, law 133/2008 restricted the possibility of receiving an income support (*assegno sociale*) to individuals who have resided in Italy for no less than 10 years (Law 133/2008, Art.20). Today, although some of those norms are still in place, they are being always more frequently challenged (and in some cases struck down) by the different Courts with regards to their discriminatory nature. [21]

One issue that has not (yet) been directly addressed by the EU Council on long-term resident aliens is that of pensions. In Italy, like in many other EU countries, the issue has instead long been at the center of many political discussions (and still is). The 1998 immigration law allowed all immigrants who regularly paid the contributions for the pension system to withdraw their individual retirement account in case of departure from the country of residence before having reached the age of retirement. The 2002 immigration law changed that provision ruling that in the above circumstances the alien cannot withdraw its paid contributions, and therefore loses them. More recently, the former Minister for Integration Cécile Kyenge has proposed that long-term resident aliens who then return to their country be able to enjoy the taxes paid to the Italian pension system even after having left the country[22].

2.3.2 The undocumented, the residents and the LTRs

Notwithstanding the above mentioned attempts to restrict social assistance entitlement to EU citizens only, which have occurred in most EU countries, it is clear that for the moment they represent a minor trend in the context a more general tendency towards recognizing an ample spectrum of rights to long-term resident aliens. Today in the majority of European countries the most fundamental rights are attached to residency (legal but also illegal), with a special status reserved to long-term residents.

The international conventions on fundamental human rights apply to everyone within the jurisdiction of the states who are contracting parties, independently from the individual's particular juridical status. Whether they are regular or undocumented migrants, all individuals have a fundamental right to basic rights and protections as a result of the de-nationalization of human

[21] Art. 65 of law 488/1998 has been struck down by the art. 13 of law 97/2013, the "Legge Europea", which ruled that also third-country nationals with long term residence status have a right to the child bonus (see http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/stampa/serie_generale/originario). Some parts of the 133/2008 law have been challenged by the Italian Constitutional Law (*Sentenza* no. 306 of July 2008 and no. 11 of January 2009), and although the law is still in place, it might be challenged by the individual resident alien willing to appeal to a Court.

[22] See for example http://www.ilmondo.it/politica/2013-10-14/kyenge-lavoriamo-accordi-reciprocit-pensioni-immigrati_341351.shtml and http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/interni/mani-kyenge-sullinps-pensione-agli-immigrati-che-tornano-958556.html

rights. Although universally adopted by all Western European countries, the notion of fundamental human rights has been interpreted more or less generously depending on the specific case.

In Italy, for example, the Constitution (Art.34) foresees that all children residing on the territory of the Republic have a right to education. As a consequence, the right to attending school has been extended to all resident migrants, including children whose parents are foreign who do not possess a valid permit of stay. The same logic applies to medical healthcare, a right which has been unanimously recognized by all Western EU countries with regards to medical emergencies, but differently with regards to medical services beyond emergency.

Sure enough, undocumented migrants do not have an easy life in Europe. In most Western European countries the debate on how illegal immigrants should be treated by the receiving countries is still very controversial for what concerns both the rights to be accorded to them and to criteria and methods for their expulsion. An emblematic examples drawn from the Italian case effectively illustrates the existence, in that country just like in many other Western European ones, of a constant tension between two different forces, one in favor of grating an ampler spectrum of rights to residents besides their juridical status, the other in favor of restricting them.

The example is represented by the attempt, made by the last Berlusconi government[23], to introduce a duty for school teachers and doctors to denounce irregular migrants to the police. The proposed measure, which was severely contested by the opposition parties, was in the end rejected by the Italian parliament after bitter confrontation on the grounds of it being a breach of the principle of protection of fundamental human rights.

Apart from the case of undocumented migrants which, although being recognized a fundamental right to basic protection, still dramatically represents the most precarious condition for the migrant (Votrico, 2012), major developments in terms of rights-expansion have interested the conditions of both regular resident alien and of long-term resident alien. The condition of legal residency has indeed started to enjoy a forward momentum when it became clear that immigrants had become a stable feature of most host societies and that, as such, efforts had to be made to include them into the social fabric of their elective country.

Providing legal immigrants with the chance to integrate into the host society implied giving them the possibility of participating into all spheres of socio-economic and even political activity. The European conventions and directives described above all went into the direction of assuring all migrants with at least a one-year residence permit the possibility, most importantly, to work, reunite

[23] Proposed in 2009 by the then Ministry of Interior of Berlusconi Government, Roberto Maroni. The proposal faced strong opposition by the Italian Parliament, and was in the end eliminated by the final law decree.

with their family, have access to social and welfare benefits, associate, vote in local elections and be represented and elected in local bodies.

An even greater pathway to effective integration was foreseen for that particular category of legal residents which, after at least five years of legal residence in the host country, has acquired the long-term residence status (LTRs): their rights were to be equated to those of citizens. With respects to the other category of legal migrants, those with a resident permits with a validity of one year or less, long-term residents enjoy an automatically renewable permit which gives them access to an ampler spectrum of rights which includes, besides the above-mentioned rights linked to residence, also a greater right to mobility beyond state borders, the possibility to settle in another EU member-state, an easier access to some particular social assistance benefits and, most of all, less bureaucratic and administrative costs linked with the annual renewal of the permit.

The LTRs is held, in Italy just like in most other Western European countries, by the majority of regular immigrants (54% in Italy). Under a strictly formal rights perspective, the main differences between a third-country national with LTRs and a fully-fledged citizen are in terms of access to (1) jobs for which local citizenship is required and (2) full political rights (3) full mobility rights. Although still significant, the number of jobs requiring citizenship is declining. In Italy for example, the main positions that still require it are jobs in the public administration involving the direct use of public powers or matters of public security, the military[24], the firemen, public schools teachers, some scientific research positions, national conservatories and orchestras, public contests such as the national beauty contest known as "Miss Italia".

On the other hand, and perhaps most importantly, non-citizens are also prevented from the possibility of voting and of being elected[25], which represents an exclusive right of citizens. Long-term residents therefore have very few chances of formally influencing the national debate on which rules govern their life. This difference in opportunities for formal civic engagement at the national level might also be connected to differences in chances for socio-economic integration and might have an impact on individual development of a feeling of belonging, which represents a fundamental element of a civic dimension of integration. Finally, differently from citizens, noncitizens do not enjoy full mobility rights. First, they can be expulsed from the territory of states

[24] This is not the case in many other countries, and most notably in the United States, where non-citizens have the possibility to join the military. In Italy, several proposals have been advanced recently, and a broader public debate on this topic is beginning to take place (see for example http://www.ilmessaggero.it/primopiano/politica/immigrati_ministro_difesa_mauro_costituzione_cittadinanza_leva_militare/notizie/414174.shtml . See also http://www.lastampa.it/2013/12/28/italia/cronache/mauro-cittadinanza-italiana-in-cambio-del-servizio-militare-k0WZ0V2V6Xuy3vUFYlCncN/pagina.html , or http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/interni/proposta-ministro-mauro-arruolare-immigrati-cambio-978894.html)

of which they are not citizens on the basis of a "duly cause" such as the individual constituting a threat to public security or other reasons deemed of 'fundamental interest' for the State[26]. In these cases, it might be very hard for the noncitizen to file a complaint against the State, unless they can successfully prove, in front of European or International courts, that their right to international protection has not been recognized or that their human rights have been breached. Secondly, noncitizens' ability to move around (in and out the state) depend on the visa regime to which they are subjected. In the context of the EU, for example, rights of mobility and settlement across member-states depend on the specific visa and residence permit that individuals enjoy. Broadly speaking, only citizens of EU member-states enjoy unconditional access and movement rights.

Still, it is clear that the LTRs provides, from a purely formal legal perspective, more rights than other regular residence statuses, and almost the same rights as citizens. The most important difference with this last category consists in the possibility to participate to the political life at the national level by voting and being elected and the enjoyment of full mobility rights. Although being a significant difference, the latter still allows us to note that, especially since the mid-1990s, residence rights have been expanding to an unprecedented degree, making long-term residents "significantly more like citizens than previously was the case" (Lister, 2012, 185).

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[25] Long-term residents can only vote and be elected for the so-called "*Consulta Cittadina per la Rappresentanza delle Comunità Straniere*", a purely consultative body with no formal power but that of "advising" the local governing body on issues related to immigrants' life.

[26] For example, Italian authorities are now discussing the possibility of sending all noncitizens who are in jail back to their countries of origin. The proposal is justified in terms of a 'fundamental interest' that the Italian State has to respect the EU standards by facing the problem of the 'inhuman conditions' of Italian jails due to their being overcrowded.

3. The empirical study: aims, methods, measures and challenges

This chapter presents a brief discussion the structure of the empirical study, including most importantly its aims and research questions (3.1.), the methodology (3.2) and measures involved (3.3), as well as the main ethical and practical challenges that I encountered in the carrying out of the project (3.4).

3.1 Aims

The general purpose of the study has been that of investigating the relationship between citizenship acquisition and civic integration for first generation immigrants. The main, driving question has been whether citizenship can be conceived as having any positive impact on civic integration or not. Whereas naturalization has often been the object of qualitative and quantitative studies in terms of its impact on *socio-economic* aspect of integration (Fougère and Safi, 2008; Mazzolari, 2006; Bratsberg *et al.*, 2002; Steinhardt, 2008; Le Grand and Szulkin, 2002; Chiswick, 1978; Eurostat, 2011; Bauböck *et al.*, 2013; MPG and ISMU, 2013), studies on the other dimensions of integration, and in particular on the *civic* dimension, are more rare and less explicit in terms of the results that they give.[27] The aim of the present analysis has been precisely that of taking a first, explorative step in order to fill in such knowledge gap.

Based on the definition of civic integration provided in chapter 1, which attempted to operationalize the multifaceted concept so as to make it as straightforward and usable as possible, the present chapter is focused on measuring empirically the different levels of civic integration of individuals with non-EU immigrant background who have, respectively, acquired and not acquired Italian citizenship, in order to measure the impact of the latter. The driving hypothesis of the analysis was that the two groups would have different levels of integration; the extent of such different levels and reasons for the difference were open for discovery. Due to the small interview sample size, and to the use of a single observation site (the Lazio region), the present study does not intend to make universal claims. Rather, the research should be read and understood as a single

[27] The main reason for the socio-economic dimension of integration being generally privileged over its civic counterpart is that the first is more easily quantifiable. Civic integration implies a higher number of interpretative problems starting from the very definition and operationalization of the concept, and going all the way to its evaluation and measurement on a case to case basis. However, no matter how problematic, the impact of citizenship on the specifically civic aspect integration cannot be neglected, in that taking part into the life of a society and experiencing a sense of belonging is not the same as having a job or enjoying decent housing condition. Sure enough, the latter factors *can* play a role, but they do not *necessarily* do so, as it has in some cases been shown (See, for example, Korac, 2003). In other words, the sentiment of "feeling part" of a society cannot be reduced to the empirical fact of participating into its job market or having access to decent housing.

puzzle piece that can be used to enhance knowledge building on a much neglected topic, that of the relationship between host country citizenship immigrants' civic integration.

The increasing number of immigrant presence in Europe and Italy make the question of the impact of citizenship on the specifically civic dimension of integration ever more relevant. As instances of alienation and isolation of immigrants have produced in many EU countries episodes of violence, unrest and turmoil which have profoundly shaken those societies as a whole, investigating the relevance and capability of citizenship acquisition in fostering a sense of belonging to the country of residence might be crucial for constructing better public policies to grant social cohesion, stability and, eventually, healthier democracies.

However, the ultimate purpose of this empirical research has not only been that of showing whether citizenship can be used as a policy tool to foster immigrants civic integration and overall social cohesion. The study has also been aimed at *empowering* the individuals involved by giving them a voice and shedding light on their opinions and concerns about, among other things, citizenship, integration, Italy and their migratory experience. For this reason, the closed-answer questionnaire was coupled with an in-depth interview which most accurately reflects the spirit and the aims moving this research.

3.2 Methods

The relationship between citizenship acquisition and civic integration has been investigated through an empirical study based on interviews of fifty (50) non-EU born "first-generation" immigrants living in Italy, and residing in the Lazio region[28]. The main objective of the empirical study was that of measuring the impact of acquired citizenship on individual chances of civic integration. Rome was chosen as the research site due to my personal ties with the city and the presence of local gatekeepers that attempted, albeit most of the times unsuccessfully, to provide me with easy access to the field and to a good number of interviewees. The study took place in multiple phases that are described in greater detail below.

The variables. The study was designed in such a way so as to isolate the two main variables whose correlation has been put under analysis, that is, the fact of holding/non holding Italian citizenship on the one hand, and the fact of having/non having a "good" degree of civic integration

[28] The region of Lazio is the second most important region in terms of number of foreign residents (over 542.000 units) after that of Lombardy (Istat, 2011).

on the other. In particular, holding/non holding citizenship represented the independent variable, whereas having/non having a "good" degree of civic integration represented the dependent variable.

The approach. The methodology used was a mixed one – integrating the quantitative and qualitative approaches. Each interview consisted of both a structured, closed-answer questionnaire, and a more open-ended talk based on a number of pre-set tracks on which individual interviewees were left free to elaborate.

The choice of using both a structured and a semi-structured questionnaire depends on the multiple nature of the information that was being sought. In accordance with the definition of the concept of "civic integration" provided in Chapter 1, the interviews were aimed at investigating each one of its three dimensions, which are, namely, the amount of knowledge of and participation to public life (vertical dimension), the quality and quantity of relationships with and trust in other individuals in society (horizontal dimension) and, finally, the subjective perceptions about one's own integration into the host country and one's own feelings of belonging (subjective dimension). The structured questionnaire was well-fitted for the vertical and horizontal dimensions, which are by nature more easily quantifiable, whereas the subjective dimension required, at least in the first place, a more open-ended structure in order to leave more space for the interviewees to express the sometimes extremely sensitive and intimate feelings involved in the topic.

The vertical and horizontal dimensions were therefore treated with a quantitative methodology aimed at measuring whether the individual could be considered as holding a sufficient or even good level of, respectively, knowledge and participation to public life on the one hand, and qualitative and quantitative relations and trust in other individuals in society on the other. In this sense I might say that the quantitative study was ultimately aimed at giving the individuals in the sample a score, which was then to be analyzed in relation with their biographical data (such as age, sex, level of education, type of job) and, most of all, to the fact of them holding/not holding Italian citizenship.

The subjective dimension was instead first of all treated and analyzed according to a qualitative methodology. The nature of the subject - that is, individual feelings and perceptions about one's own belonging to the country of origin and to Italy respectively - required instruments of deeper and more nuanced analysis, in order for me to be able to grasp the interviewees deepest meanings which were often characterized by a rather intangible nature. It was only later, as a second step, that I then attempted to synthetize the meaning of the material that had been previously treated with a qualitative methodology in order to compare and contrast it with the other two dimensions (vertical and horizontal). This operation, which of course implied a brutal over-simplification and therefore impoverishment of the data collected during the open-ended part of the interview, was

only legitimated by ultimate aim of getting a tentative answer to the main research question, that is, does host country citizenship have a positive impact on individual levels of civic integration?

The sample. As for the sample of interviewed people, the selected group of 50 individuals is characterized by both homogeneity and heterogeneity. A basic degree of internal homogeneity was needed in order to grant a basis for the comparability of the group's individual components (De Mucci and Dini, 2000, 44-50). For this purpose, the minimum requirements for individual immigrants to become part of the sample were the following:

1) Membership to the category of so-called *first-generation immigrants*[29]*;*
2) Being of *extra- EU* origin[30];
3) Having legally resided in Italy for *at least 15 years.*

The reasons for choosing not to mix first with second generation immigrants on the one hand, and EU with non-EU immigrants on the other, are explained extensively in the introductory chapter. It might suffice here to say here that those categories face fundamentally different challenges in terms of integration into the host society, which makes it virtually impossible not to consider them separately. Requirement number 3 was instead motivated by another kind of concern. First, although the Italian citizenship law makes foreign residents eligible for Italian citizenship after 10 years of residence, actual citizenship acquisition is never immediate, as the average time for the administrative procedures is in Italy of 730 days (IDOS, 2013, 217). Second, only very rarely immigrants begin the procedures for naturalization as soon as they reach the very tenth year of residence exactly. Third, since the objective was to measure the impact of citizenship on civic integration, at least a few years of time need to have passed after the actual acquisition in order for me to measure the eventual impact of citizenship on levels of civic integration.

Besides such basic requirements of homogeneity, the sample was however designed so as to display the degree of heterogeneity needed to allow me to isolate the "citizenship variable" from other possible intervening variables (that is, most importantly, gender, age, country of origin, years of residence, level of education and type of job). Interviewees were therefore both male and female (25 men and 25 women).[31] Their age varied from a minimum of 30 to a maximum of 65 years old,

[29] By "first-generation" immigrants here I mean that none of them was either born or raised in Italy: they must not have arrived before the age of 15 (when the first, important socialization phase has already occurred in a different country than the host one).
[30] As it is explained later in this same section, all interviewees belonged, in particular, to one of the five largest immigrant communities in Italy.
[31] National statistics indicate that the portion of women on the total number of foreign residents is of 49.3% (IDOS, 2013, 457).

with an average age of 46.[32] They all belonged to different immigrant communities among the five biggest ones in Italy, that is, Morocco, Albania, China, Ukraine and the Philippines (IDOS, 2013, 457) [33]. Years of residence in the host country ranged from 15 to 36 years, with an average number of 19.5. Levels of instruction varied, ranging from primary school to university degree, even though the great majority had at least a high school degree[34]. Also the type of jobs performed varied, from gardener and housekeeper all the way to university teacher and journalist, but they have all been categorized into three macro-groups: high or medium-skilled jobs (A), unskilled jobs (B) and unemployed (C). None of the respondent was a refugee and the reason for expatriation was, for the great majority of the interviewed, either economic (need/will to earn more) or affective (need/will to follow the beloved ones[35]).

The above described heterogeneity was meant to ensure that the independent variable – the fact of holding or not Italian citizenship – could be tested on the dependent variable – levels of civic integration – without too much interference of the others. Sure enough, social sciences do not allow a real, full separation between variables, as the study is clearly not carried in a sterile laboratory, and the object is as fluid as a human being can be; however, the fact of diversifying the sample as much as possible in terms of those biographical characteristics that are generally taken as to have an impact on individual levels of integration, was helpful in unveiling at least partially the relation under study.

The interviews. The interviews have been carried out face-to-face between January 2012 and March 2014. Each of them lasted between 20 and 60 minutes, depending, most importantly, on the conditions in which they were carried out and on the time availability and personal willingness to elaborate on the different topics of each of the respondents. The two parts of the interview – the structured questionnaire and the open-ended talk – were submitted in different orders. In some cases, the two were even carried out on different meetings. The interviews were carried out in different locations; sometimes in quiet environments such as the respondent' apartments or cafes, but some others they had to be done at the respondents' workplace, in metro stations, parks or even during bus rides around the city.

[32] The average age of the selected respondents is higher than the average age of foreign residents in Italy in general, which is of 32,2 (ISTAT,2011). The reason for this is connected to the fact that, as explained later in the text, I only targeted individuals who had been legally residing in Italy for at least 15 years. This condition foreseeably caused an increase of the average age of interviewees.

[33] It is important to note that although people were not targeted in terms of their ethnic/cultural belonging, the sample turned out to be pretty heterogeneous in those terms. This did not depend on an actual design but rather on the statistical composition of the immigrant presence in Italy.

[34] This is in line with the official statistics on the average level of education of immigrants in Italy, which show that half of the foreign residents have either a degree or a diploma (OECD, 2008, 85).

[35] Some of them had arrived upon family reunification policies but not all of them.

Respondents' recruitment, which represented one of the most important challenges for the correct development of the project (see below section 3.4 on "Challenges"), was carried out partially via contacts with immigrants' associations within the Lazio region, and partially through the "snowball technique" (Bichi, 2002, 81). The technique, which had the shortcoming of not always granting the necessary heterogeneity in terms of biographical characteristics of the respondents, however had the big advantage of giving me easier access to potential respondents than other methods would have.

All of the interviews were carried out in Italian, except for those in which the respondent did not master the language well enough to express his/her inner thoughts, and therefore explicitly asked that the interview be carried out in English. This was the case for just a small minority of individuals. All of the interviews were recorded and then transcribed into the language in which they were carried out; the parts that were used for this thesis were however then translated into English.

3.3 Measurement

As for any empirical study, the development of present one required that the main concept under investigation – that of *civic integration* – be operationalized in order for it to be measured empirically (De Mucci e Dini, 2000, 59-62). In Ch. 1 the concept was given first a theoretical definition and then a more operational definition, which made it possible to attach to it a number of empirical indicators. The table below illustrates the operationalized definition as divided into three different dimensions, which have been called, respectively, vertical, horizontal and subjective dimensions. Empirical indicators were organized accordingly.

CIVIC INTEGRATION			
Dimensions	Vertical	Horizontal	Subjective
Relationship involved	Individual/State	Individual/Individuals	Self
Empirical indexes	Knowledge, information, participation	Quantity and quality of contacts and trust in others	"Feeling part of"

Table 1. Operational definition of civic integration

As mentioned earlier, each interview consisted of two main parts: a structured questionnaire and an open-ended talk. The structured questionnaire was used to investigate, respectively, the vertical and the horizontal dimensions; it consisted on 30 closed-answer questions which then translated, depending on whether the answer was correct or incorrect, into a score which could go from 0 to 30. The open-ended talk, which was used to investigate the subjective dimension, had instead no fixed number of questions but only a series of tracks organized around specific thematic areas in which the subjective dimension of civic integration was operationalized. The table below summarizes the technical details concerning the interviews.

	Vertical dimension	Horizontal dimension	Subjective dimension
Questionnaire	Structured	Structured	Open-ended talk
Empirical Indexes	Knowledge, information, participation	Contacts and trust in others	"Feeling part of"
N. of questions	20	10	Open
Evaluation	Quantitative	Quantitative	Qualitative + Quantitative

Table 2. Technical information about the interviews

The vertical dimension consists of 20 questions aimed at unveiling the amount of knowledge, information and participation held by each respondent. Although strictly interrelated, the three aspects of the vertical relationship between the individual and the Italian political and institutional universe are not all the same. I used the word "knowledge" to signal the extent to which the immigrant is acquainted with the most significant passages of Italian history. Questions on this topic ranged from "which are the colors of Italian flag" to "who was Benito Mussolini" or "in which year did Italy turn into a Republic?". The questions were chosen in such a way so as to not be too demanding, and always keeping in mind what the average, autochthonous Italian citizen could be able to answer.

The term "information", then, was used to indicate the respondent's acquaintance with the notions pertaining what could be called the "civic life", regarding the intersection between the individual's own, private, even everyday life and Italian institutions. Emblematic questions in this part ranged from "How are homosexual unions treated by the Italian State?" or "What is the relationship between the State and religion?" as well as "What is RAI?". The last of the three

subareas forming the vertical dimension, that is "participation", was measured through questions which aimed to unveil the degree to which each responded had interest, opinions and, where possible, within the limits posed by law and lack of relevant resources such as time and money, willingness to make his/her voice heard. Questions in this area ranged from "what is your opinion about XY"? (where those who had whatever opinion scored 1, whereas those who answered "I don't know/don't care scored 0) all the way to "if you could, would you be interested in voting? Why/not?" and "Have you ever participated signed a petition/blog or participated to a demonstration/boycott/public ceremony or sustained a group of public activism in any way?". Here again, the objective had been that of calibrating the questions based on what the average autochthonous Italian could answer.

The horizontal dimension consists in an overall number of 10 questions aimed at making emerge the quality and quantity of contacts and trust of the responded in the other individuals in society. This was the part about "sociality". Emblematic questions here are "In daily life, how often do you come into contact with people of origin different than your own?", "Do you have any Italian friends?", "In general, do you trust more somebody of your own religion/origin or is that it indifferent to you?", "Do your daily problems look to you rather similar or different to those of (other) Italians?". A question aimed at investigating the language proficiency of the respondent was included ("How often do you experience problems to understand what people say when speaking in Italian?") on the grounds that language is a fundamental vehicle of integration at a social level: it is the condition *sine qua non* for sociality. In this part the score could go from 0 to 10.

The subjective dimension of civic integration was treated, as anticipated, with a semi-structured questionnaire. The questions, aimed at unveiling the extent to which the respondent "feels part" of the country in which s/he has been living in the last 15 years at least, can be divided into 7 main thematic areas: the following.

(1) Country of origin and family

(2) Migratory experience

(3) Italian citizenship: reasons for having/not acquired it and opinions on its role in integration

(4) Perceived prejudices and discriminations

(5) Evaluation of lifestyles and values

(6) Identification, belonging and pride

(7) Evaluation of migratory experience and expectations for the future

Thematic areas number 5,6 and 7 are those that most directly tackle the issues of identity and sense of belonging, which are the object of the subjective dimension of civic integration. The other areas however played an equally fundamental role, in that they helped contextualizing the answers in the other parts, lowering down their level of abstractedness. In this sense, the different thematic areas in this part of the interview were built in such a way so as to balance one another and not to lose neither the concrete dimensions of the feeling of belonging, nor its more symbolic and intangible aspects.

The thematic areas, and the specific questions belonging to each of them[36], should not be understood as definite and rigid. On the contrary, they represent tools which helped me to keep the conversation on the right path, and direct it towards the information I wanted to get out of it. I always tried to keep a balance between addressing the conversation towards the things that were interesting to me, and letting the individuals speak without interrupting them too frequently. Depending on the direction each conversation was taking, I would ask certain questions rather than others, in an attempt to get an idea about where each individual stood in the "belonging continuum".

The results of the interviews were, as a first step, analyzed in qualitative terms through discourse analysis techniques, so as an attempt to grasp the respondents' inner meanings and not to lose the richness involved in such in depth interviews. In order to make them usable and comparable with the results obtained in the other two dimensions of civic integration, the same results were however then summarized and operationalized with a more quantitative technique. The ultimate effort of this study was indeed, if not that of providing an actual yes-or-no answer to the question of "what is the impact of citizenship on immigrants' civic integration?", at least that of building a scheme of typologies of individuals in terms of that same relationship.

3.4 Challenges

This research project involved interviews and contact with multiple individuals of immigrant origin. In order to obtain accurate and valuable data it was therefore necessary for me to take into consideration a number of specificities involved into direct contact with human beings in general, and people with immigrant background in particular. These considerations included, most importantly, the vulnerability of some of the respondents, their legitimate initial suspiciousness about the purposes of this project and of its author, their lack of interest in the project, their

[36] A comprehensive list of the questions is available below, in Table 10.

unwillingness to disclose private information to an unknown, their fear of being judged, their lack of time or of other relevant resources.

Furthermore, giving the sensitiveness of the topic of individual levels of integration into host society, which might push one into very intimate considerations about one's own life and sense of the self, I had to be very careful in trying *not to harm*, symbolically or otherwise, the respondents, by always keeping in mind their interests, rights, wellbeing and welfare. While needing to keep some *objectivity* towards the interviewees, I had to put constant effort into avoiding giving them the feeling of being *objectified*, while taking into considerations social and cultural differences between myself and the individuals involved, as well as the social structures and contingent situations in which our interactions took place. In this perspective, I was always conscious that signs, both verbal and non-verbal (Bourdieu, 1999), deserved to be given special and constant reflective attention in the attempt, not only, to fully understand the real message involved in the response, but also and most importantly, to realize how far question could go.

Besides the important ethical concerns described above, carrying out the research also involved a number of other challenges of more practical nature. The first one of these was definitely that of finding the interviewees belonging to the specific sample chosen in order to be able to isolate the "citizenship variable" as much as possible. The snowball technique used for reaching out individuals was not always helpful in giving me access to the targeted individuals, especially taking into consideration the requirement to have a good degree of heterogeneity among respondents. Indeed, first, people are not always updated on the personal/legal status of their acquaintances, and second, people's acquaintances tend to have similar biographical characteristics than their own (in terms of level of instruction and type of job, for example).

On top of that, each immigrant community has its own peculiarities. For example, the Ukrainian community is for 80% made of women (Ponomareva, 2011), and as a consequence of that, the attempt to have an equal proportion of female and male respondents for that community was therefore destined to failure. Similarly, I was going to have a very hard time trying to reaching an equal number of individuals holding and not holding Italian citizenship for communities as different as, say, Albania and the Philippines, which differ to quite a large extent in terms of overall naturalization rates.

Broadly speaking, the concrete difficulties I encountered in finding targeted individuals are all strictly related to the fact that, as it is unanimously recognized, when dealing with human beings it is very hard to isolate variables as one would do in a scientific laboratory. It was therefore virtually impossible for me to find individuals with the exact same characteristics and in the exact same number I had foreseen when designing the research. The sample therefore had to be

continuously adjusted during the course of the research accordingly to the empirical availability of individuals in the different nationality groups.

Still connected to the issue of reaching out the interviewees was the problem of time and space availability. On the one hand, some individuals lacked free time to dedicate to the interview: most of them had very intense working lives, which were often to be conciliated with family or other commitments. Getting a hold of them for the time necessary to carry out the into-depth interview has sometimes required me to meet the interviewee more than once, therefore cutting the interview in small pieces, risking of losing the sense of it, and having to deploy more time and other limited resources than initially foreseen. On the other hand, in some cases it was hard to find a suitable environment where to carry out the interview. In many cases the interviews could not be carried in quiet environments such as apartments or cafes, and had to be done in metro stations, parks, job places and even during bus rides around the city. These kinds of circumstances definitely had an impact on the quality of the time spent with the interviewees, other than, of course, on the quality of the recording.

Another major practical challenge was represented by language. As expected, some individuals did not speak good Italian, which made it hard sometimes for them to express their thoughts and feelings, and for me to understand them. Some of the interviews were therefore carried out in English, which posed sometimes additional risks of misunderstanding and misinterpretation on the part of both the interviewer and the informant. The interviews were all recorded and then transcribed in the original language in which they were carried out, but then the parts to be used in this dissertation were translated into English. Transcription and translations are both selective processes, which might give rise to accuracy concerns.

4. Citizenship and civic integration: an empirical study

The chapter is composed of three main parts. The first section (4.1) presents the overall main results of the study, which are presented as divided up into the three main components of civic integration (vertical, horizontal and subjective dimensions respectively). The second section (4.1) digs deeper into the subjective dimension, by making an attempt to shift from a qualitative method of analysis of the data to a quantitative one. The third and final section (4.3) features a summary of the main findings of the study and a discussion of the same.

4.1 Citizenship and civic integration

The results of the different questionnaires by which the interview was composed were mainly analyzed in light of the main independent variable, which is the fact of holding or not Italian citizenship. This however does not mean that other personal information was not taken into consideration in the final analysis. On the contrary, one of the main objective has been that of analyzing which of the biographical data that had been collected – such as, most importantly, age, gender, level of education, type of job, the fact of having children born in Italy, the fact of being married to an Italian- might interfere with, have greater impact than or reinforce the relevance of the citizenship variable.

4.1.1 Vertical dimension

The vertical dimensions consisted in 20 questions aimed at unveiling the amount of knowledge, information and participation held by each respondent. The three elements are interrelated although not identical, in that by "knowledge" I meant the respondent's acquaintance with the most important historical facts about Italy, by "information" the familiarity with facts concerning the relationship between the individuals' own life and the State, and by "participation" the extent to which they appear to have opinions and interest in what happens within the polity they live in (for more details, see 3.3). Table 4 below shows the list of questions of this first part, while table 5 shows the list of answers.

Table 4. Vertical dimension of civic integration: questionnaire

Vertical dimension: questionnaire

Q.1 What are the colors of the Italian flag?
- Red, yellow, blue
- Red, white, green
- I don't know

Q.2 Benito Mussolini was:
- An Italian dictator
- A famous Italian composer
- I don't know

Q.3 In which year did Italy turn into a Republic?
- 1861
- 1946
- I don't know

Q.4 In Italy, divorce is:
- Illegal
- Legal upon the husband's initiative
- Legal

Q.5 The relationship between Italian State and religion is:
- Catholicism is the official State religion
- There is no official state religion
- I don't know

Q.6 Homosexual couples are:
- Legally recognized
- Not regally recognized
- Persecuted by the law

Q.7 Italy is:
- A parliamentary republic
- A presidential republic
- A parliamentary monarchy

Q.8 Who is the current president of the Republic?
- Matteo Renzi
- Giorgio Napolitano
- Enrico Letta

Q.9 What is RAI?
- The public audio-visual broadcasting service
- The main Italian car industry
- An important brand of pasta

Q.10 What is the population number in Italy?
- About 60 millions
- About 40 millions
- About 90 millions

Q.11 Are you interested in following the socio-political developments in Italy?
- **Yes**
- **No**

Q.12 (a) Have you already used your right to vote in Italy?
- I have always vote/ sometimes voted, other not (for choice/protest)
- I have never or almost never voted (I am not interested in Italian politics)

Q.12 (b) If you had a right to vote in Italy, whom would have you voted in the last elections?
- I would have voted XY/I wouldn't have voted (for choice/protest)
- I wouldn't have voted (I am not interested in Italian politics/ I don't know Italian politics)

Q.13 Do you use at least two of the following media in order to keep informed about the news?
- Radio
- TV
- Magazines
- Daily Newspapers
- Internet

Q.14 Have you ever done one of the following actions?
- signing a petition
- participating to a boycott
- Sit-ins; authorized and/or unauthorized demonstrations; marches; strikes; flash mobs
- participating to a celebrative public ceremony
- using internet to actively express your political opinions
- other forms of political/civic activism (specify)

Q.15 What is your opinion about « technical » governments?
- Opinion X or Y
- I don't know/ I am not interested

Q.16 What is your opinion about the current Italian citizenship law?
- Opinion X or Y
- I don't know/ I am not interested

Q.17 What is your opinion about the « Lega Nord» party?
- Opinion X or Y
- I don't know/ I am not interested

Q.18 What is your opinion about the challenge of the overcrowded prisons in Italy?
- Opinion X or Y
- I don't know/ I am not interested

Q.19 Have you ever been part of one of the following groups?
- Political parties
- Labor group
- Voluntary work
- ONGs
- Civil society associations
- Religious Groups
- Virtual groups (Facebook/Twitter) for a social, religious, political cause

Q.20 Imagine you see someone abandoning his/her waste on a public beach/park/street. Do you think you would feel concerned (like you should do something about it)?
- Yes
- No

Table 5. Vertical dimension of civic integration: table of answers

	Name	Age	In Italy for	Education	Married to an italian?	Children born/raised in Italy	Citizenship	Total Scor	50% right
1	Orlando	49	26	A	no	1	yes	13	1
2	Richard	40	26	B	no	0	yes	3	0
3	Herminia	65	17	C	no	0	yes	8	0
4	Gilbert	45	26	A	no	1	No	18	1
5	Penny	45	25	B	no	1	No	6	0
6	Marcial	53	23	A	no	1	No	7	0
7	Cris	38	15	A	no	1	No	7	0
8	Zorah	63	26	B	no	0	yes	18	1
9	Adbellatif	63	16	A	no	1	No	7	0
10	Abdullah	39	19	C	no	0	No	5	0
11	Zouhir	51	16	A	yes	0	yes	20	1
12	Naim	50	28	A	no	1	yes	17	1
13	Klaudia	46	20	A	yes	1	yes	20	1
14	Emanuele	45	22	A	yes	1	yes	20	1
15	Elvin	46	16	A	no	0	yes	15	1
16	Maksim	60	18	A	no	1	yes	20	1
17	Halyna	45	15	A	no	0	no	14	1
18	Elena	51	17	A	yes	1	yes	20	1
19	Irina (1)	45	15	A	no	0	no	18	1
20	Irina (2)	50	15	A	no	0	no	14	1
21	Yaryna	37	15	B	yes	1	no	7	0
22	Lucio	38	15	A	no	1	no	19	1
23	Lylia	50	20	A	no	1	no	18	1
24	Lyudmilla	57	15	A	no	0	no	15	1
25	Marya	48	15	A	no	0	no	2	0
26	Michele	33	15	A	no	1	no	16	1
27	Nadya	47	15	B	no	0	no	9	0
28	Natalya	48	15	A	yes	1	yes	16	1
29	Olena	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	20	1
30	Vira	48	15	A	no	0	no	16	1
31	Wong	63	35	B	no	1	yes	10	0
32	Sii	30	15	B	no	0	no	3	0
33	Giovanni	56	27	B	no	1	yes	6	0
34	Inin	51	36	A	yes	1	yes	13	1
35	Zhun	65	31	A	yes	1	yes	5	0
36	Sarah	45	28	A	no	1	no	20	1
37	Li	34	16	A	no	0	no	17	1
38	Xiu	38	18	C	no	1	yes	6	0
39	Cristina	40	15	A	no	0	no	17	1
40	Roda	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	15	1
41	Eveline	43	17	A	yes	0	yes	15	1
42	Nadine	39	15	B	yes	1	yes	10	0
43	Lin	37	15	A	no	1	no	18	1
44	Giulio	46	24	A	no	0	no	15	1
45	Luca	48	18	A	no	1	no	15	1
46	Wong (2)	47	30	A	no	0	no	15	1
47	Khalid	36	16	C	no	0	yes	7	0
48	Andrit	33	15	A	no	0	yes	16	1
49	Adam	40	19	A	yes	1	yes	19	1
50	Nedina	40	17	A	no	1	yes	20	1

Of the overall number of 50 respondents, which includes the two groups of naturalized individuals and non, 33 get >50% of the questions right – the threshold that has been individuated as for them to be considered to have passed this part of the test. Of these 33 individuals, 17 are Italian citizenship holders, whereas 16 are not. In percentage terms this means that the citizenship holders are 51% of the total of individual who pass the test, accounting for a small majority. In terms of the impact of citizenship on this first part of the integration test, it is therefore possible to observe that although a majority of those who have passed this first part of the test are Italian citizenship, the majority is so tight (just 1 person, in absolute terms) that citizenship can only be considered to have a somewhat limited impact.



Figure 1. Vertical dimension: respondents who score >50% right



Figure 2. Vertical dimension: % of citizenship holders among those who score well

Apart from Italian citizenship, other factors seem to hold a more consistent impact on the probability of passing the test. Among these, the most relevant appears to be individuals' level of instruction. As figure 3 below shows, out of 33 responders who have passed it, 32 have an "A" level of instruction – that is, a university level. Education therefore clearly appears as having a stronger impact than citizenship in determining individuals' chances of passing this first part of test. This is especially true when considering that, whereas most of the individuals with a university level of instruction pass the test irrespectively of the fact of holding Italian citizenship or not, the contrary is not true, as individuals who have a "B" or "C" level of instruction and do not have citizenship generally do not pass the test. The other side of the coin is that among those who have an "A" level of education, only a small minority (5 individuals over 37) does not pass the test. A high level of instruction is therefore definitely a powerful drive in the case under consideration, that influences individual's score on the test not only in positive terms – that is, a high level of education determines a high score – but also in negative ones – that is, the lowest level of education is always connected to the failing of the test.



Figure 3. Vertical dimension: individuals who score >50% right by level of instruction



Figure 4. Vertical dimension: scores of individuals with an "A" level of instruction

Another factor that appears to hold some relevance is that of mixed marriages (see figure 5 below). The sample of targeted individuals features an overall number of 13 who are married with a native Italian[37]. Of these 13, 10 pass the test- accounting for the 77% of the total. This data, however rough[38], ultimately indicates that having married "a local" most probably has a positive impact on individuals' knowledge, information and participation to Italian civic life.

For what concerns the impact of the fact of having children born or/and raised in Italy, the latter also appears to have at least *some* positive influence on the chances of passing the test- although less significant than the mixed-marriages factor. Out of an overall number of 27 respondents having children raised in Italy, 17 pass the test, and 10 don't. As shown in figure 6 below, the number corresponds to a 63% of the total.

[37] The term "native" is extremely rough and destined to disuse in the context of our contemporary societies. In this context, however, the term is unfortunately the only that allows me to distinguish between the individuals under consideration- that is individuals with immigrant background who have acquired Italian citizenship- and the rest- that is individuals with no recent immigrant background (some call them the "immobiles").

[38] The data could be refined and deepened. For example, a further, plausible hypothesis could be that the more engaged the autochthonous wife/husband, the more informed and willing to participate is the relative spouse. Unfortunately, however, I did not come into possession of relevant data about the wife/husband.



Figure 5. Vertical dimension: scores of individuals who are married to native Italians



Figure 6. Vertical dimension: scores of individuals who have children raised in Italy

Two factors that one might have expected to have some weight in the final score and that instead do not are, namely, years of residence and age of the respondents. The average years of residence in Italy are similar for those who pass and those who fail this part of the test, and as those who pass it have an average of 19.2 and those who don't of 20.1 (1 point of difference does not seem to suggest anything in particular). The same can be said for the age of the respondents, in which the difference in the averages of the two groups is again of just 1 point (45.8 is the average age of those who pass the test, and 47.1 of those who do not).

Table 6. Positive impact of different factors on a good result in the vertical dimension of the test

Positive impact of different factors[39]		
	Limited impact	**No impact**
• High level of instruction • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy • Citizenship	• Years of residence • Age

Based on the data collected during through the interviews, table 6 above summarizes the main findings about the relative impact that different biographical data have on individuals' chances of scoring well (>50% right) in this first part of the test. Education appears to have the greatest impact, as particularly high or low levels of instruction are linked, respectively, to a good or low score. Mixed marriages and the fact of having one or more children born and/or raised in Italy also appears to have some relevant impact; indeed, even though this data could not be tested on the

whole sample, as those two categories apply to only some of the individuals in the target, for the individuals who do fall in those categories, the result is positive. On the opposite extreme, I noticed that age and years of residence in Italy did not make any significant difference in determining the score. Finally, citizenship appears to have a limited impact in that its impact is positive in only 50%+1 of the cases. In particular, it appears that the high-level-of-instruction factor can interfere with the citizenship factor, in that whenever citizenship is combined with a poor level of instruction then the individual score is low, whereas when it is combined with a high level, then the score is high in almost all cases. Citizenship, alone, therefore does not seem to a strong enough drive to determine a good score at the test.

4.1.2 Horizontal dimension

The horizontal part consisted in 10 questions aimed at uncovering the quality and quantity of relationships and trust in other individuals in society – being them Italians, immigrants from their community or from other communities. More in particular, the questions included in this second part of the structured questionnaire were designed to understand the extent to which the individuals involved have the chance to meet with other individuals and build social links in their daily life. The importance of social capital in providing for the integration of individuals into societies has already been discussed elsewhere (see Ch. 1, section 1.4), it might suffice here to say that the relational aspect of civic integration is just as crucial as any other of its components.

[39] Strong impact is above 70%; limited is between 50% and 69% and no impact is anything below 50% (which means that the factor has either no impact or an actually negative impact).

Table 7. Horizontal dimension of civic integration: questionnaire

Horizontal dimension: questionnaire

Q.21 How often do you come into contact with people with a different origin than your own in your daily life?
- Often/ pretty often
- Never/ almost never /not very often

Q.22 Here in Italy do you have a person you feel you can talk to about your most intimate and personal feelings?
- Yes
- No

Q.23 How many Italians do you hang out with out of your working environment?
- Some/Many
- Very few[40]

Q.24 Among them, are there any that you feel you can trust?
- Yes
- No

Q.25 In general, do you think that one can trust most of the people who live in Italy, or rather do you feel that caution towards the strangers is never too much?
- I think one can trust most people in Italy
- One is never too cautious towards strangers

Q.26 In general, do you trust more people of your same origin/religion, or is that indifferent for you?
- Same origin/religion
- Indifferent

Q.27 How often do you experience problems in understanding what people say when speaking Italian?
- Often/Pretty often
- Never/ Rarely

Q.28 Do you feel like your origin is a problem in building relations of trust with other individuals in Italy with an origin different that your own?
- Yes (often/ in most cases)
- No (never/almost never/in exceptional cases)

Q.29 Besides work, in the last year have you had the chance to do at list one of the following activities?
- Sport
- Cultural or artistic activities
- Political activities
- Educational activities
- Linguistic activities
- Activities of professional update
- Charity activities
- Other similar activities (specify)

Q.30 Do your daily problems look to you rather similar or rather different to those of (other) Italians?
- Rather similar
- Rather different

[40] The option "none" was erased when it became clear that, for some reasons which it would be interesting to investigate, nobody used it.

Table 8. Horizontal dimension of civic integration: table of answers

	Name	Origin	Age	In Italy for	Education	Job	Married to an italian?	Children born/raised in Italy	Citizenship	Score	50% right
1	Orlando	Philippines	49	26	A	C	no	1	yes	6	1
2	Richard	Philippines	40	26	B	B	no	0	yes	6	1
3	Herminia	Philippines	65	17	C	B	no	0	yes	5	0
4	Gilbert	Philippines	45	26	A	A	no	1	No	8	1
5	Penny	Philippines	45	25	B	B	no	1	No	3	0
6	Marcial	Philippines	53	23	A	B	no	1	No	4	0
7	Cris	Philippines	38	15	A	B	no	1	No	5	0
8	Zorah	Morocco	63	26	B	A	no	0	yes	9	1
9	Adbellatif	Morocco	63	16	A	B	no	1	No	4	0
10	Abdullah	Morocco	39	19	C	B	no	0	No	2	0
11	Zouhir	Morocco	51	16	A	A	yes	0	yes	10	1
12	Naim	Morocco	50	28	A	A	no	1	yes	10	1
13	Klaudia	Albania	46	20	A	A	yes	1	yes	10	1
14	Emanuele	Albania	45	22	A	A	yes	1	yes	7	1
15	Elvin	Albania	46	16	A	A	no	0	yes	10	1
16	Maksim	Albania	60	18	A	A	no	1	yes	10	1
17	Halyna	Ukraine	45	15	A	B	no	0	no	5	0
18	Elena	Ukraine	51	17	A	A	yes	1	yes	10	1
19	Irina (1)	Ukraine	45	15	A	B	no	0	no	5	0
20	Irina (2)	Ukraine	50	15	A	B	no	0	no	4	0
21	Yaryna	Ukraine	37	15	B	B	yes	1	no	10	1
22	Lucio	Ukraine	38	15	A	B	no	1	no	8	1
23	Lylia	Ukraine	50	20	A	A	no	1	no	5	0
24	Lyudmilla	Ukraine	57	15	A	B	no	0	no	5	0
25	Marya	Ukraine	48	15	A	B	no	0	no	2	0
26	Michele	Ukraine	33	15	A	B	no	1	no	5	0
27	Nadya	Ukraine	47	15	B	B	no	0	no	5	0
28	Natalya	Ukraine	48	15	A	C	yes	1	yes	10	1
29	Olena	Ukraine	45	15	A	A	yes	0	yes	10	1
30	Vira	Ukraine	48	15	A	B	no	0	no	4	0
31	Wong	China	63	35	B	A	no	1	yes	7	1
32	Sii	China	30	15	B	A	no	0	no	4	0
33	Giovanni	China	56	27	B	A	no	1	yes	8	1
34	Inin	China	51	36	A	A	yes	1	yes	8	1
35	Zhun	China	65	31	A	A	yes	1	yes	8	1
36	Sarah	China	45	28	A	A	no	1	no	5	0
37	Li	China	34	16	A	B	no	0	no	7	1
38	Xiu	China	38	18	C	C	no	1	yes	7	1
39	Cristina	Philippines	40	15	A	C	no	0	no	2	0
40	Roda	Philippines	45	15	A	B	yes	0	yes	3	0
41	Eveline	Philippines	43	17	A	B	yes	0	yes	7	1
42	Nadine	Morocco	39	15	B	A	yes	1	yes	8	1
43	Lin	China	37	15	A	A	no	1	no	1	0
44	Giulio	China	46	24	A	B	no	0	no	6	1
45	Luca	China	48	18	A	B	no	1	no	1	0
46	Wong (2)	China	47	30	A	B	no	0	no	2	0
47	Khalid	Morocco	36	16	C	B	no	0	yes	6	1
48	Andrit	Albania	33	15	A	A	no	0	yes	4	0
49	Adam	Albania	40	19	A	A	yes	1	yes	9	1
50	Nedina	Albania	40	17	A	B	no	1	yes	5	0

The first, relevant information that it is possible to draw from the table of answers above is that the overall number of those who "pass" this second part of test (i.e. get more than 50% of the questions right) is of 26 over 50. This number is considerably lower than that of the vertical

dimension, which saw overall 33 individuals scoring well. Combining this data with the one on the citizenship status of the individuals concerned, it is possible to notice that the great majority of those who pass the test hold Italian citizenship – that is 81% of the total (21 individuals over an overall of 26). The implication is that only 4 individuals among those who have Italian citizenship do not pass the test.



Figure 7. Horizontal dimension: respondents who score >50% right



Figure 8. Horizontal dimension: % of citizenship holders among those who score well

The figures above clearly show the preponderance of individuals holding Italian citizenship on the group of those who score more than 50% right, therefore testifying that, in this second part of the test, differently than in the first, citizenship plays a rather significant role in determining individuals' chances of developing relational network and ultimately social capital. A second astonishing difference in the biographical characteristics of those who pass this part of the test *vìs à vìs* those who pass the first part is represented by the diverging weight of individuals' respective level of instruction. While in the vertical dimension instruction emerged as being directly correlated with individual's chances of getting a high score in that part of the test, here it is not so much the case: among those who get a high score, only 49% have an "A" level of instruction – that is, a minority.



Figure 9. Horizontal dimension: scores of individuals with an "A" level of instruction



Figure 10. Horizontal dimension: scores of individuals with "B" and "C" levels of instruction

Figures 9 and 10 above give a clear account of the very limited impact that a high level of instruction might play on a positive score. Indeed, by simultaneously looking at both figures, one can easily notice that not only the majority (51%) of those who have an "A" level of instruction get a low score, but also that actually it is those who have lower level of instructions ("B" and "C") that have proportionally higher chances of passing the test. What this means, overall, is first of all that a high level of education is *not* directly correlated with a good score at the test, and secondly, that it seems that the relation works the opposite way (the lower level of education, the higher chances of passing the test).

Differently than for the high-level-of-instruction factor, one information that *does* appear to have a very significant impact on the chances of scoring well in this part of the test is the fact of being married to a native Italian. As the figure 11 below shows, of the all of individuals who in the targeted sample group happen to be married to a native Italian, 92% of them score well in this relational dimension of the test. This The number is higher than that registered in the vertical dimension of the test.

Another, further factor that appear to have *some* positive influence, although not an extremely relevant one, on the chances of passing this part of the test, is the fact of having children born or/and raised in Italy. Out of an overall number of 27 respondents having children raised in Italy, 17 pass the test and 10 don't (just the same as in for the vertical dimension of integration). The overall number of those who pass the test corresponds to a 58% of the total, which allows me to put this factors in the list of those who have a limited impact.



Figure 11. Horizontal dimension: scores of individuals who are married to native Italians



Figure 12. Horizontal dimension: scores of individuals who have children raised in Italy

As for the other two biographical information that I have individuated as potentially critical in influencing the individual scores at the test – that is age of the respondent and years of residence – here again, just as in the vertical dimension of the test, it is possible to note that they do not have any relevant impact on the result. Indeed, the difference in average age of those who pass the test and of those who do not is minimal: 46 years old for the first group and 45.5 for those who do not.

The difference is inconsistent also in the case of average years of residence, that is, 17 for those who score well and 16.5 for the others. Note that here the average age of both groups is below the average age of the same groups in the case of the first part of the test and, more in general, to the average age of the overall group which, ranging from 15 to 36 years, has an average of 19.5 years.

Table 9. Positive impact of different factors on a good result in the horizontal dimension of the test

Positive impact of different factors		
	Limited impact	**No impact**
• Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy	• High level of instruction • Years of residence • Age

Based on the data collected during through the interviews, table 9 above summarizes the main findings about the relative impact that different biographical data have on individuals' chances of scoring well (>50% right) in this second part of the test, relative to the horizontal dimension of civic integration. A first comparison of the results of this part with those of the vertical dimension of the test makes it is possible to notice that the overall numbers of those who pass the horizontal

part of the test is lower: 26 individuals, instead of the 33 who passed the vertical dimension. Furthermore, contrarily to what emerged in the first part, here citizenship appears to play a significant role in increasing individual probabilities of passing the test, as indeed the great majority of those who pass the test hold it (81%) and, conversely, only 20% of non-holders do.

Education, which in the vertical dimension of the test appeared to play the most important role in determining individual chances of scoring well, in this second part instead does not appear to play any significant role. Other factors that have a relevant impact are, in order, mixed marriages and the fact of having one or more children born and/or raised in Italy. The relative weight of each of those factors is the same as for the vertical dimension, where the impact of mixed marriages was observed to be very strong, while the fact of having children in Italy appeared as having a limited impact. In the same fashion, individuals' age and years of residence in Italy still did not make any significant difference in determining the score in this part just as they did not in the first part.

4.1.3 Subjective dimension

As illustrated in section 4.1.3, in the part of the interview concerned with subjective dimension of civic integration, questions were organized around 7 main thematic areas, each of which having to do with one of the crucial aspects of individuals' own migratory experience and image of the self in relation to it. The areas are logically distinct, although of course in practice strictly related to one another. Table 10 below summarizes them. The areas that most directly tackle the issue of self-identification and sense of belonging are areas 5, 6 and 7 respectively. Areas 1 to 4 instead played the vital role of contextualizing the other areas by rooting them into the respondent's personal migratory history and lowering down the level of abstractedness of the answers that the questions contained in areas 5, 6 and 7 (such as "do you feel at home in this country?) would have otherwise inevitably produced.

Table 10. Subjective dimension of civic integration: thematic areas

Subjective dimension: thematic areas

(1) Country of origin and family:

- What is the current situation in your country of origin? Do many people decide to emigrate? Who emigrates? Why? Mostly towards which countries? What do they look for?
- Which particular city/region do you come from?
- Where does your family live?
- Has anybody else in your family decided to emigrate? Where?
- How often do you see your family? How often do you go back to your home country?
- Do you send money to your family? How often? How is the money generally employed?

(2) Migratory experience:

- Could you tell me your story of emigration from your home country?
- What pushed you to leave? How old were you? Which was your situation in that moment?
- Did you go to other countries before arriving here? Which ones? Why? How did you find yourself in those?
- What were some of the most important difficulties you had to face? How did you face them?

(3) Italian citizenship: reasons for having/not acquired it and opinion about its role in integration:

- Why did you choose to acquire/not Italian citizenship?
- In your opinion, does citizenship help in fostering integration? Has it worked/would it work for you or for others in your situation?

(4) Perceived prejudices and discriminations:

- How often do you feel mistreated or discriminated because of your foreign origins/religion? How does that make you feel?
- Have you already witnessed or experienced acts of discrimination or racism towards yourself or other people of foreign origin?
- How much do you think people act the way they do because of your ethnic origin/religion rather than seeing you as a person? How does that make you feel?
- In your overall experience, how respectful are people in Italy towards people of foreign origin?

(5) Evaluation of lifestyles and values

- What is your opinion about the way people live and behave in Italy?
- What are the aspects that you like/share and that you do not like/share?
- How, if in any way, has your life in Italy transformed your way of thinking and your behavior?
- How, if in any way, has your life in Italy transformed the image that you have about the dominant values in your country of origin?

(6) Identification, belonging and pride:

- How much being a Moroccan/Ukrainian/etc. has to do with what you think about yourself?
- How much all these years in Italy have shaped the image that you have about yourself? And to what extent is it instead shaped by your Moroccan/Ukrainian/etc. background?
- How important it is to you to live according to Moroccan/Ukrainian/etc. values?
- To what extent do you feel a member of the Italian society?
- To what extent are you proud of being a group member of the Italian society?
- Do you feel at home in Italy?
- Do you think of yourself as an Italian?

(7) Evaluation of migratory experience and expectations for the future:

- Overall, would you say that your experience in Italy is a positive one?
- If you could go back in time, would you choose another country to migrate to? Which one? Why?
- Are you satisfied with the expectations you had before leaving about living Italy?
- Plans for the future: do you see your life in this or in another country? Which one? Why?
- Do you feel like you have all of the conditions to develop your plans for the future for you and (if applicable) your family?

The main aims of track 1 and 2 were to make the conversation start smoothly, while giving me an idea about the context beyond each individual respondent decision to leave their country and come to Italy. Individuals from the same country of origin have, for obvious reasons, in most cases a shared sense of the particular situation in their home country which determined their decision to emigrate; however, since all individuals come from countries characterized by important emigration fluxes, the conditions which made them emigrate were after all not so different among them. Economic reasons are indeed at the basis of most individuals' decision to migrate (the second most popular reason being reuniting with the family/partner).

> "I lost my job at home. I needed to *earn money* in order to get married." (Morocco, not naturalized)
>
> "I didn't choose to emigrate, I just had no choice. (..). My father was ill, he needed expensive medicines (…), and *there were no jobs* at home." (China, naturalized)
>
> "My brother was coming back home for holidays, and I came to substitute him at work. (…) Here I found that I could *earn well* – at the time there was no economic crisis. So I stayed.." (Ukraine, not naturalized)
>
> "I met my [Italian] husband in Ukraine, I was working for the Italian Embassy there (…). I decided to *follow him*." (Ukraine, naturalized)

When asked about the reasons for choosing to pick up (or not) Italian citizenship, the individuals of each group (naturalized and non) appeal to reasons that are quite internally homogeneous, but different among the two groups. Among those holding Italian citizenship, the reasons for picking it up are, in the vast majority of cases, of instrumental character. Indeed, a majority of respondents answered that they had the impression that the acquisition of citizenship would just "make their lives easier" in at least one way. Some even pointed to one concrete, specific reason that pushed to apply for citizenship, such as a particular career opportunity, or other necessities linked to different types of bureaucratic pressures experienced as non-citizens.

> "Citizenship simplifies things. It's not about having more rights, but rather, about having *less bureaucratic problems*. (…) It gives the State a lot of certainties, so that if you want to settle down here you have no major problems.' (China, naturalized Italian)
>
> "[Citizenship] *makes me feel more relaxed*. If my lost my job tomorrow and could not find a new one within a year as foreseen by the laws, what would happen to me if I

didn't have citizenship? What would happen to my 2-year old child? Would I be sent back to my Ukraine? As a noncitizens you are always living with that fear.'(Ukraine, naturalized)

"[Citizenship] just *makes your life easier* (…). To give you an example, for both the short-term and the long-term resident permit one may be subjected to a thousand controls, such as for example the one on housing conditions ... if one is Italian, no one goes to check on what kind of house he lives. If you are a foreigner, the police could come and check that your house is of enough square meters for the number of family components, you must have an extra room for a guest, and must have a certificate of hygienic-sanitary adequacy. I live alone with my son (…), and had some problems renewing our residence permit, when on top of me, in a house exactly like mine, lives an Italian family consisting of husband, wife, two sons and three dogs. So what was I supposed to do ... rent a seven rooms' apartment? I couldn't afford it. So I had to make fake documents? I would have been outlawed! So now you see what I mean when I say that the stranger is often put in a position in which he *cannot do anything but lie*, and take risks. *You're always afraid* that they find you find something that doesn't comply with the absurd bureaucratic rules." (Albania, naturalized)

Only in three men (two Chinese, one Moroccan) mentioned reasons which seemed to be connected with questions of identity. Still, in all of those cases, identity was only mentioned as "one of the reasons", following, most notably, other reasons related to concrete opportunities, just as mentioned in the extracts above. In the last extract the weight of identity reasons in the decision of picking up citizenship is even quite ambiguous: it is not completely clear if the reason why the respondent laments the fact of having to stand in the "foreigners' line" is bad for him. Is it because after all the years in Italy he does not feel a foreigner and thinks he should not be treated as such, or is it rather because he just thinks that there should be a way of making life easier for long-term foreign residents?

"After Tiananmen, I was so *disappointed with China* that I started looking at *Italy as a better place to live*. I like it here, now my life is here."(China, naturalized)

"After so many years in Italy, *not being "completely Italian"* was a *strange* thing to me. So taking up citizenship was like completing it." (Morocco, naturalized)

"It's just one of those small things that make the difference, you know? When I hadn't yet acquired Italian citizenship, at the airport gates I was always *treated like a complete stranger to the country me and my whole family has been living*, working and paying taxes for years. I had to stand in the "third-country nationals" line for long time- sometimes even half an hour- while the track for Italians was completely empty. It was very annoying."(Philippines, naturalized)

On the opposite extreme, individuals in the group of non-citizens tend to have quite different explanations for *not* seeking Italian citizenship. Rather than instrumental-based, as it was for those who decided to pick up Italian citizenship, the reasons of the group of non-citizens are in most cases value-related. Indeed, although some might also mention instrumental reasons (of the kind of "I don't really need it"), the decision not to pick up Italian citizenship is ultimately always linked in their narratives to deeper non-instrumental motivations, such as strong feelings of belonging to the home country, fear of being looked as a "betrayer" and willingness not to weaken the liaison with their country. Surprisingly enough, these kind of value-concerns were not only mentioned by individuals whose mother country does not recognize double-citizenship (like Ukraine or China), but also by those coming from countries which in theory would (like Morocco). To be noted that the fact of not picking up citizenship reveals in most cases a more or less explicit desire (or plan) to head back to one's own country of origin some day in the future.

> "If I give up my Chinese citizenship, then getting it back again will be really difficult. *With an Italian visa I can travel* back and forth from China to Italy and from Italy to China with no problems. That's *all I need*." (Chinese, not naturalized)
>
> "*I feel Moroccan*. Why would I apply for Italian citizenship?" (Morocco, not naturalized)
>
> "Picking up Italian citizenship to then be seen as a *betrayer* of my *home country*? No thank you, that's not what I want." (Ukranian, not naturalized)
>
> "Now I am trying to get information on if there are ways to take Italian citizenship without losing my Ukrainian one… but if there are no ways to do that, *I just cannot do it*. Living here, far from home and family, is already very hard for me. Giving up my citizenship would be like *cutting bridges* with my home countries, and I really cannot do that." (Ukrainian, not naturalized)

In terms of opinions about the role that citizenship acquisition plays in fostering immigrants' sense of belonging, individuals in the two groups (naturalized and non) had similar reactions. For the majority of them, sense of belonging does not rest on the fact of holding Italian citizenship or not, but rather on a certain "individual attitude", also referred to as a "real willingness" to be part of a certain society, or else, for others, on the fact of having "satisfying job" which makes the individual be proud of living in a place that has provided her/him with such opportunity. The general feeling that I got from here is that individuals tend to think of citizenship as to "just a piece

of paper" which does not necessarily affect individual's chances of developing a sense of *feeling part* of the society.

In this context of general disillusionment about the actual integration potential of citizenship, I was particularly surprised to observe important differences in how naturalized and non-naturalized individuals live similar experiences. When dealing with the issue of discrimination and racism towards individuals of foreign origin, for example, the two groups reacted in extremely different ways. While agreeing on the idea that citizenship does not represent the end of all discriminations and racism, which many individuals in both groups have occasionally experienced or witnessed, non-citizens appear to have an attitude of helplessness towards these kind of episodes - as if they were just something that an individual of foreign origin was forced to accept and live with – whereas a high number of citizens are joined by an astonishing combative attitude, which pushes them not to passively accept discrimination. In this context, citizenship indeed seems to exercise a sort of positive psychological effect on individuals who hold it, giving them courage and confidence to stand up for their rights.

> "When the bus arrived I was furious because I had been waiting for it for 45 minutes. So I complained to the driver and you know what he told me? He said: if you don't like it, why don't you go back to your country. I found that really offensive but *I didn't shut up* (…). I replied: look, *this is my country!* I am an Italian citizens, just like you! That made him shut up. He was really an ignorant." (Morocco, naturalized)

> "Having Italian citizenship doesn't stop others from treating me as a foreigner as soon as they hear my Albanian accent; it just gives me the *possibility of telling them* that I am not."
> (Albania, naturalized)

> "No matter what we do, for many native Italians we will never be real Italians. But *we are*, and one day or another *they will have to just get over it*!" (Philippines, naturalized)

The last statement is particularly revealing of this kind of positive, combative psychological attitude characterizing the statements of individuals who belong to the group of Italian citizens. The idea on the background seems to be: too bad if some people do not want us, we are here to stay. It is just as if individuals stopped feeling just "guests" and started experiencing a new life as "members" who are not anymore obliged to just accept everything that they are given, and understand that their say becomes as legitimate as that of others'. The attitude is sensibly different than that of non-citizens who, as anticipated, instead perceive discrimination as something that they just have to accept and cannot do very much about. The feeling of helplessness emerges quite evidently in

statements like the following ones, which point to a very generalized sense, among non-citizens, that there is just no point in responding to the provocations.

> "The fact is [that] (…) *Italians just don't like foreigners*. They only tolerate them as long as they clean the floor of their apartments, or when they take care of their elderly for a miserable pay, but not when they ask for rights." (Ukraine, not naturalized)

> "One day I had some kids coming to me and telling me that I am a foreigner, that I should just go home. (…) I didn't say anything to that, *I didn't respond*. What difference would it make? I just want to live my life in peace… (Philippine, not naturalized)

The fact of choosing to passively accept acts of open discrimination and racism is, in the case of a number of non-citizens, also linked to the fear of another form of discrimination, that is ethnic profiling by the police[41]. Some non-citizens explicitly bring up the fear that reacting would then put them into troubles, because if a fight starts and the police gets called, the latter would surely put the blame on non-citizens, as according to these individuals the police is also always openly discriminating against foreigners. The second sentence is particularly astonishing, as the speaker even says that the police is always out to catch non-citizens as soon as they do something wrong, as if deep within himself he was ultimately recognizing that a foreigner responding to a citizen could be really seen something "wrong", that the foreigner should not do.

> "Say that I responded (…), and we got in a fight. The police might have come, and for sure they *don't blame the Italians, but me, because I am a foreigner,* and they might even bring me to prison for things like that." (Philippines, not naturalized)

> "One must be careful, the Carabinieri are always out there *to send foreigners out* as soon as they do something wrong." (Morocco, not naturalized)

The broader, overall impression that I got by comparing the statements of the two groups (naturalized and non) is indeed that whereas both see discrimination and racism as "a fact" that does not change after naturalization, they tend to have very different reactions and attitudes towards it.

[41] The Open Society Institute (2009) defines "ethnic profiling" as the "use of generalizations grounded in ethnicity, race, national origin, or religion - rather than objective evidence or individual behavior - as the basis for making law enforcement and/or investigative decisions about who has been or may be involved in criminal activity" .

Non-citizens experience a condition of *helplessness* which ultimately grows feelings of resentments against Italians, whereas citizens are more eager to interpret acts of racism and discrimination to a certain "ignorance" of a part of the population which happens in all societies.

> "Racism exists everywhere in the world (…). It's human. But *not all people in Italy are like that*. Every time that I witness an act of racism by an Italian towards a person of foreign origin, on the bus or other public spaces (…), *there is always another Italian who speaks up to defend* that person." (Ukraine, naturalized)

> "People in my workplace were just troubled by my presence. Well, I cannot blame them, it was 18 years ago, and it was the south of Italy(…), most of them had never seen a Chinese in their life! Imagine what it must have been, for them, to have to work with one. (…) They were *not bad people*. They were *just closed-minded*, in the sense that they just ignored everything that was outside of the small reality they lived in". (Chinese, naturalized)

When talking about their home country and their many years away from it, individuals from both groups appear substantially similar. Most of them remember nostalgically their home country and would like to have the opportunity to go back more often. However, here again there is a qualitative difference in the specific ways in which they talked about their nostalgia, in how they described it. While for many naturalized nostalgia was lived as something natural, and even positive, in that it kept their origins and souvenirs alive, for non-citizens it represents a burden, something that makes their life in Italy difficult, sometimes unlivable, like a "illness".

> What do I miss? My culture, my roots…I carry that sense of nostalgia deep within me. It is a nostalgia that stays inside and that is like a small illness, that everyday digs a little deeper, constantly remembering you that you are far away… it is really hard. It is that *nostalgia that doesn't allow me to see my future here*. From time to time I ask myself questions about staying or leaving (…)…The *problem* is that my daughter who had arrived here 5 years ago, is now starting to like it here, to feel at home… *it's a mess*.(Ukraine, not naturalized)

> As time passed, and I grew older and I started understanding the importance of my roots, of the culture I was born and grew up in. When I arrived in Italy I did not care about it, I was young, I was just overwhelmed everything that was new and extremely curious. *Today I give more importance to my origins*, I miss my parents who back home are getting older, and *try to transmit my roots to my son* who has grown up here. (China, naturalized)

The two quotes, where the respondents are both women but the first is a non-citizen and the second has naturalized, are emblematic of a qualitatively different way of living the nostalgia that the fact of having lived many years out of one's own country produce. Both respondents mention their culture and roots as what they miss. In the first case, however, the respondent says that the feeling prevents her from seeing her future here, and is worried because her daughter instead appears to like Italy and be willing to stay. This does not emerge instead in the second case, where the nostalgia does not seem to affect the choice of living in Italy, but it is rather lived as something natural, which comes at a certain phase of one's life, namely adulthood, and almost "helps" or "allows" the individual to get back in contacts with her roots and to transmit them to her son. Also in this second case the respondent has a child, but the fact that the son appears to be well-rooted in Italy is not lived as a potential problem.

More in general, non-citizens seem to experience a greater feeling of precariousness and insecurity than citizens, which appears to be connected (or even caused?), in many cases, by the fact of not having made a clear choice about staying or leaving. Non-citizens appear to be struggling between the dream of going back home and start a new life elsewhere (most often, their country of origin), and the reality of all of the difficulties (most often, economic) that such a plan would inevitably involve.

> "*The more we stay here, the worse* for us [the speaker and his wife]. Our son is now 3 years old, and we have another on the way (…). If in, say, 10 years we decide to leave Italy, my son will say: "What?? Why would I live? I like it here, this is my country". In this sense, the more we stay the worse. *It's like a clock bomb for us*." (Ukraine, not naturalized)

The sense of precariousness is really a recurrent, characterizing element of the narrations of non-citizens, when it comes to look at the future and talk about their life perspectives. From hearing them talk about their choices, both in the past and for the future, one can really perceive that there is a sense that their life is not so much in their hands, and that they are not in full control of their choices. Some explicitly mention God's will or destiny and accept that to be the main driving force for their choices.

"We [the speaker and his wife] have set a date for our repatriation: the end of 2014. But we don't know if this time we will be able to keep up with what we have decided. In the past it was not possible. *Time will tell*." (Ukraine, not naturalized)

"*Only God knows* if and when I will *be able* go back." (Philippines, not naturalized)

"Coming here was not really a choice for me (…). There were no jobs at home, hunger everywhere in my region. I just had to emigrate somewhere. (..) The same for going back. I will only move back to China *if good luck doesn't turn its back to me*." (Chinese, not naturalized)

"If it was for my wife, we would leave tomorrow, she really misses home(…)… but now it's too early for me, we still have to gain money. *We'll see how things go* in the next years, how are parents back home do. (male form Morocco)

"*I have stopped making plans*, when the moment will be right, I will go. Now I cannot. (….)What is sure, is that when I cannot work anymore, my life here is over (…). We'll see *what God has prepared for me*. " (Albania, not naturalized)

Quite differently, individuals who have naturalized seem to experience greater stability which enables them to think about their future in a more serene way. Some of them actually even talk about the possibility of going back to their country one day but, differently than for non-citizens, the possibility is presented more as less like a question of fate or destiny, and more like a potential decision that they are in full command of.

"My life is here now; my family, my business, everything is here. *No doubt* that my future is here." (Albani, naturalized)

"I might go back to the Philippines one day, when I get old, after pension. But I will only leave after I have settled both my sons, once they have found a stable job and a house. At that point they will be autonomous and *I can plan to settle* back in the Philippines with clear conscience and *no major problems*." (Filipino, Naturalized)

Also when talking about how their experience in Italy has changed them, it is possible to point to some relevant differences between citizens and non. While a majority of individuals of both groups recognize that the migratory experience has changed them in some way, the specific way in which individuals in the two groups live the change is qualitatively different. Non-citizens appear to live their growing attachment to Italy as a sort of problem. As the first two extracts below show, the new relationship with Italy is indeed seen, in the first case, as something that might make the

individual "different" in the eyes of compatriots at home, and in the second, as what makes migrants "destined to be unhappy". The overall picture that one gets from non-citizens statements is that the immigration experience has almost forced on these individuals a double identity which is however neither desired nor even fully accepted.

> "Now when I go back to my country they call me "the Italian"; sometimes *this makes me sad*, because it's as if they didn't recognize me as one of them anymore, as they wanted to put a *distance between us.* (…)The fact that I live in Italy doesn't make me less Ukrainian. (Ukraine, not naturalized)
>
> "When I am in Italy, I miss Albania; when I am in Albania (…), I miss Italy. Migrants are *destined to be always unhappy*. " (Albania, not naturalized)

Quite differently, in the case of naturalized citizens, the growing attachment to Italy is lived as something positive: some explicitly describe it as a "nice surprise" (3rd extract); others take it as "a fact" that results from questions of preference of the Italian habits over those of the country of origin (4th extract) and others describe it as almost natural development of their lifestyle that they explain with a degree of pride (5th extract).

> "You know when I realized that I was starting to be Italian? Watching football. I realized that the Italian national team gives me the same and even greater emotions than the Moroccan. *It was a nice surprise*." (Morocco, naturalized)
>
> "Sometimes I miss China, especially for food…but *I could never go back to live there* after having lived here for so long. For example, in China people spit all the time (….), something which I am not used to anymore, and that profoundly irritates me now that *I got used to Italy* where people don't have this habit. That's normal, after all these years, I got used, and *I prefer it the Italian way*." (China, naturalized)
>
> "The Philippines is my country, but *I like Italy, it's safer, people are nice* and then you know… I am like an Italian now, in the morning I have "cappuccino" and for dinner I have prosciutto, mozzarella and Italian bread. Not like Filipinos, who have rice all the time… personally, now I only have rice for lunch." (Philippines, naturalized)

The question of personal proximity to Italian lifestyles and dominant values is however not unproblematic, as indeed most individuals (naturalized and non) appear to *not* feel at ease with a yes-or-no endorsement of (what they perceive to be) Italian lifestyle and values, and prefer to point to aspects that they share and aspects that they do not. In both cases, there emerge no significant differences between individuals who are naturalized and individuals who are not. As for aspects that

they do not share, one theme that was brought up spontaneously many times by individuals of both groups, and on which the difference between Italy and the countries of origin of the respondents was often asserted fiercely, was that concerning the education of children. On this specific topic I could not register any difference whatsoever between the them, as the impressive and almost unanimous[42] rejection for what is perceived to be the Italian model for children's education was irrespective of individual citizenship status.

> "One of the most difficult things for me in Italy has been... being a mother.(...) My greater difficulty has been to face the Italian *system of instruction, that I do not share*. For example discovering the Italian middle school has been a great shock for me. Poor quality, poor education, poor instructors. Teachers have no authority... there are no rules. For me there must be rules, and adults have the duty of transmitting them." (Albania, not naturalized)

> "*Here kids grow like the grass in the garden*... they are clean, well-dressed, well-fed...but they are infantile, anarchic. They are not able to take on responsibilities. And then they turn into adults who are not able to take on responsibilities." (Ukraine, naturalized)

> "Here in Italy the children are *ill-educated* ... I've seen terrible things, like children speaking up to their parents. They are just rude. *In Morocco it is different* .. a child can never talk back to a parent. We teach them to have respect for the elderly, *we teach them the rules*, and if a child does not comply, he is immediately punished, so he understands. *Here it is not like that* (…), here it looks like it is the children who rules, the parents are not able to teach them respect."(Morocco, not naturalized)

Generally speaking, children's education in Italy therefore really does represent an hot topic for individuals of foreign origin. The other most frequent criticisms are instead about the fact of giving too much attention to appearances, and that of not taking enough care of the "incredible beauty" of Italian cities. Surprisingly enough, the chart about the things that individuals of foreign origin *do like* about Italy values is equally homogenous, as individuals in both groups (naturalized and non) tend to point to a similar aspect, that is, namely the "warmness" of Italians, and in particular what they describe as a particular form of generosity.

The very concept of "Italian dominant values" therefore appears too abstract to the respondents and therefore not very useful in the context of this interview to understand individuals' overall evaluation of the life models and culture the country of residence. Much more reviling in

[42] The only exception here were a few respondents of Chinese background.

this sense were the questions aimed to unveil the levels of identification with the community of Italians, which indeed gave me access to fresh, interesting insights on individuals' self-perceptions.

For example, when asked about whether they think of Italy as to their home, individuals in the two groups (naturalized and non) had very different reactions. While, on the one hand, the group of citizens was pretty homogeneous, in the group of non-citizens there is an important extent of variation among the respondents. Some, as in the quote below, completely reject the idea.

> "*This is not my home*. (..) My parents are elsewhere. My brothers and sisters are elsewhere. My grandchildren are elsewhere. My whole soul is elsewhere. (..) *Dying here? It's the worst thing that could ever happen to me.*" (Ukraine, not naturalized)

It seems that for the respondent above, thinking of Italy as to a home would be almost like betraying his dream of going back to his country of origin one day. Still among the non-citizens, others talk about Italy in terms of a sort of "temporary home", only hosting them for a limited period of time. Also this position is very much popular among respondents. Finally, a third sub-group among the larger group of non-citizens respond explicitly that they find themselves well in Italy but they want to go back to their home country as soon as other conditions (mainly economic, as seen above) will have been fulfilled.

> "More than my home [Italy] is like….*a parenthesis*. A long one, yes, but still a parenthesis." (Philippines, not naturalized)

> "I like it here… but as soon as I can, *I will go back to my own*." (Ukraine, not naturalized)

The difference with the group of citizens on this topic is rather straightforward. Citizens do seem to have accepted Italy as their home. While their origins are still very important for them, their statements give a sense that they feel like they have dug their roots here, and that they feel settled.

> "I think *I will spend my old age here* (…). If one is satisfied with the job she has, then she find herself well in that country, and likes the idea of staying even after her career is over." (China, naturalized)

> "I have been living here almost more than in Morocco! *Italy is my country now*." (Morocco, naturalized)

> "After also my mother finally joined me, I have no more reasons to think about going back to Ukraine. I have a kid to grow here, I have my husband, I have my job. *Everything is here*.." (Ukraine, naturalized)

> "Now *I feel 100% an Italian citizen* (…)… Not in the ethnic sense, because my roots are in Ukraine, and part of my soul will always be there… But in the sense that I have chosen this as the country to live, I participate to the wealth of this community (..)." (Ukraine, naturalized)

The fact of thinking about Italy as home or not is of course closely related to the question of identity. The latter was partially touched upon above, when reporting about individual feelings about how the migratory experience has changed them, in which part I have underlined how the change was often not lived well by non-citizens. That same issue emerged with even greater clarity when I asked them to what extent they feel proud about living in Italy. When confronted with these questions, non-citizens split into two groups. The first group is formed by those individuals who declare to be proud in that they to some extent feel grateful to Italy. These are individuals who recognize that living in the country has given them the chance to sustain her/himself and her/his family economically.

> "If being proud means being grateful… Yes, *I am grateful to Italy*, because it's by being here that I was able to work and give a future to my children." (Ukrainian, non-citizen)

This conception of pride-as-gratefulness was quite popular among non-citizen respondents. However, although de facto it constitutes a positive answer to the question posed, I think that it somehow distorts the meaning of the word "pride" as it was meant in this context, where it was rather intended as a more intimate consciousness about the value and uniqueness of a country's cultural and historical heritage. None of the non-citizen respondents appealed to this, more commonsensical meaning of pride when referring to Italy. It was even less so in the case of the second group of non-citizen residents who, quite oppositely, actually talked about Italy with a good degree of resentment.

> "Italians talk about their country as if it was the best in the world… Well maybe you are better than Romania or other places like that, but surely there are *a lot of country that are better than Italy*. Look at France for example, where the streets are all clean, everything is well-kept… Italy is all dirty, the streets are completely messed-up.."(Morocco, not naturalized)

Therefore, while on the part of non-citizens I did not many assertions of feelings of pride towards Italy, the attitude of citizens was completely different. Citizens were for the most part very keen on expressing sentiments of pride towards Italy and in expressing a sense of belonging to the country. In some cases, I was really surprised by the emphasis that respondents put in their words to represent their feelings of pride towards their elective country.

> "I feel proud of something when that something is on the list of important things in terms of history of humanity…. Since in Italy there are many, then *I feel proud of Italy*." (Ukraine, naturalized)

> "I might criticize Italy, sometimes even harshly… but deep within me *I love Italy*, especially when it is able to take out the best part of itself." (China, naturalized)

> "After all these years here ... I worked so hard, then I have brought my family here, my children ... And now they have their own children. I ran away from Morocco. It was not for me, I was not well there. Many problems. In Italy, I was lucky. I met so many good people who have helped me. *I am happy about having become an Italian citizen*." (Morocco, naturalized)

> "Today *I feel absolutely Italian*. I'm still very attached to Morocco, I go back often. But Italian citizenship has completed a feeling of being at home here." (Morocco, naturalized)

> The fact of having Italian children – and if you look at them you can really see that they are Italians, they cannot even understand Albanian (..) – that also makes me feel *a proud Italian father*, just like the others. (Albania, naturalized)

To sum up, I should say that the general impression that I got from by taking to naturalized and non-naturalized individuals, is that citizenship works as a sort of "psychological stabilizer", as indeed compared to the rest, the individuals who have acquired it seem to feel more stable in many ways. First, they seem to have a stronger hold on their rights. This is not because citizenship actually gives them access to rights which before they did not have, but rather, because after having gotten citizenship they appear more inclined to stand up for them when they are the object of mistreatment and discrimination. It is as if citizenship made them stop feeling like guests and start behaving like legitimate rights-holders. It is in this particular sense that I would agree with describing citizenship as "the highest standard of equal treatment" (EUI, 2013, 40): not so much because of new rights, but rather because of a new individual consciousness about them.

Another reason to consider citizenship as a "psychological stabilizer" is that citizens seem to suffer less from the psychological burdens created by the condition of so-called "double absence" (Sayad, 2002). While both groups experience that condition – in which they feel like they always

"miss something"– citizens seems to accept this condition and almost take it as a positive experience which keeps them somehow tightly linked to their home country. From a condition of double absence, citizens therefore seem to shift to one of "double presence" (Mezzadra and Ricciardi, 2013). Non-citizens, on the other hand, appear to greatly suffer from it (we have seen how some refer to it as to an "illness"), to the point that some of them see it as a strong reason for them to leave Italy and go back to their home country.

Finally, a third important reason giving me the sense that citizenship has the power of a stabilized is related to the fact that there is a sensible qualitative difference between the way citizens and non-citizens talk about the future. Citizens appear more confident about their power of deciding whatever is better for them: they might stay or leave, but whatever they will do will be a product of their own decisions. For non-citizens, the situation is quite the opposite. Many of them would actually like to leave, to go back to their country, but almost none of them feels like their desires or choices have the power to shape their future. All of them indeed appeal to some outside reason – destiny, luck, God, and the like – to explain that they do not feel in full command of their choices.

Now, the stability that citizenship appears to bring about *does not coincide* with the "feeling of belonging" itself; still, the impression I got is that the two are very strictly connected. Stability indeed emerges here as the necessary mean for individuals to develop a sense of being at home in Italy. Once again, the example of the different ways that citizens and non-citizens have of dealing with discrimination is a very emblematic one which helps explaining this. Citizenship does not determine by law the end of marginalization or mistreatment, but somehow helps the individual to stand up and react to those episodes. Citizens appear to stop feeling and acting as "guests", and the sense of precariousness gradually fades away to leave room for a sense of belonging to develop and foster.

4.2 Subjective dimension: from qualitative to quantitative

In this section I attempt to synthetize the material that has been analyzed above according to a qualitative methodology in order to make it more usable and comparable to the other dimensions of which the definition of civic integration used here is composed. This operation implies a brutal oversimplification of the information reported at length above, which is legitimized only by the broader aim of making the overall results of the study on the link between citizenship and civic integration more evident. Sure enough, this operation does not intend to diminish the importance of the qualitative analysis above, which is on the contrary absolutely fundamental in

terms of a more comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms driving the "feeling of belonging" discussed in section 4.3.

Table 11. Subjective dimension: from qualitative to quantitative

Subjective dimension (quantitative): questions

(1) Overall, would you say you feel a member of the Italian society?
- Yes
- No

(2) Overall, would you say that you now feel at home in Italy?
- Yes
- No

(3) Overall, would you say that your feel proud, at least to some extent, about this country?
-Yes
- No

The three questions above have been selected in reason of their representing the core of the subjective dimension of civic integration. The first is aimed at understanding the extent to which the respondent feels a member of the Italian society, the second the extent to which s/he looks at Italy as her home and the third is focused on the idea of pride. The three are not repetitive, in that one might for example feel a de-facto member of society without necessarily feeling at home (frequent). At the same time, one might feel proud of Italy without feeling a home there (more rare).

Sure enough, the three questions do not do justice to the whole complexity of feelings and self-perceptions that this dimension of integration inevitably involves. However, as anticipated, the aim of this brutal operationalization is that of being able to quantify the results in order to understand the relation of each dimension to the other, and to finally be able to quantify somewhat the relationship between civic integration, in all of its dimensions, and citizenship.

Table 12. Subjective dimension(quantitative): table of answers

	Name	Origin	Age	In Italy for	Educat.	Married to an Italian?	Children	Citizenship	> 50% right
1	Orlando	Philip.	49	26	A	no	1	yes	1
2	Richard	Philip.	40	26	B	no	0	yes	1
3	Herminia	Philip.	65	17	C	no	0	yes	1
4	Gilbert	Philip.	45	26	A	no	1	No	0
5	Penny	Philip.	45	25	B	no	1	No	0
6	Marcial	Philip.	53	23	A	no	1	No	0
7	Cris	Philip.	38	15	A	no	1	No	0
8	Zorah	Moroc.	63	26	B	no	0	yes	1
9	Adbellatif	Moroc.	63	**16**	A	no	1	No	0
10	Abdullah	Moroc.	39	19	C	no	0	No	0
11	Zouhir	Moroc.	51	16	A	yes	0	yes	1
12	Naim	Moroc.	50	28	A	no	1	yes	1
13	Klaudia	Alb.	46	20	A	yes	1	yes	1
14	Emanuele	Alb.	45	22	A	yes	1	yes	1
15	Elvin	Alb.	46	16	A	no	0	yes	1
16	Maksim	Alb.	60	18	A	no	1	yes	1
17	Halyna	Ukr.	45	15	A	no	0	no	0
18	Elena	Ukr.	51	17	A	yes	1	yes	1
19	Irina (1)	Ukr.	45	15	A	no	0	no	0
20	Irina (2)	Ukr.	50	15	A	no	0	no	0
21	Yaryna	Ukr.	37	15	B	yes	1	no	1
22	Lucio	Ukr.	38	15	A	no	1	no	0
23	Lylia	Ukr.	50	20	A	no	1	no	0
24	Lyudmilla	Ukr.	57	15	A	no	0	no	0
25	Marya	Ukr.	48	15	A	no	0	no	0
26	Michele	Ukr.	33	15	A	no	1	no	0
27	Nadya	Ukr.	47	15	B	no	0	no	0
28	Natalya	Ukr.	48	15	A	yes	1	yes	1
29	Olena	Ukr.	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	1
30	Vira	Ukr.	48	15	A	no	0	no	0
31	Wong	China	63	35	B	no	1	yes	1
32	Sii	China	30	15	B	no	0	no	0
33	Giovanni	China	56	27	B	no	1	yes	1
34	Inin	China	51	36	A	yes	1	yes	1
35	Zhun	China	65	31	A	yes	1	yes	1
36	Sarah	China	45	28	A	no	1	no	1
37	Li	China	34	16	A	no	0	no	1
38	Xiu	China	38	18	C	no	1	yes	1
39	Cristina	Philip.	40	15	A	no	0	no	0
40	Roda	Philip.	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	1
41	Eveline	Philip.	43	17	A	yes	0	yes	1
42	Nadine	Moroc.	39	15	B	yes	1	yes	1
43	Lin	China	37	15	A	no	1	no	0
44	Giulio	China	46	24	A	no	0	no	1
45	Luca	China	48	18	A	no	1	no	0
46	Wong (2)	China	47	30	A	no	0	no	0
47	Khalid	Moroc.	36	16	C	no	0	yes	1
48	Andrit	Alb.	33	15	A	no	0	yes	1
49	Adam	Alb.	40	19	A	yes	1	yes	1
50	Nedina	Alb.	40	17	A	no	1	yes	1

The first, relevant information that it is possible to draw from the table of answers above is that the overall number of those who "pass" this third part of test (i.e. get more than 50% of the questions right) is of 29 over 50. This number is lower than that of the vertical dimension, which saw overall 33 individuals passing it, but slightly higher than that of the horizontal dimension, which featured 26 individuals scoring above 50% right. Combining this data with the one concerning the citizenship status of the individuals who pass the test, it is possible to notice that *all* of those who have naturalized (meaning 100 per cent!) pass the test. This is not the case for the group of non-citizens, in which only a small minority (4 individuals) pass the test. As indicated in Figure 14 below, the weight of the two groups on the overall number of individuals who score well in this part of the test is respectively, of 86% for the group of citizenship holders, and of 14% for those who instead do not hold Italian citizenship. These numbers clearly imply a strict relationship between possessing Italian citizenship and experiencing a sense of belonging to Italian society. The link is much stronger and more evident in this part of the test than in the previous two (vertical and horizontal dimensions).



Figure 13. Subjective dimension: respondents who score >50% right



Figure 14. Subjective dimension: % of citizenship holders among those who score well

A second interesting data is that regarding the level of instruction of the respondents who pass the test (figures 15 and 16 below). Whereas in the vertical dimension of the test education seemed to have a great importance, in that individuals with a high level of instruction had more chances of passing the test, here, just as in the horizontal part, an high level of instruction does not appear to have a very relevant impact on individual chances of fostering a sense of belonging. Indeed, by taking into consideration simultaneously both of the tables below, it is possible to notice that although individuals with an "A" level of instruction get a high score in the 54% of the cases, those who hold a "B" or "C" level of instruction and get a high score at the test are 69% of the total. The information that this gives us is therefore a quite puzzling one, in which a high level of instruction does not result to be directly and unambiguously correlated to a good score in this part of the test.



Figure 15. Subjective dimension: scores of individuals with an "A" level of instruction



Figure 16. Subjective dimension: scores of individuals with "B" and "C" levels of instruction



Figure 17. Subjective dimension: scores of individuals who are married to Italians



Figure 18. Subjective dimension: scores of individuals who have children raised in Italy

As for the impact of marrying a native Italian, the factor seems to be of even greater relevance for this dimension of civic integration than in the others (in which the impact was already high). As the figure 17 above shows, of the 13 individuals who in the targeted sample group happen to be married to a native Italian, 13 score well in the subjective dimension of the test, meaning a the 100% of them. The number shows that there definitely is a positive correlation between the fact of having married a native Italian and the increased chance of being able to build social relations. As for the other factor, the one related to the fact of having children born or/and raised in Italy, the number is quite surprisingly exactly the same as in the other two dimensions of civic integration. In all of the three parts, out of an overall number of 27 respondent having children raised in Italy, 17 pass the test, and 10 do not. This accounts to a 63% of the total. It follows that the factor exercises a limited (although still significant) impact on individual chances of developing a sense of belonging.

As for age and years of residence of the respondents, these two factors that appear to play a greater role in this last dimension of civic integration than in the first two. Indeed, while in the previous dimensions the difference in terms of average value was inconsistent, here the numbers do emerge as slightly more differentiated. First, in terms of the age of respondents, those who pass the test are by average 2 years older than those who do not pass it – a slight but still partially relevant difference. Second, in terms of the overall years of residence of the same, those who experience a feeling of belonging have been residing in Italy for an average of 20.8 (say 21) years, whereas the others for 17 – accounting for almost 3 years of difference. Here again, the difference is slight, signaling that the factor has a limited, though still significant impact.

Table 13. Positive impact of different factors on a good result in the subjective dimension of the test

Positive impact of different factors		
	Limited impact	**No impact**
• Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy • Years of residence • Age	• High level of Instruction

Table 13 above summarizes the impact of the different biographical factors taken into consideration on the subjective dimension of civic integration, that is, the “sense of belonging”. From the data analyzed above it appears that the two factors that have the most relevant impact on

individual chances of developing a "sense of belonging" to Italy are citizenship and the fact of being married a "native" Italian.

Other factors have a more limited impact. These are, namely, the fact of having children raised in Italy, age and years of residence. The presence of children appears to increase individual chances of scoring well; age seems to have a slight impact in that the average of those who pass the this part of the test are 2 years older than those who do not; finally, years of residence also appear to have some impact in that there is a three years of average difference between those who pass the test and those who do not, in terms of the first group having resided for longer.

Interestingly enough, the only factor that is clearly not positively correlated to the probability of passing this part of the test is the high-level-of-instruction factor. Differently from the vertical dimension, where a high level of instruction was directly correlated with a good level of knowledge of the notions related to Italian history and civic life, the feeling of belonging that this part of the test aimed to unveil is not only not related to a high level of instruction of the respondent, but actually appears to have some positive correlation with its opposite, in that in 69% of the cases those who have a level of instruction *lower* than "A" experience a feeling of belonging.

4.3 Discussion of the results

In the different sections devoted to the three parts of the test on civic integration (vertical, horizontal and subjective dimensions), I pointed out how different factors appear to have the power of positively determining the result in each part. The table below summarizes the impact of different factors on each dimension of civic integration. By comparing and contrasting them, it is possible to notice that each dimension has its own peculiarities in terms of the factors that might determine a good score, as indeed, a factor that might have a strong impact on one dimension might have limited or no impact on another.

Table 14. Positive impact of different factors on the three dimensions of civic integration

	Positive impact of different factors		
	Strong impact	**Limited impact**	**No impact**
Vertical dimension	• High level of instruction • Mixed marriages	• Citizenship • Children raised in Italy	• Years of residence • Age
Horizontal dimension	• Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy	• High level of instruction • Years of residence • Age
Subjective dimension	• Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy • Years of residence • Age	• High level of instruction

A first, interesting result is that concerning the role of citizenship – which represented the core of my interest in this empirical study. Two important findings emerge from the data. First, that citizenship is a determinant of a good score in *some* but *not all* of the three dimensions. Indeed, whereas it seems to have a positive correlation with the relational and subjective aspects of civic integration, its link with the vertical dimension is way weaker. Second, that even in the case of the dimensions on which citizenship appears to have the power of positively influencing the result, the latter is not the *only* the determinant factor, but rather, one *among others*.

A second important reflection should be devoted to the role of mixed marriages (that is, of the fact of having married a "native" Italian). This factor emerges as a very relevant one, which has a "strong impact" (70% and above) on *all* of the three dimensions of civic integration. This result is even more interesting when compared to another similar factor, that is, the presence of children who were raised in Italy. Although generally considered as equivalent, the two factors actually appear to have different weight in all of the three cases. Indeed, while they are similar in terms of always having at least *some* positive impact on the score, such impact appears to be *quantitatively* different, in that mixed marriages ultimately appear to play a more determinant role.

A further, interesting aspect to be highlighted is the multiple role played by the high-level-of-instruction factor. It is very surprising to notice that the factor plays an extremely determinant role in *one case* (namely, the vertical dimension), and a totally irrelevant, if not even counter-productive, role in the others (horizontal and subjective dimension). This tells a lot about how different the three dimensions are, especially in terms of the mechanisms which determine a "good integration" in one or the other. For what concerns the subjective dimension in particular, I found it very interesting to note that a high level of instruction *does not help* (or even obstacles?) the development of a "feeling of belonging", which instead seems to be more connected to other, less tangible drives. It looks as if, in other words, a high level of instruction makes the individuals who hold it more reluctant of accepting to add new loyalties to their original ones.

Turning to the relative influence of age and years of residence, one might be surprised to find that the two result to have no impact on individual chances to pass the vertical dimension of the test. Indeed, it does reasonable to expect that the more an individual resides in one country, Italy in this case, the more that person knows about the country's history and civic life. This does not appear to be the case here, where a high level of instruction seems to play the most determinant role irrespectively of those other biographical data. It is however even more puzzling to notice that those two factors again do not play a role for the horizontal dimension of integration, especially in light of the fact that here the role of high level of instruction is irrelevant too. The two factors appear instead to have *some* influence – although a limited one – on determining the development of a feeling of belonging, as indeed in the subjective dimension of civic integration they play an equally important role than the presence of children raised in Italy.

Let us now turn to Table 15 and Table 16 below, how individuals' are distributed among the three dimensions. More specifically, Table 15 features a list of the scores of each individual in each of the three parts, whereas Table 16 consists in an elaboration of those same data in terms of their distribution of the "good scores" across dimensions. Looking at the overall picture gives further interesting insights, especially for what concerns the interrelation between the different dimensions.

Table 15. Respondents' score in the three parts of the civic integration test

	Name	Origin	Age	In Italy for	Edu.	Married to an Italian?	Children raised in Italy	Citizenship	For how many yrs	Vertical dimension	Horizontal dimension	Subjective dimension	Dimensions with "good" score
1	Orlando	Philip.	49	26	A	no	1	yes	1	1	1	1	all
2	Richard	Philip.	40	26	B	no	0	yes	20	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
3	Herminia	Philip.	65	17	C	no	0	yes	1	0	0	1	subjective
4	Gilbert	Philip.	45	26	A	no	1	No		1	1	0	vertical, horizontal
5	Penny	Philip.	45	25	B	no	1	No		0	0	0	none
6	Marcial	Philip.	53	23	A	no	1	No		0	0	0	none
7	Cris	Philip.	38	15	A	no	1	No		0	0	0	none
8	Zorah	Moroc.	63	26	B	no	0	yes	3	1	1	1	all
9	Adbellatif	Moroc.	63	16	A	no	1	No		0	0	0	none
10	Abdullah	Moroc.	39	19	C	no	0	No		0	0	0	none
11	Zouhir	Moroc.	51	16	A	yes	0	yes	15	1	1	1	all
12	Naim	Moroc.	50	28	A	no	1	yes	10	1	1	1	all
13	Klaudia	Alb.	46	20	A	yes	1	yes	9	1	1	1	all
14	Emanuele	Alb.	45	22	A	yes	1	yes	14	1	1	1	all
15	Elvin	Alb.	46	16	A	no	0	yes	1	1	1	1	all
16	Maksim	Alb.	60	18	A	no	1	yes	9	1	1	1	all
17	Halyna	Ukra.	45	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
18	Elena	Ukra.	51	17	A	yes	1	yes	10	1	1	1	all
19	Irina (1)	Ukra.	45	13	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
20	Irina (2)	Ukra.	50	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
21	Yaryna	Ukra.	37	15	B	yes	1	no		0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
22	Lucio	Ukra.	38	15	A	no	1	no		1	1	0	vertical, horizontal
23	Lylia	Ukra.	50	20	A	no	1	no		1	0	0	vertical
24	Lyudmilla	Ukra.	57	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
25	Marya	Ukra.	48	15	A	no	0	no		0	0	0	none
26	Michele	Ukra.	33	15	A	no	1	no		1	0	0	vertical
27	Nadya	Ukra.	47	15	B	no	0	no		0	0	0	none
28	Natalya	Ukra.	48	15	A	yes	1	yes	10	1	1	1	all
29	Olena	Ukra.	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	1	1	1	1	all
30	Vira	Ukra.	48	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
31	Wong	China	63	35	B	no	1	yes	15	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
32	Sii	China	30	15	B	no	0	no		0	0	0	none
33	Giovanni	China	56	27	B	no	1	yes	2	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
34	Inin	China	51	36	A	yes	1	yes	28	1	1	1	all
35	Zhun	China	65	31	A	yes	1	yes	25	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
36	Sarah	China	45	28	A	no	1	no		1	0	1	subjective
37	Li	China	34	16	A	no	0	no		1	1	1	all
38	Xiu	China	38	18	C	no	1	yes	5	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
39	Cristina	Philip.	40	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
40	Roda	Philip.	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	6	1	0	1	vertical
41	Eveline	Philip.	43	17	A	yes	0	yes	7	1	1	1	all
42	Nadine	Moroc.	39	15	B	yes	1	yes	3	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
43	Lin	China	37	15	A	no	1	no		1	0	0	vertical
44	Giulio	China	46	24	A	no	0	no		1	1	1	all
45	Luca	China	48	18	A	no	1	no		1	0	0	vertical
46	Wong (2)	China	47	30	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
47	Khalid	Moroc.	36	16	C	no	0	yes	5	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
48	Andrit	Alb.	33	15	A	no	0	yes	2	1	0	1	subjective
49	Adam	Alb.	40	19	A	yes	1	yes	8	1	1	1	all
50	Nedina	Alb.	40	17	A	no	1	yes	5	1	0	1	vertical, subjective

Table 16. Respondents passing zero, one two or three dimensions by citizenship status

	N. of dimensions							
	Zero	One			Two			Three
	None	Vertical	Horizontal	Subjective	Vertical + Horizontal	Vertical + Subjective	Horizontal + Subjective	All
Citizen	0	1	0	2	0	1	7	14
Non-citizen	8	11	0	1	2	0	1	2

The main information contained in the tables above can be summarized in the three points that follow. (1) The majority of those who "pass" only **one part** of the three of which the test in composed, "pass" the vertical dimension. At the opposite extreme there is the horizontal dimension, which nobody "passes" alone. Almost the same for subjective dimension, which only three individuals pass without passing at least one other part of the test. (2) For what concerns individuals who score well on **two** of the three dimensions, the most popular combination is that between the horizontal and the subjective dimensions, which works for 8 individuals, whereas the other combinations, namely that between the vertical and horizontal, and between the vertical and the subjective, only interest, respectively, 2 and 1 individuals, for an overall of three. (3) Finally, the overall number of individuals who get all of the **three** dimensions right is 16, whereas those who get **none** of them are of 8.

Now, there are quite a few reflections that follow from these numbers. A first, very evident is the one concerning the fact that nobody, over a total of 50 individuals, scores well in the horizontal dimension only: individuals who score the horizontal dimension right, always also score well in at least one of the other two dimensions. In particular, it is the combination between horizontal dimension and subjective dimension appears to be very popular, as if the two had some kind of special connection, or at least, a stronger connection than that with the vertical dimension.

What this result tells us is, in other words, that the fact of being integrated at the social level does not come alone. Indeed, the data show that it is only in a very small minority of cases (2 over 50) that social integration happens without the individual feeling like s/he "belongs", and therefore that most of the times social integration comes together with a certain feeling of being home. This said, the data do not tell us which comes first, if social integration or the "feeling of belonging". What is sure, is that most of the times they come together. If I had to translate this notion into more concrete terms, I would have to say that it is very unlikely that an individual participates into

associative and social life if s/he does not feels like "belonging" to the society. In fewer cases, a good level of horizontal (social) integration might also be connected to the vertical dimensions, that is, to the fact of knowing quite a few things about Italian civic life. However, it is the relationship between horizontal and subjective dimension that appears to be the strongest one.

At the opposite extreme, there is the case of the vertical dimension. Whereas for the social dimension of civic integration it appeared that nobody could score well in that dimension alone (without also being well integrated in at least one of the other two dimensions – and most importantly the subjective dimension), a relevant number of individuals (12) get the vertical dimension right without getting any of the others. What this tell us, then, is that a good level knowledge and information about Italian history and civic life can be acquired without necessarily being socially integrated or "feeling part" of Italian society. The vertical dimension of integration appears to be an autonomous factor, which can be achieved alone. As we have seen in the section on vertical integration, and as it will be illustrated again later in this section, the factors that appear to be more linked to a good level of integration in this dimension are, indeed, first and foremost, a high level of instruction and the fact of being married to a "native" Italian.

In this context, the subjective dimension represents probably the most complex case to deal with, as the data are more ambiguous. Only 3 individuals (2 of them naturalized and 1 not naturalized) get it right alone, which seems to suggest that, as for the horizontal dimension, it is only very rarely that an individual "feels to belong" to a society without being also integrated wither at the relational level (most often) or at the level of knowledge and information about civic life and history (more rarely). Still, for (very) few individuals, a feeling of integration can come without being linked to the other, more objective aspects of integration. Once again, the characteristics of the subjective dimensions point to the peculiarity of the mechanisms which govern the perceptions and feelings implied in it.

For what concerns the individuals who pass two out of the three parts of the test, we might say that the most relevant combination, at least in quantitative terms, is that between the horizontal and subjective dimensions. Indeed, as it is shown in the Table above, only two individuals (both of them non-citizens) pass the vertical and the horizontal, while only one (a citizen) passes the vertical and the subjective parts. The combination between the horizontal and the subjective parts is the most popular in that it involves a higher number of individuals – 8 of them. As for the characteristics of the individuals who pass them, there are two information that are particularly relevant and are worth being underlined: the first is that all of them but one are citizenship holders; the second is that their level of education is below the university level, except for one person (a citizen). The reasons that make these information relevant are that they confirm, once again, first,

that citizenship is an extremely relevant factor for integration in those areas, and second, that differently from the vertical dimension, integration in those areas is not linked to a high level of education, but is governed by rather different dynamics.

Finally, there are a number of individuals who pass *none* of the three dimensions of the test and, on the other hand, a number of individuals who pass them *all*. If we compare the characteristics of these two groups, a first, important thing that we find out is that *all* of the eight (8) individuals who do not pass *any* part of the test are non-citizens, whereas among the sixteen (16) who pass *all* of them, the great majority citizens (14 over 16). This result is a quite straightforward witness of the fact that citizenship *does play an important role* in determining an overall good level of civic integration. Now, based on an analysis of the biographical characteristics of the individuals who pass all of the three dimensions, Table 17 below summarized the factors that appear to have the most relevant impact on determining such "success". Note that the table above only speaks about the characteristics of those 16 individuals who pass the three dimensions, and therefore should *not* be considered as overriding the Tables above which presented the impact of the different factors on each specific dimension of integration.

Table 17. Positive impact of different factors on passing ALL of the 3 dimensions of integration.

Positive impact of different factors			
	Strong impact	**Limited impact**	**No impact**
All 3 dimensions	• High level of instruction • Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy • Age • Years of residence	

In coherence with the data on each specific dimension, the Table above tells us that the individuals who pass all of the three parts of the test have, in the majority of cases, Italian citizenship and a high level of instruction. Having married a "native" Italian also emerges, just as in the previous Tables, as a facilitating factor, in that a majority of those who happen to be in this condition clearly appear to have more chances of passing the whole test. The presence of children raised in Italy results, like in the previous Tables, as having a limited impact. The other factors, that

is age of the respondents and years of residence, here have a limited impact, whereas we have observed that in some of the single dimensions they played a still less relevant role.

To sum up, I should say that the results of empirical study presented here do suggest the existence of a positive correlation between civic integration and citizenship. In general, citizenship holders score "better" than the others in most of the single dimensions of civic integration (2 out of three), and in the overall test. In particular, a very strong correlation with citizenship emerges for the subjective dimension, in that all of those who have Italian citizenship experience a sense of belonging (25 over 25). Such sense of belonging appears to be often coupled with a good level of integration at the relational level (horizontal dimension), while it is not influenced by amount of knowledge and information about Italian history and civic life (vertical dimension). The vertical dimension of citizenship is the only one that clearly escapes the overall good influence of citizenship, in that it appears to be instead much more critically driven by other factors, such as, most notably, a high level of instruction of the respondent.

In light of these results, it is particularly interesting to recall that, for most citizenship holders, the choice of picking up citizenship was, at the time of application, declaredly mostly an instrumental choice intended to "make their lives easier". At a first glance, the fact that these same individuals then appeared to actually experience a sense of belonging and therefore to give some value-related weigh to the fact of being citizens might look like a contradiction. Still, I believe that this is actually one of the key findings of this study. Citizenship here emerges not so much as an aim that people pursue in virtue of feelings of belonging that they already have, but rather, as a tool that gives them the chance to develop those same feelings in virtue of its ability to "make individuals' life easier". The idea, in other words, is that it is much more difficult for someone whose life is *not* "easy", in terms of all of those everyday administrative, bureaucratic and also social barriers that a non-citizen still has to face, to start developing a sense of "being at home". While not directly and suddenly creating a sense of belonging, citizenship creates the conditions – material and non – for the individual to stop feeling potentially treated as a second-category resident and to start developing a sense of attachment and belonging to the country.

5. Does Citizenship Matter? Reflections over the "membership vs citizenship" debate in light of the empirical study

What does the empirical study tell us about citizenship and its role? How does the study stand *vìs à vìs* the post-nationalist claims about a fundamental devaluation and even crisis of formal citizenship status? What is the relationship between citizenship status and other possible forms of membership? How does citizenship stands in a globalized world which sees previous national autonomy and self-sufficiency as constantly challenged by the porousness of borders that modern market transactions and global communications have produced? These are some of the main questions that this chapter seeks to address.

The discussion is organized in three main sections. The first (5.1) will focus on the post-nationalist claim that settling of migrants into host societies, and the consequent expansion of aliens residence rights, has produced new forms of membership which have turned the traditional citizenship status into a purely formal and essentially void container. The second (5.2) will focus on what the empirical study presented in chapter 4 can tell us about the role of citizenship *vìs à vìs* what transnationalists and cosmopolitans hold. Finally, the third section (5.3) will summarize the arguments and the reasons why citizenship status is still to be considered as fundamental for the integration of immigrants into societies.

5.1 Which avenues for immigrants' inclusion? Membership vs. citizenship

Due to the traditional exclusiveness of the relationship between the State and the individual, national citizenship was in the past considered to be the only possible form of membership to a polity. Individuals were either fully fledged-members or otherwise aliens: no middle ways were contemplated. It was only later, around the end of the 1980s, following the increasing stabilization of migrants in their host countries, that the idea of citizenship as the only form of membership started to be increasingly questioned, and the hypothesis of the emergence of multiple forms (or degrees) of membership begun to gain ground.

The affirmation of the notion of universal human rights at the international level (Cassese, 2005), together with remarkable expansion of residence rights at the national level, has contributed to opening up of new possibilities for immigrants' stabilization into their countries of immigration. This complicated the previously straightforward membership panorama. Immigrants moved from being simply just excluded, to being incorporated into the "various legal and organizational structures of the host society" (Sosyal, 1994, 136) according to schemes of differential inclusion (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2012). At the EU level, the long-term residency status (LTRs) represents an

emblematic example of such differential membership, since it gives non-citizens "rights (…) as near as possible to those enjoyed by citizens" (EC, 2003, n.109), while still keeping them from exercising key citizenship rights, such as most notably the political ones, in the host country.

The emergence of differential membership statuses within national borders has been taken as an evidence of the rise of a post-national kind of membership (Sosyal, 1994), and a corresponding devaluation of citizenship which is not anymore the only avenue for individual security and protection. Post-nationalists claim that the system created by the Westphalian Peace, in which States were the only sources for the protection of individual rights (Cassese, 2005), is rapidly turning into of an internationalized system of dispute-settling, where new and multiple sites of claim-making located above and beyond national borders have emerged (Sassen, 2002, 2008), granting that human rights are protected independently from the individual citizenship status. In this view, individuals would have turned into sorts of "universal persons" (Hansen, 2009, cited in Joppke, 2010, 84) who, living lives across borders (Danahay and Brettel, 2008), would have developed an unprecedented consciousness of, and confidence in, the international system of individual rights protection.

According to post-nationalists, the role of citizenship in shaping individuals' destinies is significantly diminished, to the point that nowadays, for immigrants, "the real prize is residency, not citizenship"(Spiro, 2008, 159). In the context of contemporary stabilization of immigrants into their host countries, citizenship would essentially be turning into an artificial construction which nation-states would anachronistically be attempting to keep alive (Jacobson, 1996), but which would make no real, concrete difference to the immigrant herself in terms of chances for participation and membership to the society. Since citizenship would imply no substantial extra-benefits, resident aliens would have always less incentives to pick it up (Brubaker, 1989, 162), therefore leaving it "almost begging for customers" (Spiro, 2008, 91).

As far as immigrant residence rights are concerned, one can hardly avoid agreeing with post-nationalists about the fact that the contemporary evolutions of the international system have indeed favored a greater attention, on the part of single national states, to the rights that resident aliens within their borders should be granted. Just like the in US, the EU has indeed considerably ameliorated the situation of third-country nationals living in one of its members-states by, for example, harmonizing the rules for granting them long-residence rights, insuring that they are not excluded from welfare benefits and other fundamental rights, such as family reunification and job market participation. Post-nationalists are also right in arguing that these evolutions make the idea of a "rigid bifurcation"(Kelly, 1998, 211) between citizens and non-citizens appear ever more blurred in contemporary societies, not so much because of the erosion of old forms of exclusion and

discrimination of newcomers, but rather, because of the extended residence rights' regimes which allow the existence of parallel forms of inclusion.

Still, I believe it is still important to ask oneself whether the condition of long-terms residents who are not citizens looks more like that of *privileged non-citizens* (Hammar, 1989), who can afford not taking up host-country citizenship by virtue of the privileges they already enjoy as LTRs, or rather like that of *second-class citizens*, who are welcomed as contributors to productive system but not to decision-making activities. The question, in other words, is whether the new forms of inclusion created by the expansion of residence rights are really forging that new, comfortable status that post-nationalists call "post-national membership", which allows individuals to move across borders without seeing their rights endangered, or else if they are rather to be interpreted as an institutionalization of the condition of precariousness of the resident aliens (Zanfrini, 2007a, 19-34; Colombo, 2011, 54; Hindess, 1998). In what follows, I will argue that even though it is true that most of the traditional barriers to immigrants' contribution are being lifted up in contemporary societies, leading to the emergence of new avenues for aliens' participation into the economic and social life of the host country, these forms of *membership without citizenship* are still far from providing the conditions for a full integration of individuals with immigrant background in host societies, which are on the contrary still organized according to a nationalistic logic.

No matter how recognized at the supra-national level, rights of residence and, more in general, of personhood, are still today mostly effective *within the context of nation-states*. This is so for two main reasons. On the one hand, because rights can really exist only when they are backed by instruments of legal enforcement (Arendt [1951], 1979), that is, within the context of nation-states, which still today represent the main depositaries of that "monopoly of the legitimate use of force" (Weber [1919], 2004). On the other hand, because, since the nation-state holds the power to change and modify resident aliens' rights as it wishes, those rights do not substantially modify the condition of precariousness of resident aliens, ultimately looking more like generous *concessions* than actual *rights* (Joppke, 2010; Morris, 2002).

The second point is crucial, and needs to be stressed further. While it is true that aliens' residence rights in the EU have undergone fundamental improvements, states' persistent discretionary power over matters of immigration control and citizenship access, make resident aliens' status still very distant from that of citizens under both a quantitative and qualitative point of view. *Quantitatively* speaking, resident aliens are still precluded an important number of crucial rights, that is, most notably, political rights and freedom of movement (including the right to protection from expulsion). But the difference between resident aliens and citizens is also very

importantly *qualitative* in nature, in that, differently than for citizens, migrants' rights are both "stratified and reversible" (Joppke, 2010, 82).

Aliens' rights are stratified in the sense that they are organized according to the specific "category" of migrant aliens belong to. Brubaker (1989, 162) has effectively described the system of rights-endowment within European states as a structure of concentric circles, where the most internal circle is that of citizens, whose link to the state enjoys the greatest level of tightness, followed by that of communitarian non-citizens, then non-communitarian non-citizens who are legal residents, then non-resident legal immigrants and then finally the undocumented and the stateless persons.



Figure 1. Brubaker's concentric circles of membership

At first sight, one might also interpret such stratification as legitimate in terms of being functional to providing aliens some fundamental rights while at the same time keeping citizenship status from a complete devaluation of its symbolic and organizational role. This is an observation which the critics of the "rights' stratification system" generally avoid to discuss. In my opinion, while it is true that stratification might be a good way of democratically ensuring that everyone is granted fundamental rights while still keeping citizenship relevant, for the system to be truly legitimate, states would have to ensure that *mobility* from one category to another is possible for everyone, and therefore set clear and transparent rules for the transitions. However, this is not always the case in European states where, first, there exists a sharp differentiation in treatment of migrants in terms of their "skills" (high skilled *vs.* low skilled), and secondly, differences in treatment also exist among individuals within the same low skilled category according to their functionality to the system.

The differentiation between high and low skilled migrants is the most explicit in terms of national public policies. States put in place mechanisms of attraction through a simplification of the bureaucratic procedures for what concerns visa, work permits, family reunification, LTRs and even

citizenship acquisition (EMN, forthcoming). The same fast-track does not exist in the case of the unskilled migrants, whose progression across the bureaucratic labyrinth is, when not explicitly obstructed through for example unduly application of discretionary clauses, most often at least not well assisted. This is because unskilled migrants are often perceived as a "burden" for the society by both national authorities and public opinion, as if they will surely end up taking advantage of the state's welfare system sooner or later (in spite of the fact that they are, after all, taxpayers).

But as anticipated, mobility across the different categories of the stratified national membership system is made difficult not only by the scarce permeability of the two main macro-categories (skilled vs. non), but also by the further internal differentiation of even the low-skilled category in terms of other criteria, such as, most notably, language, ethnicity, sex and even religious beliefs. This is to say that even among low-skilled migrants, some are *more unwanted* than others. For example, many European countries provide, more or less openly depending on the case, easier conditions for visa and even for citizenship acquisition to those who can prove blood ties (descendants of emigrants) with the country, or enjoy some degree of language or "cultural proximity" (ex. the case of Spain with migrants from Latin America [Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2008], but also Portugal, France and the UK). In the same fashion, the fact of being an observant Muslim might play a negative role in the authorities' discretionary choice to deny naturalization to an individual who has met all of the other requirements. Finally, in countries like Italy, positive discrimination of women employed in the care sector (the so-called *badanti*) has been openly put in place in the 2009 in a procedure aimed at regularizing these workers who are so crucial in making up for the weaknesses of the Italian welfare state.

All of this is to show that the system of stratified rights, which differentiates not only *across* categories but also *internally* (Kelly, 1998), should not be considered legitimate due to the current situation of diffused difficult upward mobility between one category and the other. If everyone had the exact same chances of changing her formal status, then aliens' rights would be really fostering a new panorama of membership beyond citizenship, in which all individuals would be able to live a comfortably even outside of the borders of their countries of origin. This is not the case, though, because the rights stratification system is in fact built in a way that allows nations-state to still exercise substantial monitoring and control over "who is in and who is out", leading to a persistence of important quantitative and qualitative differences, in terms of privileges, between citizens and non.

Up to now I have only been pointing out the weaknesses of post-nationalists' claims with reference to the *stratification* of rights; I will now move on to say some words about the issue of their *reversibility*. Joppke (2010, 91-96) employs the terms "reversibility" mainly with reference to

their being dependent of nation-states policies, which might therefore suddenly change as a result, for example, of the coming to power of a more conservative coalition or the approval of policies of "nationalistic" character. But in my opinion the issue of reversibility of rights is even broader than that, as indeed there is no need of a formal change of government or of the formal approval of different policies for aliens rights' to be taken away, because States actually detain the power to deviate or *make exceptions* from existing policies even without the need to formally approve a new rule. An emblematic example of this is offered by a debate which the Italian parliament is carrying right at the time of me writing this peace. The Italian legislative body is currently discussing about the possibility of making an exception from the EU law and Italian laws which prescribe that all residents – whether nationals or non – should have access to the same core benefits of social assistance (2003/109/EC, Art.13), by excluding foreign families from enjoying the right of requesting the 80 Euros "baby-bonus" that has been recently introduced for all low-income mothers giving birth to a new baby. If the proposed amendment is accepted, this would represent an instance of an arbitrary exception made notwithstanding the existing laws on access to social benefits for foreign residents.

To sum up, I would say that the post-nationalist perspective is way too optimistic in its picturing residence rights as giving its holders substantially the same status as citizens. When compared to the above described reality of the condition of precariousness in which resident aliens still find themselves, the post-nationalist stance looks much more like a normative proposition than one describing actual reality. While capturing some elements of truth, the notion of a complete devaluation of citizenship in the eyes of the noncitizen resident is probably underestimating the impact that the birthright citizenship has on individual life chances, which are inevitably strictly related to the arbitrary unequal distribution of wealth in the different countries of the world.

In this sense I would say that the post-nationalist picture of Western country's citizenship as being gone "begging for costumers" (Spiro, 2008, 91) is also characterized by a substantial *ethnocentric* nature. For those being born on the lucky side of the *birthright lottery* (Shachar, 2009) – that is, in Western countries – the difficulties encountered by resident aliens in their daily life might not be straightforward as they are for someone who has already experienced what it means, today, to be living outside citizenship status. A further confirmation of this is represented by the number of citizenship acquisitions in Western countries, which has been everywhere in constant increase in the last ten, together with that of the number of people holding double nationality. This clearly witnesses that citizenship is far from being completely devalued in the eyes of migrants.



Figure 2. Total number of citizenship acquisitions in the EU27 (source: Eurostat)

To conclude this section, I would say that it is misleading to conceive the debate between post-nationalists and the rest as a debate between those holding that there exist new forms of membership parallel to the old, traditional citizenship status, and those who deny it. The real debate is rather over the question of whether such parallel forms of membership are really undermining the importance and primacy of formal citizenship. What is debated, in other words, is whether the "new" forms of membership which emerged as a consequence of the expansion of residence rights and of globalization have the same power (once) held by citizenship in providing their holders with the same possibilities of participation and inclusion into the society as citizenship status does. My argument above was aimed at showing that the weight of citizenship in terms of the opportunities of inclusion into society that it provides is still far from losing its primacy.

5.2 National, transnational or cosmopolitan belonging? Reflections based on the empirical study

The "membership *versus* citizenship" debate above was focused on the differences in terms of *formal rights* endowment that each of the two statuses respectively gives access to. Still, post-nationalists see the emergence of parallel forms of membership alongside the traditional, nation-based one, as not just a question of formal rights-endowment or of "status", but (also) as the result of the enlargement of the horizons for participation, engagement and solidarity beyond, below and across the national level (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, 353; Balibar, 1993; Isin, 2002; Isin and Nielsen, 2008; Sassen, 2008; Turner, 2008; Chimenti, 2011). Operating a fundamental distinction

between the notion of nationality and that of citizenship, where the first is described as passively inherited and the second as actively pursued, holders of this view endorse an understanding of citizenship as, rather than a "status", a set of "acts" and "practices" (Mezzadra and Ricciardi, 2013, 17-18).

Now, the argument of actual citizenship as *not* strictly coinciding with its formal status is connected to two, analytically separate claims. Both claims start from the same premise: that increased human mobility in the context of globalization has led to a fundamental blurring of national borders and of boundaries between what is inside and what is outside, ultimately conducing to a devaluation of the national citizenship category. Still, the argument develops in two separate paths. The first argument holds that despite their being excluded from formal citizenship status, immigrants are *de facto* members of the societies they have migrated to by virtue of their actual presence (Carens, 2009). According to this view, the exclusion of migrants from official channels of political participation (most notably, the electoral one) has not prevented them from turning into key political actors in domestic politics, ultimately leading to a reconfiguration of the notion of citizenship and pushing for a requalification of the democratic space (Balibar, 1993; Carens, 2009). I will call this *the transnational claim* because it holds that alternative forms of membership and belonging might exist *despite* territorially-bounded nation-states. The second argument maintains that globalization and deterritorialisation has led individuals to stretch their political engagement and solidarities outside national borders, in a much wider arena, with the important consequence of leading them to develop attachments, identities and networks of solidarity at the global level (Turner, 2008; Danahay and Brettel, 2008; Sosyal, 1994; Sassen 2008). I will call this *the cosmopolitan claim* because it holds that alternative forms of membership and belonging might exists *beyond* territorially bound nation-states.

While recognizing that both perspectives effectively capture some important aspects of reality, it seems to me that both claims are only valid in a context where national citizenship still maintains its overriding primacy over all other forms of membership. I do agree that the contemporary individual might hold attachments and feelings of belonging below, beyond and across nation-state boundaries. However, I believe that there is a lack of significant evidence about if and how those alternative attachments override national belonging. In other words, I do not see enough concrete evidence, in concrete empirical reality, that transnational and cosmopolitan attachments are, for average individuals, so strong in framing their system of belonging to the point of undermining traditional, nation-based membership.

My hypothesis about the persistent primacy of national citizenship over other forms of membership was confirmed by the results of empirical study presented in the this work (Chapter 4).

The study illustrated that, despite deterritorialisation, expanded residence rights, globalization, transnational relations, and a diffused rhetoric about national citizenship being in "crisis", citizenship still emerges as a powerful drive significantly determining individual life chances, opportunities, perspectives and self-perceptions. This is mainly because the reality of nation-states as bounded entities still plays a prominent role in individual lives as an inclusionary (or exclusionary) tool, shaping them through its material and symbolic barriers.

Sure enough, nation-states have lost their monopoly in terms of determining individual identities and solidarities. One can – and indeed most of us do – develop attachments and identifications below, beyond and across national borders. Still, those forms of *membership without citizenship* are still far from determining individual destinies as much as national citizenship does. The reality of territorially bounded nation-states holds persistent centrality in individual lives not only for what concerns their participation to social or economic life, but rather much more for what concern everyday problems and perspectives. In this sense, I might say that national citizenship is much more about one's own private life than generally thought to be, in that being (or not) formally recognized as a member of the society one resides in often still makes a difference in terms of perspectives, opportunities and attitudes.

Balibar on the one hand recognizes that citizenship still matters in as far as it represents the only valid passport for individual admittance to the *cosmopolis of global communications and modern market transactions* (Balibar, 1988). Still, on the other, he maintains (1993; 2008), with many others ((Kymlicka and Norman, 1994, 353; Balibar, 1993; Isin, 2002; Sassen, 2008), that there exists a clear distinction between the formal and the substantial aspects of citizenship – where the fact of being a holder of the citizenship status has nothing to do with the actual participation, identification and exercise of the "civic virtue". In my opinion, this argument overlooks the important role played by formal recognition – that is, citizenship status – in incentivizing the fostering of the more substantial aspects of citizenship. Based on the results of the empirical study, I would indeed argue that a strict separation between the dimensions of citizenship – the formal and the substantial – does not fully correspond to the concrete reality. Being formally recognized as fully-fledged members of the polity has a positive inclusionary impact not only at the level of material rights and opportunities, but also, and probably most importantly, on individual capacity to develop a sense of identification, belonging and caring towards that society. And this is even more important in light of the fact that most individuals who apply for citizenship generally initially do it for instrumental purposes – that is, most often, in view of the reduction of material and symbolic barriers to their membership to the society that follows the acquisition of the formal citizenship. Even if utilitarian considerations are generally at the basis for individual decision to

apply for citizenship, the latter appears to often transform, for those who have acquired it, from being a just tool for the reduction of the precariousness linked to being aliens, to then shaping their feelings of belonging and membership. In this sense, in line with what I could observe during the empirical study, being formally recognized as a citizen appears to help, facilitate and, in many cases, even incentivize the development of also individual sense of attachment to the country and the other aspects related to the more substantial dimension of citizenship.

In more general terms, I would therefore argue that all accounts of membership as either a merely sociological fact (presence as *actual belonging*), or as a purely legal and formal category (*status*) are equally partial and incorrect. Membership is better understood as a combination of the two elements – formal recognition *and* belonging. The two aspects are often in a dialectic relationship with one another, where each of them reinforces the other. This does not mean that I deny the existence of forms of genuine identification and participation *outside* formal citizenship status; quite the opposite. Rather, it means that, while recognizing their existence, I observe that those forms of membership for the most part *do not override* national membership, which still plays a primary – although not exclusive – role in shaping individuals' lives and identities.

In this sense, the empirical study I conducted sets itself in a line of continuity with those empirical researches that underline, for example, the scarce popularity of local voting rights among resident aliens (Danese, 2001; Groenendijk, 2008; Messina, 2006), which show that according more participation rights to aliens will not give good results in terms of their electoral turnout if that is done in the context of a restrictive citizenship policy (Gonzalez-Ferrer and Morales, 2013), and more in general, that naturalized citizens generally have higher electoral turnout than resident aliens (Groenendijk, 2008, 12). These empirical study reinforce my point that formal recognition – and the possibility of getting it – might indeed be a powerful drive for individual willingness to get involved in society. In this sense, a strict differentiation between nationality, as passive and hereditary, and citizenship, as active and voluntary, might not be as sharp as some scholars (most notably, post-nationalists) describe it.

In conclusion, to sum up my arguments *vìs à vìs* both the transnationalist and the cosmopolitan claims, I would say that while recognizing that there can exist forms of membership and participation below and above national-states, as well as that the fact of not having national citizenship of the country of residence does not necessarily imply not having any weight on the political, social or economic life of the country, it seems to me that national citizenship still has consistent importance in shaping not only individual life paths and opportunities, but also patterns of their identification, participation and belonging. In this sense, I have argued above in favor of a conception of membership that is neither purely formal (*status*) not exclusively sociological

(*presence*), claiming that it is the interaction of the two elements are not as distinct as post-nationalist claim, as indeed formal recognition might and indeed often does play an important role in fostering the more substantial dimension of belonging. Finally, I believe it is incorrect to see the emergence of new forms of identifications and solidarities outside national borders as elements that undermine national citizenship. Not only there is lack of evidence about the power of alternative forms of membership to really devalue national citizenship, but also, it might be the case that there are instances in which – as some empirical studies seem to suggest (Snel *et al.*, 2006) – they actually contribute to reinforcing it.

5.3 Why citizenship (still) matters for integration

Despite the rise of new and alternative forms of membership following the recent trends of expansion of residence rights, national citizenship still represent today one the most powerful tools for the integration of individuals with foreign background in their host countries. This is so because, no matter how extended the range of civil and social rights that noncitizens might enjoy as residents, national citizenship still is the highest standard of equal treatment (Bauböck et al., 2013), as it is only after having naturalized that individuals acquire full political rights, full access to employment, full free movement rights (including the right of defense from deportation). Becoming citizens is also the only way for resident aliens to secure rights that were previously granted to them but only under a conditional, reversible form, such as in the case of some rights of social assistance.

However, it is a mistake to view naturalization only under the light of the new amount of rights and benefits that it grants, as in fact the latter is not just a question of formal rights, because it also carries an important *symbolic* aspect. In giving individuals who naturalize the same rights and opportunities of all other individuals in the society, naturalization helps to foster, in the eyes of the general public, an image of newcomers as equal and fully-fledged members of the society. By naturalizing, individuals of immigrant origin indeed symbolically express, by an act of will, their commitment to the society that has hosted them, and their fundamental willingness of being part of it. This symbolic act often plays a significant role in fostering integration social cohesion.

Naturalization has been observed as carrying important positive effects also on the material and concrete aspects of the integration of individuals with foreign background. For reasons of data availability, the majority of empirical researches have focused on the consequences of naturalization on integration at the economic level. What has emerged is that host country citizenship acquisition generally has a positive impact on employment and wage levels of immigrants (OECD, 2010; Bratsberg, Ragan and Nasir, 2002; Chiswick, 1978). Similarly,

naturalization has been observed has playing a positive role in ameliorating individuals' "living conditions" in terms of housing cost burden, quality of housing and level of property ownership (Hutcheson and Jeffers, 2012). Finally, some studies have underlined the positive role played by naturalization in terms of access to credit (Albareto and Mistrulli, 2011)and even health (OECD, 2010). As for the impact of naturalization on the other, more "intangible" aspects of integration, such as participation, and social or civic integration, very little is known and more research is needed. Still, some studies on political participation in countries where non-citizens have access to local voting rights, there appears to be significant evidence that naturalized individuals tend to have higher electoral turnout that non naturalized (Danese, 2001; Groenendijk, 2008; Messina, 2006).

Now, for all of the above formal, symbolic and "material" reasons, both the receiving country and the immigrant individuals have a strong interest in the naturalization. The receiving country has a strong interest in preventing situations in which a large part of long-settled population is excluded from the democratic processes, in that such situation might cause serious problems of legitimacy and stability of the domestic system in the medium and long term. The immigrant, on the other hand, especially if coming from developing countries, has a strong interest in naturalizing in view of the socio-economic advantages that it brings as a consequence of greater equality that it gives its applicants.

If a country is interested in encouraging naturalization, access to citizenship has to be liberalized. A number of studies have underlined that immigrants naturalize more in countries that make it easier for them to do so – that is, in countries with relatively open naturalization policies (Bauböck et al., 2013). In a similar fashion, countries which openly encourage immigrants to naturalize appear to have higher immigrant naturalization rates than countries which display either a "neutralist" or an openly "obstructionist" attitude towards immigrant citizenship acquisition (Picot and Hou, 2011; Mazzolari, 2005). The case of Italy represents an emblematic example of this trend. As a country with one of the most protectionist naturalization rules in Europe, Italy displays significantly lower naturalization rates than the other European countries with similar immigrant population size but more open naturalization policies. Citizenship is indeed one of the few areas in which policies can have a direct and observable impact on immigrant integration (MIPEX, 2011), and therefore, they should be used strategically for reaching that objective.

The idea of citizenship as inextricably connected to a notion of "shared past" or "homogeneous identity" is no longer applicable to modern pluralistic societies (Castels and Davidson 2000). If the goal of social cohesion and of integration of long-settled immigrants has to be pursued, citizenship has to shift from being an instrument of exclusion and of preservation of old, conservative schemes, to become an instrument of inclusion on the grounds of the emergence

of new patterns of societal evolution. This is to say that citizenship is no longer to be conferred upon the judgment of a successfully completed path of integration; rather, citizenship should be used as one among other key tools to get the process of integration going.

Explicitly enhancing the role of citizenship in the process of integration does not imply that the border between rights of citizenship and rights of aliens must be reinforced. On the contrary, the process of the expansion of the rights of non-citizen resident aliens is far from being completed, as the gap between citizenship holders and non is still wider than what a healthy evolution of western democratic societies should allow (Benhabib, 2004, 135)[43]. Policy-makers should promote and idea of citizenship neither as an exclusionary circle, nor as the only path for being treated as equal, but like an inclusionary community being a member of which might add some value to individuals life experiences. To put it with Seglow (2009, 2), "states should encourage immigrants to naturalize, although (..) also leave them the option" not to do so.

No matter how expanded the contemporary residence rights' regimes, individuals who do not hold the citizenship status of their country of residence still often experience a condition of precariousness that derives from their not being officially recognized as fully-fledged members of the civic community. The condition of precariousness represents for many a powerful reason driving them to apply for citizenship. Still, membership cannot be defined in purely formal terms, because holding it often also facilitates and incentivizes the development of a sense of "being part of" the society – what may be otherwise called civic integration.

[43] "You may stipulate certain criteria of membership, but they can never be of such a kind that others would be permanently barred from becoming a member of your polity. Theocratic, authoritarian, fascist and nationalist regimes do this, but liberal democracies ought not to. (Benhabib, 2004, 135)

6. Immigrants' integration in the EU: a single, homogeneous model?[44]

The successfulness or failure of immigrants' attempts to integrate into the host country depends not only on the immigrant own characteristics (Portes and Mozo, 1985; Barkan and Khokhlov, 1980; Portes, 1987; Yang, 1994), such as origin, gender, ethnicity, country of origin, level of education and of income, but also, and probably even more importantly, on the institutional settings of the country the migrate to (Sosyal, 1994). The type of polity migrants encounter, and in particular its characteristics in terms of official models of incorporation and membership, are indeed generally considered as having a significant impact on immigrants capacity to integrate into that country's socio-economic and political fabric.

The broad question that this chapter aims to answer is whether the perspective according to which the institutional setting in the host country counts in shaping immigrants' chances of integration is still valid in the contemporary EU context of policy harmonization. The question, in other words, is whether European settings become so similar that reference to the particular, national models has become obsolete and useless. Is that the case? Is it true that, when dealing with immigrants' integration, it makes no longer sense to speak about national models? Is the EU really moving towards a single, ever more homogeneous, unified strategy of immigrants' incorporation?

The chapter is composed of three main parts. The first part (6.1) deals with national immigration regimes: it looks at the way they have been traditionally characterized (6.1.1) and underlines the degree to which those traditional models have recently been converging (6.1.2). The second part (6.2) deals more specifically with the role that the EU has had on such change, that is, with the particular ways in which the EU activism on the topic of immigrants' incorporation has driven the process of policy convergence on the matter. The third and last section (6.3) provides an answer to the question of whether is it still possible to speak about national integration regimes based on the analysis carried out in the first previous chapters.

Since it seems reasonable to expect that the higher the immigration rates in one country, the more salient the internal debate on integration policies, the following analysis focuses only on the EU member states that are most exposed to immigration flows (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain).[45] A review of the immigrant integration models of

[44]An earlier version of this chapter has been published as Silvia Cavasola (2011), "The informal Europeanization of EU Member States' immigration policies", *IAI Working Papers*, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1225.pdf

[45]Taken together, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy account for 75% of the EU total. When considering countries in relative terms, though, we discover that the Netherlands also features an impressive foreign presence, as the proportion between its relatively small population and foreign residents is higher than that of all of the above countries except Spain. (Eurostat, *Demography report 2010*, pg. 48, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KE-ET-10-001/EN/KE-ET-10-001-EN.PDF)

these countries is likely to provide significant insights on whether a progress toward convergence at EU level is taking place or not.

6.1 National integration regimes: patterns of change

Immigrants incorporation regimes in the different EU member states have traditionally differed to quite a large extent according to each country's national institutional settings and models of membership. There is evidence, however, that this is no longer the case today, in that a process of partial convergence of the policies of immigrants integration has relatively recently started to take place. This section will first look at the characteristics of the traditional models, and then point to the most significant transformation.

6.1.1. Immigrant integration yesterday: differentialism, assimilationism, multiculturalism

In the literature on immigration, national integration regimes are generally understood as lying on a continuum whose extremes are represented by "differentialism" and "assimilationism".[46] The former has traditionally been associated with the German model, the latter with the French one. Sharply differing in terms of citizenship acquisition rules and public conceptualization of minorities, the two have generally been perceived as competing alternative models, rooted in the history of each country (Brubaker, 1992).

Up to a few years ago, ethnicity was the discriminant determining access to citizenship in Germany. Only individuals with German origins were entitled to request full membership. This regime revolved around the principle of *jus sanguinis*, or the right based on parental citizenship.[47] In France, by contrast, ethnicity played a marginal role, as citizenship was (and still is) understood as a right accruing to people showing loyalty to democratic and republican values. The discriminant was consequently the place of residence, according to the so-called *jus soli*.

Broadly speaking, in Germany ethnicity represented an important tool to define immigrants residing on German territory. Members of minority ethnic groups were considered as not belonging to the country and legally referred to as "guest workers" (Green, 2001, 26-29). In France, on the

[46] While on the terms "assimilationism" tends to be generally accepted, that of "differentialism" appears to be more problematic. The latter has indeed been sometimes alternatively been called "pluralism", "multiculturalism", and "particularism". I prefer to use the more general "differentialism" because (1) the term "pluralism" could be easily confused with notions such as that of "liberal pluralism"; (2) I see "multiculturalism" as being a particular development of a differentialist approach, rather than coinciding with "differentialism" itself; (3) "particularism" seems to me too linked to the republican vs others debate which, although representing a fundamental part of the debate, does not coincide with it.

[47] This was the argument used in the controversy over Alsace-Lorraine against France: that most of the inhabitants of the region had "German blood". France, on the other hand, claimed that notwithstanding their German origins, most of those people "felt" French and was willing to be part of the French republic.

contrary, the very notion of "minority" was (and still is) questioned, as the state interacts with individuals directly, and not through their membership to a group (ethnic, cultural, religious, etc.). The French republican ideal considers individuals only in terms of their relation to the state (citizens vs. non-citizen), with no interest in their other affiliations.

Until some time ago, Italy and Spain shared with Germany the preference of *jus sanguinis* as the juridical principle regulating their regimes for granting citizenship. In both cases, the choice had its roots in a broader national strategy aimed to preserve ties with the vast number of Italians and Spanish emigrated between the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th. Naturalization on the basis of residence required long bureaucratic procedures. Better conditions to acquire citizenship were granted only to those who could prove blood ties (descendants of emigrants) or enjoyed "cultural proximity" (in Spain, for example, Spanish-speaking Latin Americans benefitted from such a privilege because they share "language and culture" with Spanish citizens [Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2008, 9]).

The Netherlands and the United Kingdom also preferred differentialist approach to the integration of immigrants. However, unlike Germany, Spain and Italy, in the two countries ethno-cultural difference was reason not for negative, but for positive discrimination by law. This particular kind of differentialist approach to integration is most often referred to as "multiculturalism". This variant of differentialism is based on a conceptualization of the individual rights of immigrants as inextricably linked to public recognition of their ethno-cultural affiliations, and the inclusion of strong *jus soli* elements in naturalization law.

As a particular kind of differentialism, multiculturalism has long been inspired by an opposite conception of *state neutrality* than that held by assimilationist France. Although both belonging to the broader liberal political framework, the two traditions indeed laid on two very different conceptions of *what kind* of neutrality the liberal state owes to the individuals residing on its territory (Del Bò, 2009).

In both cases, neutralism represented first and foremost an attempt to assert the priority of the right (that is, justice) over the good (that is, particular conceptions of which aims are to be pursued). The background idea was that the main task of the state was, rather than that of determining which beliefs are right or true, to ensure that they all (or almost all[48]) coexist peacefully within a scheme of social cooperation. The general, common idea of both kinds of neutralist liberalism was therefore that it is fundamental, in pluralist societies, to establish a neutral public

[48] The "almost" hints to idea that liberalism generally excludes those doctrines (or parts of doctrines) that it deems as being illiberal.

sphere, so that individuals carrying different conceptions of the good can live together peacefully, in the name of a guaranteed equal respect them as individuals.

Although starting from the same premise, the liberal-egalitarian neutralism and the French republicanism long diverged on their respective conceptions of what the "public sphere" is. The first identified it with the institutions: these provided the formal equality of all citizens in the name of a system of justice that is "blind to differences" (Barry, 2001). The second one, that is the French republicanism, expanded the notion of public sphere to encompass also the civil society, which has become, together with institutions, a neutral bearer of the values of the republic.

The two versions converged on the idea that laws should be designed not to favour any particular doctrine[49], but at the same time diverged on the issue of to what degree civil society should share the burdens of neutrality. This fundamental divergence was also linked to a different interpretation of the concept of individual political freedom. The liberal-egalitarians conceived of political freedom in the negative sense of non-interference (Berlin, 1969): it was portrayed as an off-limits zone within which individuals can act without being hampered by any restrictions. The republicans, instead, defined it in terms of the absence of any domination or dependence. The individual action was deemed to be free when such freedom did not depend on anybody else's arbitrary will (Viroli, 1999), that is, when it respected the norms of universality and it was aimed at fostering the public good.

The concepts of non-interference and non-domination both have a negative connotation, and therefore differ sharply, for example, from the democratic conception of freedom as self-government. Yet the two also differ among themselves in terms of depth: the conception of freedom as non-interference is very narrow, and therefore does not pose too many problems of definition, whereas the notion of non-domination is much broader and potentially open to different interpretations. Leaving aside the problem of the actual definition of this last republican notion[50], which is beyond the scope of discussion, it might suffice here to note that such different interpretations of the notion of individual freedom have had very relevant implications in terms of public policies.

[49] Del Bo (2009) underlines how this does not mean that laws must have neutral *consequences*: it could suffice that they be moved by neutral *aims* or *intentions*.

[50] This represents the heart of one of the most controversial aspects of republicanism: defining the concept of "domination", therefore circumscribing the possible number of sources from which it might originate. Some hold that defining "domination" (or absence thereof) can be done in an impartial way; other accept that such operation implies a partisan choice and attitude.

In the republican version, the absence of domination is deemed more important than the absence of interference[51]. Indeed, in cases in which state interference is motivated by a commitment to liberate the people from addiction, the latter is to be considered as legitimate. As a result, while liberals prohibit the imposition of any constraint apart from to those that protect the fundamental freedoms of individuals, the Republicans instead allow, and sometimes require, that constraints be imposed on the individual free will to overcome domination. A clear example of these different conceptions is represented by the policies embraced *vìs à vìs* the hijab in France and the UK respectively.

In France the principle of *laicité* has long been strictly linked to the idea of absence of domination in the public sphere. In 2004 the centrality of that principle was reasserted through a law banning the exposure of all "conspicuous" religious symbols from all French public primary and secondary schools, which prevented Muslim pupils and teacher from wearing the hijab. At the same time, the UK and the Netherlands the State approach on the hijab affairs was guided by an opposite perspective: that the private decision to wear the hijab or not was something that did not pose any significant challenge to the neutrality of the public sphere, and that therefore should be left as a matter of strictly individual choice. The UK indeed left individuals free to wear it in all public spaces.

The debate on what are the proper borders for the notion of public sphere has therefore traditionally created a clear contraposition between assimilationist France on the one side, and multiculturalist states like the UK and the Netherlands on the other. In the meantime, in Germany, Italy and Spain, the debate has been guided less by a comprehensive theoretical model, and more by a pragmatic approach based on notions such as that of security, social cohesion, national interest and identity. In particular, as discussed above, their approach has long been characterized by an exclusionary attitude towards foreigners with no blood connections with the country: ethnicity was conceived as a legitimate ground for exclusion. As it will be seen in the next chapter, things have been changing to quite a significant degree in the past few decades.

6.1.2 Immigrant integration today: patterns of convergence

Until around ten years ago, such categories as differentialism, assimilationism and multiculturalism still epitomized substantial differences among various national approaches. Policy adjustments occurred since then, however, have changed the picture to the extent that those categories have lost much of their explanatory potential. Today, integration regimes feature a

[51] Some republican authors actually say that the two are equally relevant. I will not elaborate of the internal republican debate here. I am just referring to the "mainstream" republican view, as it is expressed by authors like Petit (see Viroli,

notable degree of similarity, with scholars claiming that a path of general convergence towards a single and uniform model, namely the assimilationist one, is taking place (Joppke, 2007a; Entzinger, 2002).

A first observable trend is the inclusion of at least some elements of *jus soli* in every country's *naturalization laws*. France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have been pioneers in this shift. More recently, however, Germany and Spain have also shortened the period of residence needed before an immigrant can apply for citizenship. Moreover, both countries have simplified application procedures. In Italy a reform introducing some *jus soli* elements seems to be close to being approved.[52]

A second interesting trend consists in the introduction of *naturalization ceremonies*, in which would-be citizens swear an oath of allegiance and are formally welcomed by host societies. These ceremonies have been conceived of as a way to stress the symbolic importance, besides the practical one, of becoming a citizen. Participation in such ceremonies has been mandatory in the United Kingdom since 2004 and France and the Netherlands since 2006.

The parallel introduction of "*integration programmes*" is another significant element of convergence. Imposed on immigrants upon or even before arrival, these programs are a means to introduce immigrants to the language and culture of the host society (Carrera, 2006). Depending on the country, they are optional or mandatory, administered at the national level (Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Italy) or at the local one (Spain)[53]. In all cases, though, participation provides an important gateway for citizenship accession, and failure to attend them might increase the discretional power of the authority in rejecting the application.

Last but not least among the convergence trends is the adoption of *language tests* as a condition for long-term residence status (LTRs) or citizenship acquisition. In a written form in some cases (Netherlands, the United Kingdom), and oral in other ones (France, Spain, Germany, Italy), language tests reveal the aim to ensure that immigrants are provided with the main tool for integrating into the host country, an (at least) elementary knowledge of the local tongue. In the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands the examination also includes questions about the country's culture and lifestyle.

All of the above evidence points to an evolution trends of national integration regimes towards convergence on some critical aspects of immigrant integration policies. What remains to be

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2009, 30-31)

[52] Even the President of the Republic has publicly declared himself in favor of it (see for example http://www.corriere.it/politica/11_novembre_22/napolitano-politica-immigrazione_3dad5690-14fa-11e1-9140-38f81e7faa5e.shtml)

[53] Although in 2004 the PSOE (socialist party) has introduced a budget for integration programs also at the national level (see Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2008, 20-22) , the most relevant work is still being done at the regional level.

seen is whether the EU can be considered as the main actor imparting such a centripetal drive onto national policies of immigrant integration.

6.2 The impact of the EU

The last fifteen years have witnessed an unprecedented growth of activism on migration issues on the part of the European Union (EU). The timing comes as no surprise, as the period has coincided with a massive intensification of migration flows towards the Union. The steady growth of both legal and illegal entrances into the territory of EU member states has constructed the perception of immigration as one of the crucial challenges of the century, the management of which requires the development of new tools and frameworks of action.

Starting from the 1999 European Council in Tampere, Finland, attention has been devoted to a specific category of immigrants, the *long-term residents*. Providing for their integration in host societies has been considered a priority both for an effective protection of their rights as well as for social cohesion.

Since Tampere, the European Union has accordingly been trying to produce a common and coherent framework for action on the matter. In the meantime, however, the member states have continued to develop their own immigration policies. The specific ways in which each of them has done so are often referred to as models or regimes of integration, such as the "assimilationist" model and the "multiculturalist" ones.

These different approaches are rooted in historical legacies as well as political, economic and social factors, and therefore have historically tended to vary across member states. Recent developments show that some degree of convergence has nonetheless occurred. What remains to be assessed are the extent and the causes of such convergence. Is the European Union acting as a centripetal force driving member states towards a shared integration policy framework? Are we witnessing the emergence of something like a European model of integration?

6.2.1 EU activism

The 1999 European Council in Tampere was the first to formalize the idea that immigrants had to be greater guarantee of their basic rights:

> The European Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. (EU Council, 1999)

The Tampere plan on immigrant integration revolved around three main principles. The first one was that the EU should *guarantee freedom and security* to all individuals residing on its territory – EU citizens as well as third country nationals legally residing on the territory of the member states. *Non-discrimination*, that is, the possibility for residents to take active part in the economic and social life of host societies. was the second principle. The third principle concerned the *legal status of long-term residents*. For this particular category of individuals, the Council prescribed the recognition of a special status, that was to be approximated to that of member state nationals, as well as the possibility to acquire citizenship of the hosting member state (EU Council, 1999).

The three principles were reasserted and integrated in several occasions. In 2002 the European Council in Seville called for a redoubling of efforts aimed at developing a consistent policy for the integration of lawfully resident immigrants (EU Council, 2002). In 2003 the European Council in Thessaloniki called on the Commission to present an annual report on the integration of immigrants in Europe, and urged the establishment of common basic principles for integration (EU Council, 2004). Such basic principles were laid down the following year in Brussels[54]. They consist of eleven very broad points meant to "assist Member States in formulating integration policies by offering them a simple non-binding but thoughtful guide" (JHA, 2004, 19). Much emphasis has been put on the idea of *integration as a two-way process*, warranting efforts on immigrants, who are required to learn and subscribe to the core values of the EU, as well as on host societies, which are expected to open up space for accommodating the needs and legitimate demands of the newcomers.

In 2005, the EU launched the five-year Hague action plan on immigration (COM, 2005). Integration of immigrants featured high in the agenda. A fund for integration was instituted, with the recommendation to member states to develop language and civic orientation courses for immigrants. When the Hague plan expired, a new multi-year scheme for the 2010-2015 period was worked out in Stockholm.[55] The Stockholm plan restated the crucial role of member state language services, while insisting that integration efforts should be made in all areas of public and social life.

When attempting to assess the impact of the EU on national integration regimes, it is essential to note that all EU initiatives on the matter pertain to a policy area that the Treaty of Lisbon refers to as one "of shared competence".[56] National policy-making should be restricted to areas in which the Union has not previously exercised its competence, meaning that, at least in theory, the EU has

[54] European Council, Brussels, 19 November 2004.
[55] "The Stockholm Program", in *Official Journal* (C115), September 2005, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:01:EN:HTML
[56] Lisbon Treaty, I/2a/2, p.51, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML

a large room for manoeuvre in this field. However, a closer look at the nature of EU initiatives reveals that in very few cases only has the EU been able to make full use of its powers.

Of the rare cases in which the EU has succeeded in spearheading policy reform in immigrant integration the Council Directives of 2003 and 2005 are definitely worth a mention. The former instituted automatically long-term residence permits for individuals having resided for 5 years (Directive, 2003), while the latter laid down the basic rules for granting the right to family reunification.[57] These achievements, however, are more the exception than the rule. Most of the time the EU has limited itself to playing and advisory role only, with progress dependent on the goodwill of member states.

There are several reasons behind the modest nature of the EU's role in shaping national integration regimes. The first such reason is the lack of enforcement power, then the vagueness of its guidelines, and finally the absence of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

Due to the *lack of enforcement powers*, then, EU principles have no concrete legal force. EU guidelines are structured as non-binding measures aimed to assist member states in defining their own policies. The guidelines are formulated as (very) general principles from which national policy-makers can (but also cannot) draw inspiration. The fact that neither the Commission nor the European Parliament (EP) have any significant role makes it easier for the member states to act independently from one another

The second reason for the EU's limited impact lies in the *vagueness of EU guidelines*. Documents produced in the framework of EU Council meetings contain neither rules nor policy priorities, but rather broad ideas that should stand in the background of policy formulation. The notion of integration as a two-way process is exemplary in this regard (EU Council, 1999). The EU has provided no specification of how such mutual effort should be translated into practice, and not even of how it should be understood. The result is that the room for interpretation is so large as to make the recommendation void in practice.

Another factor reducing EU impact on national integration policies is its *dependence on the member states' best practices*. Interstate exchange of experiences and practices is explicitly called for in all EU documents as a method for promoting progress in integration policies.[58] The praise of best practices emulation, however, remains on an abstract level, as no specific best practices worthy of emulation are singled out. Thus, there is no guarantee that national integration programs stay in the direction (vaguely) indicated by the EU (Carrera, 2006, 19-20). States are encouraged to draw

[57] Even though the adopted Directive 2003/86/EC is now being challenged by the European Parliament before the European Court of Justice

[58] See for example European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, par. A/III/18. See also "The Stockholm Program", in *Official Journal* (C115), 2005, par. 6.1.5.

examples from other states' practices, irrespective of whether such practices feature elements that some would call illiberal.[59]

Both vagueness and reliance on best practices are closely related to another problem accounting for the European Union's lack of incisiveness: the difficulty of working out *effective monitoring mechanisms*. The vaguer the goals, the harder it is to determine whether or to what extent they have been achieved. No EU monitoring body has been created to this end.[60] The Union even struggles to ascertain that the financial resources it allocates to support national integration schemes are used in keeping with its guidelines. The 2004 fund for integration, for instance, is not subjected to any review procedure despite the fact that it represents a major financial source for national governments to develop their immigration regimes (Carrera, 2006).

In sum, in spite of unprecedented (and growing) involvement on integration matters in the last fifteen years, the European Union has only had a limited impact on national integration policies. For the most part, the limits are self-imposed. The lack of enforcement powers is obviously a major factor explaining the modesty of the EU's role, but it is hardly the only one. The structuring of EU propositions, which are painfully vague and lack originality (dependence on state practices), ultimately undermines EU efforts to generate a centripetal drive towards convergence. While the EU has achieved some results, notably regarding the status of third country nationals, its impact on the shaping of national approaches to immigrant integration remains modest.

6.3 Can we still speak of national models?

The analysis above leads to the conclusion that the European Union can hardly be considered a crucial actor in orientating national policies of immigrant integration towards convergence. Still, convergence has taken place in a number of related areas, from naturalization law to integration programmes, citizenship ceremonies and language tests. What to make of this? What is the force behind policy convergence in such countries as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy?

The answer is *interstate learning and emulation* (something strongly recommended by the European Union, although in too vague terms for such a recommendation to be consider of any real impact). Since the early 2000s there has been a progressive increase in exchanges of experiences and best practices among EU states. Cross-national policy reports and international conferences on integration public discourse delving deep into to the experiences of individual member states have

[59] For example the introduction of civic and language courses, mandatory for immigrants upon or before arrival. (Joppke, 2007a).
[60] Except for the FRA, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (regulation EC No 168/2007) , which however is more of a human rights agency.

become ever more frequent.[61] Assessing achievements and failures of national immigration policies is now a standard practice for national policy-makers involved in reviewing and upgrading their own strategies.

Technically, this practice of emulation (Bennett, 1991) is referred to "voluntary policy transfer" (Dolowitz, 1996). The definition points to a phenomenon by which evidence about the positive or negative results of existing policies or administrative arrangements in one time and/or place are made use of as lessons in the development of policies or administrative arrangements in another time and/or place (Dolowitz, 1996, 344). The process is often driven by policy failure.

The cases of Germany and the United Kingdom provide evidence that this process can work from both ends of the differentialism-assimilationism continuum. Whereas in Germany failure to integrate the large Turkish community has led to the relaxation of the terms for citizenship application, in the United Kingdom the process of citizenship acquisition has been toughened through the introduction of the language and culture test aimed at containing the progressive ghettoization of British society.

As recalled above, the European Union has encouraged interstate learning process in most of its official documents. Yet, the Union has also failed to define what is to be considered as a "best practice", and to spell out which type of initiatives it would sponsor.[62] Convergence has therefore not been the product of an EU-led process of harmonization, motivated by a recognition of interdependence of each member state on one another in the matter of immigrant integration. Nor has it been the consequence of a process of penetration, in which failure to conform to a common model produces externalities (Bennett, 1991).

The introduction of similar or common measures in previously different integration regimes is better understood as a process of *informal Europeanization*. If by formal Europeanization we mean the conformation of EU member states to EU directives, the informal nature of the convergence phenomenon lies in the fact that convergence has neither been planned by EU institutions nor enforced by them. The outcome hinges on the emergence of similar challenges in all countries considered in this paper.

The question arises whether today it still makes sense to talk about national regimes . Does convergence justify the dismissal of the whole idea of "national integration regimes" in favour of something like a "European integrationist model of integration"? For the time being, the answer is

[61] An emblematic example is the debate on multiculturalism, which from 2001 featured a cross-national dialogue involving France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands. See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-had-failed.html

[62] For example, there is hardly any trace of the idea of "integration as a two-way process" in any of the analyzed countries initiatives on integration (integration programs, language and culture tests).

no. Convergence has only affected some aspects of immigrant integration policies. More structural elements concerning permanent residents, such as voting rights, the possibility to run for public offices and to enrol as civil servant, continue to differ significantly across EU member states.

Sure enough, the clear-cut opposition between integration models (assimilationism vs. multiculturalism/differentialism) has become obsolete. It is no longer possible to talk about "pure" models, as some of their main defining characteristics are no longer there (for instance, the *jus sanguinis* is no longer the unique element of naturalization law in differentialist regimes). More caution is needed then when categorizing integration regimes. Nonetheless, the differences between national integration regimes are still such that it is not possible to speak of a uniform European model of immigrant integration. Convergence is best understood as the overlapping of some marginal elements of each country's integration regimes, which does not allow for dismissing differentiations between the various national cases.

Hence, standard classifications of national integration regimes are in need of amendment, not replacement or elimination. In the last fifteen years the phenomenon of convergence has broadly reflected similar circumstances. While it is reasonable to expect that EU member states will continue to be confronted with common challenges, their domestic conditions – particularly of members of the crisis-ridden Eurozone – are so different that divergence patterns are as likely to emerge as convergence ones. The crux of an *informal* Europeanization process is after all precisely that of being more prone to setbacks and reversal.

7. Conclusions

Empirical research about the role of citizenship in the process of integration of immigrants can move into two, main, distinctive directions. On the one hand, it can focus on citizenship *policies*, and attempt to decide which citizenship policies work best for the objective of immigrant inclusion by looking at the divergences in results that different such policies produce in multiple contexts and/or times. On the other hand, it can focus on citizenship *itself*, and therefore attempt to understand the value and weight that citizenship has for the individuals who pick it up as opposed to for those who do not do it. The two research objectives are distinctive in that they require different methods of analysis and strategies of investigation (Ersanili and Koopmans, 2010, 776-7). This dissertation has been primarily concerned with the second issue, that of the role of citizenship in the process of immigrant integration.

The relationship between citizenship and integration has been here observed and studied at a single, given time, and within a single national context. The results of the study therefore say something about the specific mechanisms which still make citizenship a powerful and privileged pathway for alien integration into the host country, while remaining silent on questions such as how the relationship between citizenship and integration works within different citizenship policy regimes, that is, for example, in a system adopting a liberal citizenship regime as opposed to a more restrictive one. It follows that this dissertation represents a contribution not so much to the so-called "citizenship-as-tool-or-as-reward" debate, which focuses on which citizenship policies are more well-suited for the purpose of immigrant integration, but rather to the more qualitative research on whether citizenship acquisition positively impacts the process of integration of first-generation immigrants, and on the particular ways in which it does so.

The dissertation has been structured into six main chapters, plus an introduction and a conclusion. The six chapters correspond to three different levels of analysis: a theoretical level, an empirical level and an analytical one. The aim of the two chapters in the *theoretical* part was to provide a definition and a contextualization of the two main concepts that make up the research question and around which the dissertation is build, that is, namely, "civic integration" (Chapter 1) and "citizenship" (Chapter 2). The *empirical* level also consisted in two chapters accounting for the methodology (Chapter 3) and the empirical study itself (Chapter 4). The third and last part deals with what I called the *analytical* level, a part of the dissertation in which the results of the empirical study and a number of issues connected to them are discussed with a broader level of abstraction. In particular, Chapter 5 discusses the results of the empirical study in light of post-national membership theories, whereas Chapter 6 discusses the impact of the EU on member-states'

integration regimes, arguing that significant homogenization has not taken place yet. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 represent the core of the study.

Overall, this research finds that notwithstanding the pervasive effects on the economic, social and political life that globalization, deterritorialization and increased cross-country mobility have had on nation-states and on individuals living within their borders, citizenship is still a powerful drive in shaping first-generation immigrants' chances for civic integration into the host country. Taking a step further from the studies that have researched on the positive impact of host-country nationality on the more "tangible" and concrete aspects of integration such as, most notably, socio-economic integration (Fougère and Safi, 2008; Mazzolari, 2006; Bratsberg *et al.*, 2002; Steinhardt, 2008; Bevelander and Veenman, 2006a; Le Grand and Szulkin, 2002; Chiswick, 1978; Eurostat, 2011; Bauböck *et al.,* 2013; MPG and ISMU, 2013), the present research finds substantial evidence that citizenship is also crucial for what concerns the specifically *civic* aspect of integration of first-generation migrants. More in particular, individuals who have acquired citizenship have been here observed as having better records in terms of *two out of three* of the main indicators that have been used to operationalize the concept of civic integration, which are, respectively, the quality and quantity of social contacts on the one hand (horizontal dimension), and the development of a "feeling of belonging" on the other (subjective dimension). The one indicator that emerges pretty clearly as *not* being positively influenced by citizenship acquisition is what has been referred to as the "vertical dimension" of civic integration, which comprises individual knowledge and information about the institutions and their functioning. Civic integration in this area appears to be much more significantly determined by a high level of instruction of the respondent.

For what concerns the areas in which citizenship *does* have a positive impact on civic integration (namely, the horizontal and subjective dimensions), the results of the study illustrate that impact of citizenship is ultimately strongest on the second one (subjective dimension). Indeed, the data show that on a total number of 50 interviewed individuals, nobody scores well in the horizontal dimension *alone*: individuals who get the horizontal dimension right, always also score well in at least one of the other two dimensions; in the great majority of cases, the "other" dimension that is most frequently combined with the horizontal one, is the subjective. This result hints at the existence of some kind of special connection between the two, as if integration at the relational (horizontal) level was strongly correlated with the fact of having developed a feeling of belonging.

In light of the results of the empirical study, citizenship has here been ultimately described as one of the key factors encouraging aliens' civic integration, and most importantly, the development of a sense of attachment to the host society. This is so because the formal recognition

of membership that comes with citizenship acquisition seems to ease those material and immaterial barriers that make it difficult for the individual to experience a sense of belonging to the society. This is not to say that formal citizenship actually corresponds to an immediate cessation of all discriminatory practices towards the new members, which is hardly ever the case (Seglow, 2009, 788). Rather, formal recognition helps fostering in new members the perception that their demands are legitimate, therefore pushing them to make their voices. Citizenship ultimately reduces a sense of precariousness that many of the interviewed individuals of extra-EU origin have more or less explicitly described when talking about their lives as non-citizens – and it is precisely the reduced perception of precariousness that sets the basis for them to start developing an attachment and a feeling of belonging to the host country. This result is even more relevant in light of the fact that nowadays in EU countries long-term resident aliens are formally endowed with rights "as near as possible to those enjoyed by [EU] citizens" (EC, 2003, 109), in that it is even more revelatory of the symbolic weight that national citizenship still carries for individuals independently from the formal rights that it actually gives access to. This is to say, in other words, that no matter how similar the condition of long-term residents is *vìs à vìs* fully-fledged citizens, citizenship acquisition still marks an important step in the process of inclusion of new members for what concerns their chances of developing feelings of attachment to the host society, because it creates the conditions of reduced perceived precariousness that are indispensable for them to see themselves and act as members.

Another key question on the relationship between citizenship and integration that has been addressed in this dissertation, albeit somewhat more indirectly, is that concerning the *direction* of such relation. What comes first, citizenship or integration? Is citizenship an accelerator of integration, or it is rather the fact of feeling integrated that explains the decision to pick up host country citizenship? Not aspiring to offer a definitive answer to such a complex and multifaceted question, which indeed requires further extensive and *ad hoc* research, the results of the study carried here show that the sampled individuals who had acquired host country citizenship, only very rarely had done it by virtue of a pre-existing self-perception of integration and belonging to the country; for most of them, such feeling have started emerging after their having become citizens. Indeed, when asked about their reasons for choosing to pick up Italian citizenship, the majority of them appealed to explicitly instrumental reasons (having to do with material benefits deriving from citizenship), not mentioning any particular value-related motivation such as feelings of attachments or belonging in their explanations; at the same time, however, when talking about what citizenship meant to them at the time of speaking (that was in most cases at least some years after acquisition), a good number of them clearly pointed to questions of personal identity and of attachment to their

new country. This show that in the eyes of its beholders, citizenship did not have a symbolic value right from the start, but rather, it generally took it up a while after its acquisition. What this result seems to hint at is that the value of citizenship evolves over time in the mind of its beholders, from instrumental to intrinsic value (even though more research is needed on this topic).

My observations about the persistent centrality of the national citizenship paradigm in individual life oppose me to post-nationalists of various sort – and in particular to those, among them, who argue that national citizenship has lost all of its potential to shape individuals' life trajectories and identities. By exaggerating the role of contemporary trends such as increased cross-national contacts and mobility, these theories mystify the nature of globalization and of its consequences, as if global movements of capital corresponded to an actual equal freedom of movement and settlement across borders also for individuals who, as low-skilled and un-specialized migrants, do not correspond to the capitalistic conceptualization of the notion of "human capital". If we think of such category of migrants, which are most often treated as *unwanted* workers by the host-country authorities, it is indeed hard to conceptualize them as cosmopolitans or "world citizens", and this is so for two main reasons. First, because their condition most often is *not* the result of a deliberate choice, but rather of a stringent necessity to ameliorate their lives or even to survive; secondly, and possibly more importantly, because the "world" of which they are supposed to be citizens is filled with formal and informal barriers and discriminations towards them, which severely limit their concrete chances of participation to the life of that society, turning them more into tolerated guests than fully-fledged members. In this light, I find myself much more in line with scholarship recalling that human mobility is actually the "main stratifying factor of our (..) times" (Bauman, 1998: 2; Chenchen, 2014, 219), in that it represents a commodity that is "scarce and unequally distributed" (Bauman, 1998: 2). And it is precisely in terms of these profound disparities and stratifications among individuals who find themselves at different ends of the global capitalist value-scale, that the limits of post-nationalism as an empirical theory emerge most clearly, downgrading it to being a theory of mostly normative content. While not denying that the contemporary complex phenomena related to international migrations and its demographic consequences have produced new and parallel forms of citizenship, in this dissertation I have argued about how crucial national citizenship can still be for average individuals in a world that is still extensively organized according to nation-state categories.

My argument about the persistent centrality of citizenship is *not* meant as a normative stance. I do not mean this dissertation as a conservative defense of the old national categorizations on who is a member and who is not. Neither was this research aimed at defending the current status quo in terms of citizenship policies and legislation in Italy or elsewhere in Europe. Rather, its main

objective was that of understanding what is the impact of the current status quo in terms of citizenship policies on immigrants' ability to integrate in their host society – that is Italy, in the case of the empirical study conducted here. The focus, as specified above, was therefore not so much that of indicating the moral, ethical and practical concerns which should be taken into consideration while designing new public policies for citizenship acquisition, but rather, that of detecting how the relationship between citizenship and integration works within the current state of affairs. This does not mean that the result of the study are completely normatively-neutral, because on the contrary, they *do* present some broad implications in terms of citizenship and integration policies. Indeed, the fact that citizenship is observed and conceptualized as a powerful gateway for immigrant integration has led me to argue at different points of this dissertation that if the goal of integration is to be pursued methodically, it would be urgent to make the rules for citizenship access more open and transparent, and overall less subjected to excessive discretionary powers. Similarly, national authorities should move from neutralist attitudes towards third-country nationals' citizenship acquisition, to a regime that explicitly encourages citizenship acquisition for long-term residents.

To conclude, I would say that in a world like the one described by post-nationalists and cosmopolitans, unrestricted freedom of movement, of settlement and perfectly enforceable universal rights of personhood would probably turn national citizenship into a void container, with no special use or significance for individuals. In the contemporary real-life panorama, however, the only category of individuals whose situation *approximates* the one post-nationalists describe is probably that of individuals who, corresponding to the capitalist definition of "human capital" by virtue of their professionalization, high-skills or talent (including sports), are most often subjected to more flexible rules and granted privileged access to rights, opportunities and citizenship. Still, this is a condition that interests only a small portion of the much broader category of migrants. Average individuals in that category – that is individuals do *not* have the chance of being considered as "strategic" in terms of their potential economic contribution to the host country – do not receive the same soft treatment. It is for them that citizenship still plays a vital role in shaping chances and opportunities, as well as, by consequence, life trajectories and identity. To these individuals, the formal recognition that comes with citizenship has the power of lifting up those material and immaterial boundaries to their integration and effective membership to the society. Sure, citizenship is not *all* that matters for integration: other variables related to background, level of instruction, origin, beliefs etc. have to be taken in consideration when considering individuals' ability to integrate. However, the empirical study presented in this dissertation clearly indicates that, other factors being equal, citizenship *does* play a significant role as one of the main intervening factors determining the success (or the failure) of the process of integration.

List of tables and figures

Introduction



Figure 1. Foreign-born persons by country. Source: http://eudocitizenship.eu/indicators

Chapter 1

CIVIC INTEGRATION			
Dimensions	Vertical	Horizontal	Subjective
Relationship involved	Individual/State	Individual/Individuals	Self
Empirical indexes	Knowledge, information and participation	Quantity and quality of contacts and trust in others	"Feeling part of"

Table 1. Operational definition of civic integration

	Total Population	Born in non-EU country	% populat.

Germany	82,002,356	6,127,771	7.5
France	64,366,894	4,992,168	7.8
UK	61,595,091	4,603,792	7.5
Italy	60,045,068	2,984,091	5.0
Spain	45,828,172	4,057,197	8.9

Table 2. Data source: Eurostat, Demography report 2010



Figure 3. Self-employment rate by place of birth (years 2009-11). Source: OECD

Chapter 3

	Vertical dimension	Horizontal dimension	Subjective dimension
Questionnaire	Structured	Structured	Semi-structured
Empirical Indexes	Knowledge, information, participation	Contacts and trust in others	"Feeling part of"
N. of questions	20	10	Open
Evaluation	Quantitative	Quantitative	Qualitative + Quantitative

Table 3. Technical information about the interviews

Chapter 4

Table 4. Vertical dimension of civic integration: questionnaire

Vertical dimension: questionnaire

Q.1 What are the colors of the Italian flag?
- Red, yellow, blue
- Red, white, green
- I don't know

Q.2 Benito Mussolini was:
- An Italian dictator
- A famous Italian composer
- I don't know

Q.3 In which year did Italy turn into a Republic?
- 1861
- 1946
- I don't know

Q.4 In Italy, divorce is:
- Illegal
- Legal upon the husband's initiative
- Legal

Q.5 The relationship between Italian State and religion is:
- Catholicism is the official State religion
- There is no official state religion
- I don't know

Q.6 Homosexual couples are:
- Legally recognized
- Not regally recognized
- Persecuted by the law

Q.7 Italy is:
- A parliamentary republic
- A presidential republic
- A parliamentary monarchy

Q.8 Who is the current president of the Republic?
- Matteo Renzi
- Giorgio Napolitano
- Enrico Letta

Q.9 What is RAI?
- The public audio-visual broadcasting service
- The main Italian car industry
- An important brand of pasta

Q.10 What is the population number in Italy?
- About 60 millions
- About 40 millions
- About 90 millions

Q.11 Are you interested in following the socio-political developments in Italy?
- **Yes**
- **No**

Q.12 (a) Have you already used your right to vote in Italy?
- I have always vote/ sometimes voted, other not (for choice/protest)
- I have never or almost never voted (I am not interested in Italian politics)

Q.12 (b) If you had a right to vote in Italy, whom would have you voted in the last elections?
- I would have voted XY/I wouldn't have voted (for choice/protest)
- I wouldn't have voted (I am not interested in Italian politics/ I don't know Italian politics)

Q.13 Do you use at least two of the following media in order to keep informed about the news?
- Radio
- TV
- Magazines
- Daily Newspapers
- Internet

Q.14 Have you ever done one of the following actions?
- signing a petition
- participating to a boycott
- Sit-ins; authorized and/or unauthorized demonstrations; marches; strikes; flash mobs
- participating to a celebrative public ceremony
- using internet to actively express your political opinions
- other forms of political/civic activism (specify)

Q.15 What is your opinion about « technical » governments?
- Opinion X or Y
- I don't know/ I am not interested

Q.16 What is your opinion about the current Italian citizenship law?
- Opinion X or Y
- I don't know/ I am not interested

Q.17 What is your opinion about the « Lega Nord» party?
- Opinion X or Y
- I don't know/ I am not interested

Q.18 What is your opinion about the challenge of the overcrowded prisons in Italy?
- Opinion X or Y
- I don't know/ I am not interested

Q.19 Have you ever been part of one of the following groups?
- Political parties
- Labor group
- Voluntary work
- ONGs
- Civil society associations
- Religious Groups
- Virtual groups (Facebook/Twitter) for a social, religious, political cause

Q.20 Imagine you see someone abandoning his/her waste on a public beach/park/street. Do you think you would feel concerned (like you should do something about it)?
- Yes

	Name	Age	In Italy for	Education	Married to an italian?	Children born/raised in Italy	Citizenship	Total Scor	50% right
1	Orlando	49	26	A	no	1	yes	13	1
2	Richard	40	26	B	no	0	yes	3	0
3	Herminia	65	17	C	no	0	yes	8	0
4	Gilbert	45	26	A	no	1	No	18	1
5	Penny	45	25	B	no	1	No	6	0
6	Marcial	53	23	A	no	1	No	7	0
7	Cris	38	15	A	no	1	No	7	0
8	Zorah	63	26	B	no	0	yes	18	1
9	Adbellatif	63	16	A	no	1	No	7	0
10	Abdullah	39	19	C	no	0	No	5	0
11	Zouhir	51	16	A	yes	0	yes	20	1
12	Naim	50	28	A	no	1	yes	17	1
13	Klaudia	46	20	A	yes	1	yes	20	1
14	Emanuele	45	22	A	yes	1	yes	20	1
15	Elvin	46	16	A	no	0	yes	15	1
16	Maksim	60	18	A	no	1	yes	20	1
17	Halyna	45	15	A	no	0	no	14	1
18	Elena	51	17	A	yes	1	yes	20	1
19	Irina (1)	45	15	A	no	0	no	18	1
20	Irina (2)	50	15	A	no	0	no	14	1
21	Yaryna	37	15	B	yes	1	no	7	0
22	Lucio	38	15	A	no	1	no	19	1
23	Lylia	50	20	A	no	1	no	18	1
24	Lyudmilla	57	15	A	no	0	no	15	1
25	Marya	48	15	A	no	0	no	2	0
26	Michele	33	15	A	no	1	no	16	1
27	Nadya	47	15	B	no	0	no	9	0
28	Natalya	48	15	A	yes	1	yes	16	1
29	Olena	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	20	1
30	Vira	48	15	A	no	0	no	16	1
31	Wong	63	35	B	no	1	yes	10	0
32	Sii	30	15	B	no	0	no	3	0
33	Giovanni	56	27	B	no	1	yes	6	0
34	Inin	51	36	A	yes	1	yes	13	1
35	Zhun	65	31	A	yes	1	yes	5	0
36	Sarah	45	28	A	no	1	no	20	1
37	Li	34	16	A	no	0	no	17	1
38	Xiu	38	18	C	no	1	yes	6	0
39	Cristina	40	15	A	no	0	no	17	1
40	Roda	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	15	1
41	Eveline	43	17	A	yes	0	yes	15	1
42	Nadine	39	15	B	yes	1	yes	10	0
43	Lin	37	15	A	no	1	no	18	1
44	Giulio	46	24	A	no	0	no	15	1
45	Luca	48	18	A	no	1	no	15	1
46	Wong (2)	47	30	A	no	0	no	15	1
47	Khalid	36	16	C	no	0	yes	7	0
48	Andrit	33	15	A	no	0	yes	16	1
49	Adam	40	19	A	yes	1	yes	19	1
50	Nedina	40	17	A	no	1	yes	20	1



Figure 1. Vertical dimension: respondents who score >50% right



Figure 2. Vertical dimension: % of citizenship holders among those who score well



Figure 3. Vertical dimension: individuals who score >50% right by level of instruction



Figure 4. Vertical dimension: scores of individuals with an "A" level of instruction



Figure 5. Vertical dimension: scores of individuals who are married to native Italians



Figure 6. Vertical dimension: scores of individuals who have children raised in Italy

Table 6. Positive impact of different factors on a good result in the vertical dimension of the test

Positive impact of different factors		
Strong impact	**Limited impact**	**No impact**
• **High level of**	• Children raised in Italy	• Years of residence

instruction • **Mixed marriages**	• Citizenship	• Age

Table 7. Horizontal dimension of civic integration: questionnaire

Horizontal dimension: questionnaire

Q.21 How often do you come into contact with people with a different origin than your own in your daily life?
- Often/ pretty often
- Never/ almost never /not very often

Q.22 Here in Italy do you have a person you feel you can talk to about your most intimate and personal feelings?
- Yes
- No

Q.23 How many Italians do you hang out with out of your working environment?
- Some/Many
- Very few

Q.24 Among them, are there any that you feel you can trust?
- Yes
- No

Q.25 In general, do you think that one can trust most of the people who live in Italy, or rather do you feel that caution towards the strangers is never too much?
- I think one can trust most people in Italy
- One is never too cautious towards strangers

Q.26 In general, do you trust more people of your same origin/religion, or is that indifferent for you?
- Same origin/religion
- Indifferent

Q.27 How often do you experience problems in understanding what people say when speaking Italian?
- Often/Pretty often
- Never/ Rarely

Q.28 Do you feel like your origin is a problem in building relations of trust with other individuals in Italy with an origin different that your own?
- Yes (often/ in most cases)
- No (never/almost never/in exceptional cases)

Q.29 Besides work, in the last year have you had the chance to do at list one of the following activities?
- Sport
- Cultural or artistic activities
- Political activities
- Educational activities
- Linguistic activities
- Activities of professional update
- Charity activities
- Other similar activities (specify)

Q.30 Do your daily problems look to you rather similar or rather different to those of (other) Italians?
- Rather similar
- Rather different

Table 8. Horizontal dimension of civic integration: table of answers

	Name	Origin	Age	In Italy for	Education	Job	Married to an italian?	Children born/raised in Italy	Citizenship	Score	50% right
1	Orlando	Philippines	49	26	A	C	no	1	yes	6	1
2	Richard	Philippines	40	26	B	B	no	0	yes	6	1
3	Herminia	Philippines	65	17	C	B	no	0	yes	5	0
4	Gilbert	Philippines	45	26	A	A	no	1	No	8	1
5	Penny	Philippines	45	25	B	B	no	1	No	3	0
6	Marcial	Philippines	53	23	A	B	no	1	No	4	0
7	Cris	Philippines	38	15	A	B	no	1	No	5	0
8	Zorah	Morocco	63	26	B	A	no	0	yes	9	1
9	Adbellatif	Morocco	63	16	A	B	no	1	No	4	0
10	Abdullah	Morocco	39	19	C	B	no	0	No	2	0
11	Zouhir	Morocco	51	16	A	A	yes	0	yes	10	1
12	Naim	Morocco	50	28	A	A	no	1	yes	10	1
13	Klaudia	Albania	46	20	A	A	yes	1	yes	10	1
14	Emanuele	Albania	45	22	A	A	yes	1	yes	7	1
15	Elvin	Albania	46	16	A	A	no	0	yes	10	1
16	Maksim	Albania	60	18	A	A	no	1	yes	10	1
17	Halyna	Ukraine	45	15	A	B	no	0	no	5	0
18	Elena	Ukraine	51	17	A	A	yes	1	yes	10	1
19	Irina (1)	Ukraine	45	15	A	B	no	0	no	5	0
20	Irina (2)	Ukraine	50	15	A	B	no	0	no	4	0
21	Yaryna	Ukraine	37	15	B	B	yes	1	no	10	1
22	Lucio	Ukraine	38	15	A	B	no	1	no	8	1
23	Lylia	Ukraine	50	20	A	A	no	1	no	5	0
24	Lyudmilla	Ukraine	57	15	A	B	no	0	no	5	0
25	Marya	Ukraine	48	15	A	B	no	0	no	2	0
26	Michele	Ukraine	33	15	A	B	no	1	no	5	0
27	Nadya	Ukraine	47	15	B	B	no	0	no	5	0
28	Natalya	Ukraine	48	15	A	C	yes	1	yes	10	1
29	Olena	Ukraine	45	15	A	A	yes	0	yes	10	1
30	Vira	Ukraine	48	15	A	B	no	0	no	4	0
31	Wong	China	63	35	B	A	no	1	yes	7	1
32	Sii	China	30	15	B	A	no	0	no	4	0
33	Giovanni	China	56	27	B	A	no	1	yes	8	1
34	Inin	China	51	36	A	A	yes	1	yes	8	1
35	Zhun	China	65	31	A	A	yes	1	yes	8	1
36	Sarah	China	45	28	A	A	no	1	no	5	0
37	Li	China	34	16	A	B	no	0	no	7	1
38	Xiu	China	38	18	C	C	no	1	yes	7	1
39	Cristina	Philippines	40	15	A	C	no	0	no	2	0
40	Roda	Philippines	45	15	A	B	yes	0	yes	3	0
41	Eveline	Philippines	43	17	A	B	yes	0	yes	7	1
42	Nadine	Morocco	39	15	B	A	yes	1	yes	8	1
43	Lin	China	37	15	A	A	no	1	no	1	0
44	Giulio	China	46	24	A	B	no	0	no	6	1
45	Luca	China	48	18	A	B	no	1	no	1	0
46	Wong (2)	China	47	30	A	B	no	0	no	2	0
47	Khalid	Morocco	36	16	C	B	no	0	yes	6	1
48	Andrit	Albania	33	15	A	A	no	0	yes	4	0
49	Adam	Albania	40	19	A	A	yes	1	yes	9	1
50	Nedina	Albania	40	17	A	B	no	1	yes	5	0



Figure 7. Horizontal dimension: respondents who score >50% right



Figure 8. Horizontal dimension: % of citizenship holders among those who score well



Figure 9. Horizontal dimension: scores of individuals with an "A" level of instruction



Figure 10. Horizontal dimension: scores of individuals with "B" and "C" levels of instruction



Figure 11. Horizontal dimension: scores of individuals who are married to native Italians



Figure 12. Horizontal dimension: scores of individuals who have children raised in Italy

Table 9. Positive impact of different factors on a good result in the horizontal dimension of the test

Positive impact of different factors		
	Limited impact	**No impact**
• Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy	• High level of instruction • Years of residence • Age

Table 10. Subjective dimension of civic integration: thematic areas

Subjective dimension: thematic areas

(1) Country of origin and family:

- What is the current situation in your country of origin? Do many people decide to emigrate? Who emigrates? Why? Mostly towards which countries? What do they look for?
- Which particular city/region do you come from?
- Where does your family live?
- Has anybody else in your family decided to emigrate? Where?
- How often do you see your family? How often do you go back to your home country?
- Do you send money to your family? How often? How is the money generally employed?

(2) Migratory experience:

- Could you tell me your story of emigration from your home country?
- What pushed you to leave? How old were you? Which was your situation in that moment?
- Did you go to other countries before arriving here? Which ones? Why? How did you find yourself in those?
- What were some of the most important difficulties you had to face? How did you face them?

(3) Italian citizenship: reasons for having/not acquired it and opinion about its role in integration:

- Why did you choose to acquire/not Italian citizenship?
- In your opinion, does citizenship help in fostering integration? Has it worked/would it work for you or for others in your situation?

(4) Perceived prejudices and discriminations:

- How often do you feel mistreated or discriminated because of your foreign origins/religion? How does that make you feel?
- Have you already witnessed or experienced acts of discrimination or racism towards yourself or other people of foreign origin?
- How much do you think people act the way they do because of your ethnic origin/religion rather than seeing you as a person? How does that make you feel?
- In your overall experience, how respectful are people in Italy towards people of foreign origin?

(5) Evaluation of lifestyles and values

- What is your opinion about the way people live and behave in Italy?
- What are the aspects that you like/share and that you do not like/share?
- How, if in any way, has your life in Italy transformed your way of thinking and your behavior?
- How, if in any way, has your life in Italy transformed the image that you have about the dominant values in your country of origin?

(6) Identification, belonging and pride:

- How much being a Moroccan/Ukrainian/etc. has to do with what you think about yourself?
- How much all these years in Italy have shaped the image that you have about yourself? And to what extent is it instead shaped by your Moroccan/Ukrainian/etc. background?
- How important it is to you to live according to Moroccan/Ukrainian/etc. values?
- To what extent do you feel a member of the Italian society?
- To what extent are you proud of being a group member of the Italian society?
- Do you feel at home in Italy?
- Do you think of yourself as an Italian?

(7) Evaluation of migratory experience and expectations for the future:

- Overall, would you say that your experience in Italy is a positive one?
- If you could go back in time, would you choose another country to migrate to? Which one? Why?
- Are you satisfied with the expectations you had before leaving about living Italy?

Plans for the future: do you see your life in this or in another

Table 11. Subjective dimension: from qualitative to quantitative

Subjective dimension (quantitative): questions

(1) Overall, would you say you feel a member of the Italian society?
- Yes
- No

(2) Overall, would you say that you now feel at home in Italy?
- Yes
- No

(3) Overall, would you say that your feel proud, at least to some extent, about this country?
-Yes
- No

Table 12. Subjective dimension(quantitative): table of answers

	Name	Origin	Age	In Italy for	Educat.	Married to an Italian?	Children	Citizenship	> 50% right
1	Orlando	Philip.	49	26	A	no	1	yes	1
2	Richard	Philip.	40	26	B	no	0	yes	1
3	Herminia	Philip.	65	17	C	no	0	yes	1
4	Gilbert	Philip.	45	26	A	no	1	No	0
5	Penny	Philip.	45	25	B	no	1	No	0
6	Marcial	Philip.	53	23	A	no	1	No	0
7	Cris	Philip.	38	15	A	no	1	No	0
8	Zorah	Moroc.	63	26	B	no	0	yes	1
9	Adbellatif	Moroc.	63	**16**	A	no	1	No	0
10	Abdullah	Moroc.	39	19	C	no	0	No	0
11	Zouhir	Moroc.	51	16	A	yes	0	yes	1
12	Naim	Moroc.	50	28	A	no	1	yes	1
13	Klaudia	Alb.	46	20	A	yes	1	yes	1
14	Emanuele	Alb.	45	22	A	yes	1	yes	1
15	Elvin	Alb.	46	16	A	no	0	yes	1
16	Maksim	Alb.	60	18	A	no	1	yes	1
17	Halyna	Ukr.	45	15	A	no	0	no	0
18	Elena	Ukr.	51	17	A	yes	1	yes	1
19	Irina (1)	Ukr.	45	15	A	no	0	no	0
20	Irina (2)	Ukr.	50	15	A	no	0	no	0
21	Yaryna	Ukr.	37	15	B	yes	1	no	1
22	Lucio	Ukr.	38	15	A	no	1	no	0
23	Lylia	Ukr.	50	20	A	no	1	no	0
24	Lyudmilla	Ukr.	57	15	A	no	0	no	0
25	Marya	Ukr.	48	15	A	no	0	no	0
26	Michele	Ukr.	33	15	A	no	1	no	0
27	Nadya	Ukr.	47	15	B	no	0	no	0
28	Natalya	Ukr.	48	15	A	yes	1	yes	1
29	Olena	Ukr.	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	1
30	Vira	Ukr.	48	15	A	no	0	no	0
31	Wong	China	63	35	B	no	1	yes	1
32	Sii	China	30	15	B	no	0	no	0
33	Giovanni	China	56	27	B	no	1	yes	1
34	Inin	China	51	36	A	yes	1	yes	1
35	Zhun	China	65	31	A	yes	1	yes	1
36	Sarah	China	45	28	A	no	1	no	1
37	Li	China	34	16	A	no	0	no	1
38	Xiu	China	38	18	C	no	1	yes	1
39	Cristina	Philip.	40	15	A	no	0	no	0
40	Roda	Philip.	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	1
41	Eveline	Philip.	43	17	A	yes	0	yes	1
42	Nadine	Moroc.	39	15	B	yes	1	yes	1
43	Lin	China	37	15	A	no	1	no	0
44	Giulio	China	46	24	A	no	0	no	1
45	Luca	China	48	18	A	no	1	no	0
46	Wong (2)	China	47	30	A	no	0	no	0
47	Khalid	Moroc.	36	16	C	no	0	yes	1
48	Andrit	Alb.	33	15	A	no	0	yes	1
49	Adam	Alb.	40	19	A	yes	1	yes	1
50	Nedina	Alb.	40	17	A	no	1	yes	1



Figure 13. Subjective dimension: respondents who score >50% right



Figure 14. Subjective dimension: % of citizenship holders among those who score well



Figure 15. Subjective dimension: scores of individuals with an "A" level of instruction



Figure 16. Subjective dimension: scores of individuals with "B" and "C" levels of instruction



Figure 17. Subjective dimension: scores of individuals who are married to Italians



Figure 18. Subjective dimension: scores of individuals who have children raised in Italy

Table 13. Positive impact of different factors on a good result in the subjective dimension of the test

Positive impact of different factors	
Limited impact	No impact

• Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy • Years of residence • Age	• High level of Instruction

Table 14. Positive impact of different factors on the three dimensions of civic integration

	Positive impact of different factors		
	Strong impact	**Limited impact**	**No impact**
Vertical dimension	• High level of instruction • Mixed marriages	• Citizenship • Children raised in Italy	• Years of residence • Age
Horizontal dimension	• Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy	• High level of instruction • Years of residence • Age
Subjective dimension	• Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy • Years of residence • Age	• High level of instruction

Table 15. Respondents' score in the three parts of the civic integration test

	Name	Origin	Age	In Italy for	Edu.	Married to an Italian?	Children raised in Italy	Citizenship	For how many yrs	Vertical dimension	Horizontal dimension	Subjective dimension	Dimensions with "good" score
1	Orlando	Philip.	49	26	A	no	1	yes	1	1	1	1	all
2	Richard	Philip.	40	26	B	no	0	yes	20	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
3	Herminia	Philip.	65	17	C	no	0	yes	1	0	0	1	subjective
4	Gilbert	Philip.	45	26	A	no	1	No		1	1	0	vertical, horizontal
5	Penny	Philip.	45	25	B	no	1	No		0	0	0	none
6	Marcial	Philip.	53	23	A	no	1	No		0	0	0	none
7	Cris	Philip.	38	15	A	no	1	No		0	0	0	none
8	Zorah	Moroc.	63	26	B	no	0	yes	3	1	1	1	all
9	Adbellatif	Moroc.	63	16	A	no	1	No		0	0	0	none
10	Abdullah	Moroc.	39	19	C	no	0	No		0	0	0	none
11	Zouhir	Moroc.	51	16	A	yes	0	yes	15	1	1	1	all
12	Naim	Moroc.	50	28	A	no	1	yes	10	1	1	1	all
13	Klaudia	Alb.	46	20	A	yes	1	yes	9	1	1	1	all
14	Emanuele	Alb.	45	22	A	yes	1	yes	14	1	1	1	all
15	Elvin	Alb.	46	16	A	no	0	yes	1	1	1	1	all
16	Maksim	Alb.	60	18	A	no	1	yes	9	1	1	1	all
17	Halyna	Ukra.	45	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
18	Elena	Ukra.	51	17	A	yes	1	yes	10	1	1	1	all
19	Irina (1)	Ukra.	45	13	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
20	Irina (2)	Ukra.	50	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
21	Yaryna	Ukra.	37	15	B	yes	1	no		0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
22	Lucio	Ukra.	38	15	A	no	1	no		1	1	0	vertical, horizontal
23	Lylia	Ukra.	50	20	A	no	1	no		1	0	0	vertical
24	Lyudmilla	Ukra.	57	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
25	Marya	Ukra.	48	15	A	no	0	no		0	0	0	none
26	Michele	Ukra.	33	15	A	no	1	no		1	0	0	vertical
27	Nadya	Ukra.	47	15	B	no	0	no		0	0	0	none
28	Natalya	Ukra.	48	15	A	yes	1	yes	10	1	1	1	all
29	Olena	Ukra.	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	1	1	1	1	all
30	Vira	Ukra.	48	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
31	Wong	China	63	35	B	no	1	yes	15	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
32	Sii	China	30	15	B	no	0	no		0	0	0	none
33	Giovanni	China	56	27	B	no	1	yes	2	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
34	Inin	China	51	36	A	yes	1	yes	28	1	1	1	all
35	Zhun	China	65	31	A	yes	1	yes	25	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
36	Sarah	China	45	28	A	no	1	no		1	0	1	subjective
37	Li	China	34	16	A	no	0	no		1	1	1	all
38	Xiu	China	38	18	C	no	1	yes	5	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
39	Cristina	Philip.	40	15	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
40	Roda	Philip.	45	15	A	yes	0	yes	6	1	0	1	vertical
41	Eveline	Philip.	43	17	A	yes	0	yes	7	1	1	1	all
42	Nadine	Moroc.	39	15	B	yes	1	yes	3	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
43	Lin	China	37	15	A	no	1	no		1	0	0	vertical
44	Giulio	China	46	24	A	no	0	no		1	1	1	all
45	Luca	China	48	18	A	no	1	no		1	0	0	vertical
46	Wong (2)	China	47	30	A	no	0	no		1	0	0	vertical
47	Khalid	Moroc.	36	16	C	no	0	yes	5	0	1	1	horizontal, subjective
48	Andrit	Alb.	33	15	A	no	0	yes	2	1	0	1	subjective
49	Adam	Alb.	40	19	A	yes	1	yes	8	1	1	1	all
50	Nedina	Alb.	40	17	A	no	1	yes	5	1	0	1	vertical, subjective

Table 16. Respondents passing zero, one two or three dimensions by citizenship status

	N. of dimensions							
	Zero	One			Two			Three
	None	Vertical	Horizontal	Subjective	Vertical + Horizontal	Vertical + Subjective	Horizontal + Subjective	All
Citizen	0	1	0	2	0	1	7	14
Non-citizen	8	11	0	1	2	0	1	2

Table 17. Positive impact of different factors on passing ALL of the 3 dimensions of integration.

	Positive impact of different factors		
	Strong impact	**Limited impact**	**No impact**
All 3 dimensions	• High level of instruction • Citizenship • Mixed marriages	• Children raised in Italy • Age • Years of residence	

Chapter 5.



Figure 1. Brubaker's concentric circles of membership



Figure 2. Total number of citizenship acquisitions in the EU27 (source: Eurostat)

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